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Abstract
This study examines the associations between interlockings and auditor 
independence and audit quality. The type of interlocking relationships examined in this 
study are director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner interlocking, audit committee 
member interlocking, and audit committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking. The 
issues associated with these interlockings are important with regard to auditor 
independence and audit quality because links created between directors and/or audit 
committee members and a common audit firm/partner through other companies could 
raise questions about auditor independence as they could affect both actual and 
perceived audit quality. Auditor provided non-audit services fees, and audit firm 
engagement tenure with the current auditee are the two proxies for auditor independence 
(a component of audit quality) used in this study and audit quality is proxied by the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion, and the level of earnings 
management/discretionary accruals tolerated by the auditor.
The results indicate that director interlocking is significantly and positively 
associated with auditor provided non-audit services fees, which provides evidence of 
potentially impaired auditor independence. Director-audit partner interlocking, audit 
committee member-audit firm interlocking and audit committee member-audit partner 
interlocking are significantly and negatively associated with auditor provided non-audit 
services fees and thus no evidence is found that these relationships impair auditor 
independence. The former two of these findings are sensitive to whether these fees are 
deflated by total fees to the auditor.
Director-audit firm interlocking is significantly and positively associated with 
audit firm tenure, which may provide evidence of impaired auditor independence. In
contrast, audit committee member interlocking is significantly and negatively associated 
with audit finn tenure, which supports the proposition that interlocked audit committee 
members may recommend changing auditors more frequently, possibly as a means to 
improve auditor independence.
The results indicate that director interlocking, director-audit firm interlocking 
and director-audit partner interlocking are significantly and negatively associated with 
the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. Audit committee member-audit partner 
interlocking is also significantly and negatively associated with the likelihood of 
receiving a qualified audit opinion. These results provide evidence that a higher number 
of links between directors, directors-audit firms/partners, and audit committee 
members-audit partners reduces the likelihood of a company receiving a qualified 
opinion from its auditor. These results can be interpreted as evidence of reduced audit 
quality as a result of these interlockings.
The results from this study also document that director interlocking, director- 
audit firm interlocking and director-audit partner interlocking are weakly significantly 
and positively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Audit 
committee member-audit partner interlocking is strongly significantly and positively 
associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. However, apart from 
director interlocking, these results are sensitive to the inclusion of more extreme values 
for discretionary accruals. The results are much stronger for smaller companies and 
when examining income-decreasing discretionary accruals. These results provide 
evidence of reduced audit quality when there are more links between directors, and 
more tentative evidence for links between directors-audit finns/partners, and audit
committee members-audit partners.
Therefore, most of the results provide evidence consistent with impaired auditor 
independence and reduced audit quality associated with the number of links between 
directors and/or audit committee members and audit firms/partners in other companies. 
A personal relationship may be created when directors and/or audit committee members 
work together with a common audit firm/partner in more than one company, which may 
be an important issue with regard to both real and perceived auditor independence and
audit quality.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This study examines the associations between interlockings1 23 and auditor 
independence and audit quality. Interlockings are defined in this thesis as the 
relationships created between directors, between directors and audit firms/partners, 
between audit committee members, and between audit committee members and audit 
firms/partners through working in other companies. The potential issues associated 
with interlockings1 in the context of auditing are important in regard to auditor 
independence and audit quality because links between the same director and a common 
auditor may impair auditor independence (Davison et ah, 1984; Jubb and Houghton, 
1999; Jubb, 2000), which could affect actual and/or perceived audit quality.
A high quality independent audit is essential in providing reliable financial 
infonnation to users for their decision-making. The value of an audit report arises from
1 The terms “interlocking” and “interlockings” are used differently in this study. The term “interlocking” 
is used to indicate the specific type of link. However, the term “interlockings ” is used collectively to refer 
to: director interlocks (DLKS), director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS), director-audit partner 
interlocks (DAPLKS), audit committee member interlocks (ACLKS), audit committee member-audit 
firm interlocks (ACAFLKS), and audit committee member-audit partner interlocks (ACAPLKS) 
throughout this study.
2 In Australia, there is no restriction on the number of board memberships a person may hold. The 
Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) (2005) argues that the number of directorships that a 
person accepts should be limited only by that person's capacity to properly carry out the obligations 
required of each directorship on behalf of the shareholders. Australian directors may, and do in many 
instances, sit on more than one board of both listed and unlisted entities, thus creating interlocking 
relationships (Jubb, 2000). A number of studies establish the existence of director interlocking between 
large listed companies in Australia (e.g., Rolfe, 1967; Hall, 1983; Stening and Wan, 1984; Carroll et al., 
1990; Alexander and Murray, 1992). Using data from 2003, Kiel and Nicholson (2006) finds a large 
number of director interlockings in their study for ASX listed companies.
3 In the literature, interlocking directorates refer to any situation in which two or more corporations share 
one or more directors in common, and such multiple or shared directorships are commonly referred to in 
the relevant literature as interlocking directorates (Allen, 1974; Stening and Wan, 1984; Zajac, 1988; 
Mizruchi, 1996; Jubb and Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000). This occurrence is also known as multiple 
directorates and cross-directorships. When an interlocking director comes into contact with a common 
auditor across other companies on whose boards they sit, a director-auditor interlock occurs (Jubb and 
Houghton, 1999, Jubb, 2000; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). A director-audit partner interlock occurs when 
director-audit firm interlocking companies have a common audit partner from the same audit firm. A 
similar relationship can be created among audit committee members who sit on more than one audit 
committee, creating interlocks with audit firms and audit partners.
the fact that it is issued by someone who is, in fact, independent (Wilkinson, 1969; 
Wolnizer, 1978). Professional bodies and regulatory authorities express auditor 
independence in tenns of the auditor’s attitude of mind, freedom from financial 
indebtedness to clients, and freedom from personal obligations to clients arising as a 
result of business relationships with directors, managers and other officers in the 
organisation (Wolnizer, 1978; Chan, 2004; APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, 2006). Auditors should not only be independent in fact but should also be 
independent in appearance (Chan, 2004). To ensure actual or perceived audit quality, 
auditors are required to be and to be seen to be, free of any interest that is incompatible 
with objectivity (Chan, 2004).
An auditor’s joint provision of audit and non-audit services to audit clients is a 
potential threat to auditor independence, both in fact and in appearance (Chan, 2004; 
Hay et al., 2006). A long association between management and the auditor is also a 
major threat to the actual or perceived independence of auditors (Hoyle, 1978; Courtney 
and Jubb, 2005). When director interlocked companies are audited by the same audit 
firm, the tenure of that auditor is significantly longer than that of firms are not so linked 
(Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Ye et al. (2006) finds that lengthy audit firm tenure was a 
contributing factor that prompted auditees to purchase non-audit services from their 
current auditors. Therefore, interlocking associations may amplify joint provision of 
audit and non-audit services by the auditor, and may also foster longer auditor tenure 
due to the close relationships formed in linked companies as compared to non-linked 
situations. This may be seen as a threat to auditor independence, be it in fact or in 
appearance, and audit quality. To examine these issues in interlocking situations, this
2
thesis uses four proxies for measuring audit quality. Two of the proxies relate to auditor
independence and two of the proxies relate to actual audit quality.4
The first proxy for measuring auditor independence (a component of audit 
quality) is auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) fees, which is the most 
commonly used proxy in the literature (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Kinney and Libby, 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ruddock et al, 2004; Hoitash et al., 
2005; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005; Ye et al., 2006; Gul et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2008; 
Huang et al., 2008). The second proxy for measuring auditor independence (a 
component of audit quality) is audit firm tenure with the current auditee, which is also a 
commonly used proxy (e.g., DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Geiger and 
Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; 
Mansi et al., 2004; Courtney and Jubb, 2005; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Hamilton et al., 
2005; Carey and Simnett, 2006; Ye et al., 2006; Gul et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2008; 
Jackson et al., 2008).
The first proxy for measuring actual audit quality is the likelihood of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion by the auditor. An auditor may be reluctant to qualify'  ^ an audit 
report for one of a group of linked companies because the audit qualification may 
adversely affect the interests of corporate participants (Ball et al., 1979). An auditor
may also be reluctant to qualify the audit reports of linked companies because, in an
4 According to DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition, audit quality is a function of the auditor’s ability to detect 
material misstatements (auditor competence) and willingness to report discovered material misstatements 
(auditor independence). Jackson et al. (2008) uses two measures of actual audit quality such as (1) the 
propensity to issue going-concern report and, (2) the level of discretionary accruals.
5 This study classifies audit reports as either unqualified or qualified. Since the period to which the data 
used in this thesis applies, the word “qualified” has been replaced in Auditing Standard ASA 701 (April 
2006). ASA 701 uses the term “modification” instead of “qualification”. Modification to the auditor’s 
report refers to the following situations: an emphasis of a matter; a qualified opinion (referred to in AUS 
702 as an “except for opinion”); a disclaimer of opinion (referred to in AUS 702 as an “inability to form 
an opinion”); or an adverse opinion (ASA 701, paragraph 4, 2006). However, as the current study is based 
on data relating to 2003-2005 which predates the implementation of the above recommendations, it 
continues to use the term ‘qualified’ to refer to types of opinion other than unqualified as per AUS 702.
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interlocking situation, auditors may become compliant for fear of losing not just one 
audit over which an issue has arisen, but other audits that have the same director(s) 
(Davison et al., 1984; Jubb, 2000). Several studies use the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified audit opinion as a proxy for measuring audit quality (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; 
Choi and Doogar, 2005; Ahmad et al., 2006; Hay et al., 2006; Jackson et al., 2008; Lai 
and Gul, 2008).
The second proxy for measuring actual audit quality is the level of earnings 
management/discretionary accruals tolerated by the auditor. The issue of associations 
between interlockings and earnings management is important because accruals are 
argued to have infonnation content in terms of their ability to alert auditors to potential 
earnings manipulation (Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Jubb, 2000). The close association, 
familiarity and large stake of audit firm/partner and directors in linked companies may 
be used by management as an opportunity to manage earnings. Numerous studies use 
earnings management (discretionary accruals) as a proxy for financial reporting or 
earnings quality and hence audit quality (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Hoitash et al. 2005; Ruddock and Taylor, 
2005; Gul et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2008; Lai 
and Gul, 2008).
To examine the above issues in interlocking situations, this thesis uses 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed companies during the period 2003-2005.
1.1 MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The main motivation for this study comes from the increasing concerns of 
regulators in Australia and overseas regarding corporate governance, client/director-
4
audit firm/partner relationships and the debate surrounding auditor independence and 
audit quality after corporate collapses early this century (Ramsay Report, 2001; CLERP 
9 Act, 2004). These high profile collapses motivated to introduce the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) Act (2004) in Australia. This Act does not ban 
APNAS, however, it requires disclosing the categories of APNAS fees in the 
company’s annual report. It also requires mandatory rotation of the lead audit partner 
(but not audit firm) every five years for ASX listed companies. In the United States of 
America (USA), restrictions on APNAS and audit partner tenure are among the 
principal provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2002), designed to enhance 
auditor independence (Chen et al., 2005). In Australia, there was a controversial 
relationship between the management of failed insurance company HIH and its auditor, 
Arthur Andersen (Royal Commission Report, 2003). HIH paid more in APNAS fees 
than audit fees, which raised questions in relation to auditor independence and audit 
quality.6
The other motivations for this study come from the scant research on the impact 
of interlockings on auditor independence and actual audit quality. Interlocks create 
personal contacts and the building of personal contacts and networks by the audit 
firm/partner with common directors of linked companies should be valued and nurtured 
in “relational exchanges” (Jubb and Houghton, 1999, p.2). These interpersonal 
relationships might become close among the parties due to their frequent interactions 
and contacts, and these will occur more frequently for linked companies compared to 
non-linked companies. Due to these interpersonal associations and auditors’ knowledge 
about the linked companies through their provision of auditing services, directors might
6 In the USA, one of the most important issues in the Enron case was the large amount of APNAS fees 
paid to Arthur Andersen relative to those for audit services. While providing audit services, Arthur 
Andersen also provided management consulting, information technology and operational consulting 
services, which were argued to have compromised their independence (Holtzman, 2004).
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be more interested in engaging the incumbent auditor for non-audit services than might 
be the case otherwise. However, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services and 
its potential impact on auditor independence and audit quality is one of the most critical 
issues facing the auditing profession. In the context of APNAS and auditor 
independence, DeFond and Francis (2005) argues that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 
2002) provision that bans APNAS is at best misguided, and at worst politically- 
motivated. Their study also argues that
“ .........we also believe, however, that there are many important questions not yet
addressed by researchers in this area, including the following: Do personal 
relationships created by nonaudit services threaten independence? Are 
contextual issues such as the Finn’s overall governance environment important 
in explaining whether auditor independence is impaired?” (p. 6).
The arguments directed against APNAS fees are normally expressed in tenns of 
economic dependency and mutuality of interest (Wines, 1994). If APNAS fees become 
sufficiently important to the auditor in relation to an individual client or a group of 
clients, the auditor’s economic dependence on those clients may cause bias and a loss of 
impartiality and objectivity (Wines, 1994). While the fees for APNAS from individual 
companies may not be significant, total revenue from APNAS fees for an audit firm is 
likely to be higher from a family of linked companies than would be the case in the 
absence of such a link, which may create strong economic bonds between the auditor 
and the linked companies. Courtney and Jubb (2005) suggests that examining whether 
the level of non-audit services purchased from the incumbent auditor is contingent on 
the number of director-auditor links might add insight to the independence debate as it 
relates to the joint provision of audit and non-audit services.
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The impact of personal connections in exchange relationships has been well- 
established in the provision of auditing services (Pfeffer, 1994; Courtney and Jubb, 
2005). Seabright et al. (1992) argues that the auditor-client relationship relies largely on 
personal knowledge and trust and that these characteristics act as disincentives for 
clients to change auditors. The:
“examination of the determinants of tenure length may be as important, if not 
more important, than the determinants of auditor change to accounting firms and 
to concerns over corporate governance” (Courtney and Jubb, 2005, p. 5).
Both the USA’s SOX (2002) and Australia’s CLERP 9 Act (2004) address 
partner rotation rather than firm rotation. The issue of firm rotation has, however, 
received much public comment after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in the USA 
and H1H in Australia (Courtney and Jubb, 2005). There are concerns about the impact 
of familiarity with the client, whether positive or negative, on audit quality and auditor 
independence when auditor tenure is for particularly short or long periods (Raghunathan 
et al., 1994; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). DeFond and 
Francis (2005) argues that there is a realistic concern that mandatory audit finn rotation 
may yet be proposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They state
“ .......we encourage more research in this area. Since there is little research on the
effects of the ‘revolving door’ we encourage more research in this area as well” (p. 6). 
Thus, research outcomes that suggest an association between interlockings and longer 
auditor tenure may accentuate concerns over auditor independence and audit quality 
(Courtney and Jubb, 2005).
Auditing is a relationship-driven service with networks of personal relationships 
developed between managers, directors, shareholders and the audit firm/partner (Jubb
7
and Houghton, 1999). The interpersonal relationships between directors and/or common 
audit committee members and auditors of linked companies might create a conscious or 
unconscious tendency for the auditor to favour the relationship over professional 
objectives, which might affect the auditor’s ability to exercise an appropriate level of 
professional scepticism (Johnstone et al., 2001). If auditors are considered as economic 
agents who make self-interested decisions, the auditor's future economic interest in a 
client may affect the auditor’s reporting behaviour (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2006). An 
auditor may be reluctant to issue a qualification due to concerns that by qualifying the 
audit report the auditor may lose the client (Kida, 1980; Barnes and Huan, 1993). 
Several studies suggest that future research could investigate whether the audit of 
companies when common director-auditor links exist is of a different quality to the 
audit of companies when these links do not exist, and also that director-auditor link 
investigations can be extended to the audit partner level (e.g., Jubb and Houghton, 1999; 
Jubb, 2000; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). In addition, Jubb (2000) reports that director- 
audit firm links are associated with higher levels of absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. Jubb (2000) suggests that since the finding with respect to the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals was probably the most serious risk to auditor independence in 
the presence of director-auditor links, further investigation needed to be conducted.
The final motivation for this study comes from the increasing role of audit 
committee members in overseeing their entity’s financial reporting quality. Recently, 
significant emphasis has been placed on the importance of the audit committee’s role in 
the corporate governance of public companies, especially following the collapses of 
apparently healthy corporations that had received clean audit reports (Levitt, 1998). 
Audit committees should take an active role in overseeing the external audit and one of 
the important parts of this oversight relates to the independence of the external auditor
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(Levitt, 1998). Lam (1975) argues that the most important rationale for the audit 
committee is to enhance the independence of the external auditor and the reliability and 
credibility of corporate financial reporting. Seabright et al. (1992) suggests that the 
members of the audit committee may be linked with other boards (audit committees) 
and it would be useful to explore the impacts of these linkages on audit quality and 
auditor independence. Cohen et al. (2002) argues that audit committees are now 
required to be actively engaged in the auditor retention process, thus, research relating 
to corporate governance factors that influence auditor retention and auditor switching 
decisions are likely to be fruitful areas for future research.
In addition, Jubb (2000) suggests that some interlocking participants may be 
more influential than others, in particular the audit committee members. Thus, it is 
important to investigate the impact of interpersonal associations between audit 
committee members and the audit fimi/partner created through working together in the 
context of more than one company’s audit committee on auditor independence and audit 
quality. To date, auditor independence and audit quality investigated in the literature:
“tend to be theorised or measured at an impersonal or institutional level, rather 
than reflecting acknowledgement of the personal relationships involved in 
business decisions of this type” (Jubb and Houghton, 1999, p. 3).
There are few studies that have acknowledged the importance of the ‘people’ 
factor in the literature (Jubb and Houghton, 1999). Davison et al. (1984) documents that 
there is a significant relationship between the number of director interlocks of a 
company and the probability that these interlocked companies are audited by the same 
public accounting finn as the focal company. Seabright et al. (1992) examines auditor- 
client attachments (i.e. tenure) through relationships and finds that attachment of
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individuals (exchange partners and clients) primarily responsible for exchange 
relationships decreased the likelihood of switching auditors. Jubb and Houghton (1999) 
and Jubb (2000) examine director-audit firm relationships and auditor choice and find 
that there is a significantly greater probability of choosing the same auditor for a 
director’s interlocking companies. Jubb (2000) also investigates the association between 
director-audit firm links and audit quality and finds that director-auditor linked 
companies receive fewer qualified opinions and linked companies also report a higher 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. Courtney and Jubb (2005) examines director- 
audit firm links and their effect on auditor engagement tenure and finds longer auditor 
tenure for director-auditor linked companies compared to non-linked companies.
Prior research has, therefore, examined the effects of director-audit finn 
interlocking on auditor choice, auditor tenure, audit opinion and discretionary accruals. 
However, other types of relationships may also affect auditor independence and audit 
quality, such as director interlocking, director-audit partner interlocking, audit 
committee member interlocking, and audit committee member-audit firm/partner 
interlocking. These relationships are important issues to investigate, not least because 
the Ramsay Report (2001) states that:
“in determining whether an auditor is independent, all relevant circumstances 
should be considered, including all relationships between the auditor and the 
audit client” (p. 6).
There is evidence and the evidence is concerning, so further studies examining 
the associations between interlockings and auditor independence and audit quality are 
clearly warranted due to the lack of research of an association between interlockings
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and APNAS fees, audit firm tenure, audit opinion and discretionary accruals. To that 
end, this study addresses the following research questions:
RQ1: Are interlockings associated with auditor provided non-audit services fees?
RQ2: Are interlockings associated with audit firm engagement tenure?
RQ3: Are interlockings associated with the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit
opinion by the auditor?
RQ4: Are interlockings associated with earnings management?
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS
The contributions of this study are two-fold. First, the research has a number of 
implications for regulatory bodies and the accounting and auditing professions. Second, 
the results of this study enrich the existing empirical literature on auditor independence 
and audit quality. This study has the capacity to inform policymakers, corporate boards, 
and academic researchers on the need to consider the importance of promoting 
appropriate guidelines on the composition of boards of directors and audit committees. 
Specifically, the results of this study have the capacity to enlighten the related bodies on 
the importance of interpersonal associations between boards of directors and/or audit 
committee members and audit firms/partners in other companies and their effect on 
auditor independence and audit quality.
Furthermore, this study has the capacity to contribute to the debate over APNAS 
fees and the economic dependence of an audit firm on a client or a group of clients. This 
is the first study to investigate the role of interlockings and their association with 
APNAS. The findings will be useful to regulators, professional accounting bodies, 
auditors and audit partners regarding the joint provision of audit and APNAS and
1 1
auditor independence where directors, audit committee members and audit 
finns/partners come together through linked companies.
The findings from this study may also have important implications for 
considerations of auditor tenure and auditor independence because there are concerns 
that the ability to retain clients for a longer time period provides incentives for auditors 
to settle disputes in the client's favour; disputes that may otherwise result in the loss of 
the client (Ruiz-Barbadillo et a/., 2006). Prior research focuses on investigating the 
relationships between audit quality and auditor tenure. However, there are other 
dimensions of auditing and corporate governance characteristics that may potentially 
affect audit finn tenure. Findings of association between audit firm tenure and 
interlockings may contribute to the debate on mandatory audit firm rotation and auditor 
independence issues when audit firms/partners are associated with longer tenure for 
firms with common directors and/or audit committee members.
Findings relating to audit quality might be useful to auditors, regulators and 
users of audited financial statements in an interlocking environment where directors 
and/or audit committee members and audit finns/partners links are associated with the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. Findings relating to earnings management 
will provide evidence on the association between the discretionary accruals and the 
number of interlocking links, which has not been researched as evidence of audit 
quality. The findings from the audit opinion and earnings management produce more 
consistent evidence to support the view that certain types of interlockings are linked 
with biased financial reporting. These findings may support any future regulatory 
initiatives to prevent firms from appointing directors of companies with the same
7 Jubb (2000) provides evidence of association between director-audit firm interlocking and discretionary 
accruals, however, her study does not examine other types of interlocking links used in the current study.
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auditor. Alternatively, the results may support a future move to impose a “cooling-off’ 
period before a director can serve as a director of another company with the same 
auditor. These results can also be of interest to regulators as they support the mandatory 
rotation of audit partners required by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
(CLERP 9, 2004) and SOX (2002).
Finally, the findings from this study will contribute to the current literature 
through the evidence they present on auditor independence and audit quality issues 
when directors and audit committee members work together with the same auditor in 
other companies. The findings from this study offer at least two important contributions 
to the extant literature. First, this is the first study to provide evidence on how an 
interlock associated with having the same audit partner can lead to biased financial 
reporting. Second, while studies examining audit committee effectiveness have 
primarily focused on the effect of characteristics such as independence, expertise, and 
diligence, the current study is also the first to examine how the effectiveness of audit 
committees can be compromised by the presence of interlocked audit committee 
members. This is evidenced from significant associations between the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit opinion, discretionary accruals and audit committee member- 
audit partner interlocking.
1.3 ORGANISATION OF THIS STUDY
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides the 
conceptual framework and the development of the hypotheses. Chapter 3 provides 
details of the methods used to examine the research questions (hypotheses) and defines 
the test and control variables for each of the models. Chapter 4 provides a description of 
the sample, outlining the data collection procedures and the manner in which the
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frequency of interlocking is calculated, and presents descriptive statistics for the sample 
companies and for the interlocking variables. Chapter 5 provides the results of the 
analysis of the auditor independence models. The results of the analysis of the audit 
quality models are provided in Chapter 6. The thesis concludes in Chapter 7 with a 
discussion of the results, the limitations of this study, and suggestions for future 
research.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
2.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the conceptual framework for this study and explains how 
interlocking associations may affect auditor independence and audit quality. The 
conceptual framework depicts the expected associations between interlockings and 
auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) fees, and interlockings and audit firm 
tenure (AFTENURE). These are both proxies for measuring auditor independence. This 
chapter also depicts the expected associations between interlockings and the likelihood 
of receiving a qualified audit opinion (OPINION), and interlockings and discretionary 
accruals (DACC), which are two proxies for measuring actual audit quality. Finally, this 
chapter develops the hypotheses tested in this study.
2.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The value of the auditing profession is based both on auditors’ actual and 
perceived competence and independence (Ye et al., 2006). However, there are 
incentives that might induce auditors to compromise their independence (Ye et al., 
2006). Yq et al. (2006) argues that among these factors, the economic dependence of 
auditors on APNAS fees and also the personal relationships developed during lengthy 
auditor tenure have been alleged to contribute to the erosion of auditor independence. 
There are concerns for auditor independence in terms of the joint provision of APNAS 
because it can create knowledge spillovers that could lead to economic bonding 
(Simunic, 1984; Magee and Tseng, 1990; Becker et al., 1998; Larcker and Richardson, 
2004; Y q et al., 2006). This economic bonding may impair both actual and perceived 
auditor independence and audit quality because the audit firm may be more unwilling to 
criticise the work done by its consultancy division and lose lucrative APNAS fees,
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which may result in auditors being less likely to disagree with management’s 
interpretation of accounting matters (Khurana and Raman, 2006; Ye et al., 2006; 
Holland and Lane, 2008).
According to the theory of relationship marketing, a long-term association 
between the buyer and seller has the potential to bring benefit to both parties (Ye et al., 
2006). From the audit firm perspective, a close relationship, developed over time at both 
the firm level and at the interpersonal level, is an important marketing tool for the 
auditor to continue providing existing services with clients (Clark and Payne, 1994; 
Huntley, 2006). However, it is suspected that a personal relationship developed between 
auditor and client may create bonds of loyalty or emotive relationships, which will 
consciously or subconsciously impact auditor independence (Ye et al, 2006). There are 
also regulatory concerns that such close relationships and potential economic 
dependence due to joint audits and APNAS may have a detrimental effect on auditor 
independence and audit quality (Chai and Jubb, 2000; Ye et ah, 2006).
The current study uses two measures of actual audit quality. First, actual audit 
quality is measured in terms of the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion when 
it is deserved, which is consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981a) definition of quality of 
audit services as the likelihood of auditors’ discovering and reporting material 
misstatements in audited financial statements (audit quality is a function of technical
x As auditor independence and audit quality is hard, if not impossible, to observe, prior studies use 
earnings management surrogates (Menon and Williams, 2004; Myers et al., 2003), or audit opinion 
issuance (Defond et al., 2002; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002) as estimations of audit quality. Given that: 
“the financial statements are the joint production of both managers and auditors, the increased earnings 
management or reduced accounting conservatism may not be attributable to the auditor’s failure to detect 
and report errors, especially when the accounting procedure does not violate accounting standards” (Ye et 
al., 2006, p. 12).
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competence or the ability to detect misstatements and auditor independence9 is the 
auditor’s willingness to report such misstatements). The present study examines all 
types of qualifications (audit opinions that are other than clean) because “auditor 
independence is not solely defined in terms of the issuance of a particular type of 
modification” (Lai and Gul, 2008, p. 220). Lai and Gul (2008) argues that although a 
going concern modification is important, it is however, only relevant for firms that have 
a relevant problem (e.g., financial distress). Lai and Gul (2008) also argues that:
“for financially healthy firms, independence of auditors’ reporting is still an 
important issue and could be investigated by other types of modifications” (p. 
220) .
Prior studies also use auditors’ reporting opinions as a measure of auditor 
independence (e.g., Craswell, 1999; Firth, 2002; Jackson et al., 2008). The current study 
adopts the same measure and posits that if the auditors of interlocking companies offer 
the same level of audit quality as non-interlocking companies, then there should be no 
difference in the likelihood of issuing qualified opinions between interlocking and non­
interlocking companies.
Second, actual audit quality is also measured in terms of clients’ level of 
discretionary accruals, which represents the part of total accruals that is more 
susceptible to manipulation by managers and which is frequently used in the literature 
as a proxy for earnings management (e.g., Jones, 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Jackson et al., 2008; Lai and Gul, 2008). The current study posits that if the levels of 
discretionary accruals of interlocking companies are not different than those of non­
interlocking companies, then the audit quality of interlocking companies is not likely to
9 This study defines auditor independence as: “an objectivity, both real and perceived, sufficient to 
overcome conflicting self-interest incentives that might otherwise cause auditors to ignore, conceal or 
misrepresent their findings” (Ikin, 2003, p. 4).
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be different than the audit quality of non-interlocking companies. This study uses the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by using forward-looking modified 
Jones (1991) model suggested by Dechow et al. (2003). An important argument for 
using the absolute value of discretionary accruals is that auditors are concerned with 
discretionary accruals rather than their direction (Francis and Krishnan, 1999).
The current study argues that the relationships established between directors, 
audit committee members and audit finns/partners in linked companies may affect 
auditor independence and audit quality. This thesis uses agency theory as the concepUial 
underpinning of the relationships among directors, audit committee members, and 
auditors in the organisations and to investigate the effect of these relationships on 
auditor independence and audit quality. Under this theory, there are two types of parties 
primarily in the organisation: principal(s) (shareholders), and agent(s) (managers, 
directors, auditors etc.). Due to the separation of ownership and management in large 
organisations, the board of directors is appointed to monitor and verify the actions of 
management and protect the principals’ interests. Audit committees are established, 
under this theory, to provide assurance to the governing board that the organisation 
accurately reports financial information to internal and external users. The demand for 
auditing arises from the auditor’s independent monitoring role in the principal-agent 
relationship (Eilifsen and Messier, 2000). However, these monitoring mechanisms10 
may be influenced by interpersonal associations among the parties (directors, audit 
committee members, auditors/partners) by engaging together for more frequent and 
hence longer periods in the linked companies compared to non-linked companies. Since
10 Marnet (2004) suggests that “one of the key messages of the more recent corporate debacles is that 
excessive reliance has been placed on the roles of monitors in the traditional approach to corporate 
governance. The independence and impartiality of the monitors and gatekeepers cannot be assumed to be 
sufficiently strong to prevent significant managerial self-dealing and fraud. Findings from cognitive 
research, group decision making, and recent work on managerial power and auditor independence suggest 
that some of the traditional means to minimising the agency problems are flawed in their description of 
how individuals behave in real world settings” (p.280).
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agency theory assumes that agents are opportunistic and may engage in self-serving 
behaviour if opportunities arise (Ekanayake, 2004), consequences may arise for auditor 
independence and audit quality.
Agency theory assumes that directors are very powerful people in company 
affairs and this power is compounded when the same people serve on the boards of 
more than one company (Rolfe, 1967). The more directorships a person holds, the more 
likely it is that a director can directly influence corporate policy including the strategies, 
structure and performance of the company (R.olfe, 1967; Granovetter, 1985). It is also 
assumed that the board of directors is the first line of defence for shareholders against 
incompetent management (Weisbach, 1988). In a director-auditor interlocking situation, 
the large number of clients from interlocking links may work as collateral for auditors, 
which serves as an incentive for auditors to maintain auditor independence across linked 
companies. Further to this line of thinking, Mamet (2007) argues that members of the 
board of directors and external auditors are thought to care about their reputations, 
future incomes and their prospects in the job market, which may motivate them to 
maintain their independence in linked companies.
On the other hand, interlocking directorates may reduce the monitoring capacity 
of directors due to the time commitment aspect (McNulty, 2007) and a large number of 
benefits in linked companies. A director who has more than one directorship may have 
little time to look at issues carefully to provide constructive direction. Hunton and Rose 
(2008) suggests that interlocking (busy) directors are more likely than non-interlocking 
(non-busy) directors to compromise their independence in the face of restatement 
decisions. A director who sits on more than one board at a time enjoys more benefits11
11 There are also more likely to be more costs, e.g. stress, time deprivation, bad publicity in the event of 
malfeasance.
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such as financial remuneration, prestige and reputation etc. compared to a director who 
sits on a single board. In addition, directors generally wish to be re-elected, and might 
also wish to be elected to the boards of other companies (Mamet, 2004). Hunton and 
Rose (2008) provides evidence that independent directors, particularly, interlocking 
(busy) directors, might pursue self-interests when making accounting choices, if they 
believe they might suffer serious financial and reputational harm. Directors may feel 
comfortable in retaining the same audit firm/partner for a longer period due to their 
familiarity and close relationship with the auditor in linked companies. These issues 
may negatively affect auditor independence and audit quality.
Audit committee and audit firm/partner interlocking may also affect auditor 
independence and audit quality. Audit committee member-audit firm/partner 
interlocking may play a vital role in ensuring auditor independence and improving audit 
quality because members of audit committees may have more extensive audit 
knowledge due to working on more than one company’s audit committee, and tend to 
defend auditors in accounting conflicts and protect against financial irregularities 
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Ramsay Report, 2001; DeZoort et al., 2002). Audit 
committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking may create a perception of enhanced 
auditor independence and more reliable financial reporting among financial statement 
users due to the potential effect on the relationship between the external auditor and 
management (Gwilliam and Kilcommins, 1998). Koh et al. (2007) argues that 
independent and active audit committees and independent boards are important 
governance attributes for financial reporting. Epps and Ismail (2009) argues that 
stronger corporate governance (board independence and audit committee independence) 
mechanisms provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process and may be 
important factors in improving the integrity of financial reporting.
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In contrast, interlocking relations between the audit committee and the audit 
firm/partner may degrade auditor independence and audit quality due to their close 
relationships, which may develop over time with frequent meetings held amongst the 
linked companies. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) expresses doubt about the ability of 
audit committees to guarantee auditor independence and argues that if independence is 
conceptualised as a personal characteristic of an individual, the capacity of one group of 
people to contribute to the independence of another is questionable. In the interlocking 
environment of audit committee members, there may be a possibility that, given their 
increased duties in linked companies, audit committee members may face an overload 
of responsibilities that could adversely affect their performance. Audit committee 
member-audit firm/partner interlocking may also degrade auditor independence because 
the auditor may try to satisfy the audit committee members to increase the likelihood of 
securing or maintaining engagements in all or at least some of the linked companies. 
The familiarity and the likely close relationship of the audit firm/partner with the audit 
committee members, participation of the audit committee in the appointment, removal 
and remuneration of auditors, the content and extent of audit work and the auditor’s 
dependence on the fee revenue from the linked companies, may influence the 
auditors’/partners’ behaviour, which could decrease auditor independence and degrade 
audit quality.
Diagram 1 shows the associations between interlockings and APNAS fees, audit 
firm tenure, opinion and earnings management for this study. It shows that director ‘A’ 
sits on both companies, 1 and 2, and creates multiple directorates or director
12 Researchers also argue that the adoption of audit committees may be primarily symbolic (Kalbers and 
Fogarty, 1998; Beasley et al., 2009) and that the benefits associated with them are more rhetorical than 
substantive (DeZoort, 1997; Turley and Zaman, 2004). Turley and Zaman (2004) also argues that: 
“interestingly the auditors believed that audit committees are not effective and not powerful enough to 
resolve contentious matters with management” (p. 316).
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interlocking. If both companies are audited by a common audit firm, ‘X’, it creates a 
director-audit firm interlocking.1’ When a common audit partner, ‘P’, from audit firm 
‘X’ audits both companies, it creates a director-audit partner interlocking. Similar types 
of relationships can be created between the audit committee members and the audit 
firm/partner when concurrent membership of their companies’ audit committees
14occurs.
This study hypothesises that links between director and director-audit 
firm/partner in other companies are associated with APNAS fees and audit firm tenure. 
If interlocking associations influence APNAS fees and audit firm tenure, these 
interlockings may also affect the auditor’s decision about what type of opinion should 
be issued on the financial statements. Due to the expectation of higher APNAS fees and 
extended engagement tenure in linked companies compared to non-linked companies, 
an auditor may be less likely to issue a qualified audit report when it is deserved and 
may accept financial reports with manipulated earnings for linked companies.
The first and second hypotheses in each set of hypotheses below deal with 
director interlocking or audit committee member interlocking alone (i.e. without 
necessarily having a common auditor). For APNAS (Hypotheses la, d) it is argued that 
the business scan capability that multiple directorships/audit committee memberships 
bring help those parties evaluate the reputation of and potential independence issues 
with specific non-audit service providers. Hence there can be expected to be an 
association between interlocking and APNAS even in the absence of a common audit
13 Director interlocking companies may not be audited by the same audit firm, and if this is the case, there 
is no director-audit firm interlocking. To create director-audit partner interlocking, there must first be 
director-audit firm interlocking.
14 Audit committee member interlocking has not been shown in the framework because this study uses the 
same procedure to measure audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking as relationships created between directors and audit firm/partner.
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firm. Similar arguments can be applied to OPINION (Hypotheses 3a, d) and DACC 
(Hypotheses 4a, b). For AFTENURE (Hypotheses 2a, d), a different argument applies. 
In this case, since research shows there is a tendency to link common directors with a 
common audit firm, it can be expected (although not yet tested) that where different 
auditors are engaged across the linked companies, there will be a tendency to move to a 
common auditor, so affecting auditor tenure. The following sections develop the 
hypotheses of this study.
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
2.2.1 AUDITOR PROVIDED NON-AUDIT SERVICES FEES
A large body of empirical studies concerning the impact of APNAS fees on 
auditor independence argue that extensive fees paid to auditors for APNAS increase the 
financial reliance of the auditor on the client, thus reducing the auditor’s independence 
(Magee and Tseng, 1990; Becker el al., 1998; Larcker and Richardson, 2004). Audit 
firms that provide more APNAS to their clients are even more likely to be in a weaker 
position of maintaining independence towards their clients (Chai and Jubb, 2000). 
Interlocking relations can be used by auditors as an opportunity to sell more APNAS 
because auditor-client relationships are an important marketing tool for auditors to 
maintain existing service and promote cross-selling of APNAS (Clark and Payne, 1994; 
Huntley, 2006). Auditors may gain more clients and earn more APNAS fees from a 
family of linked companies due to interlocking relations compared to auditors of non- 
linked companies.
Joint provision of audit and APNAS increases economic bonding/dependence of 
the auditor and the relationship between auditor and client may become too close, 
adversely affecting auditor independence (Beattie and Feamley, 2002). This economic
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dependence may increase as the number of interlocking links increases. In other words, 
the involvement of the auditor in the supply of APNAS reduces the probability of 
truthful audit reporting if the APNAS work generates economic dependence and impairs 
auditor independence (Simunic, 1984; Schatzberg et al, 1996). Audit firms working 
with common directors/audit committee members in linked companies may establish 
close relationships with them. Ye et al. (2006) argues that a close relationship 
developed at both the firm level and at the interpersonal level is essential in the 
successful selling of APNAS. Interlocking directors and/or audit committee members 
may purchase more APNAS from the incumbent auditor and offer higher APNAS fees 
to create additional economic pressure on the auditor than would otherwise be the case. 
At the same time, auditor has more opportunity to cross sell of APNAS in linked 
companies.
Therefore, the first proxy for measuring auditor independence is auditor 
provided non-audit services (APNAS) fees, which is the most commonly used proxy in 
the literature (e.g., Graeme, 1994; DeFond et al, 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh 
et al., 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Hoitash et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Ye et al., 
2006; Gul et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2008). Prior studies examine 
the perceptions of individuals as to whether APNAS affect perceptions of auditor 
independence and some of them provide evidence consistent with APNAS provision 
impairing perceptions of auditor independence (e.g., Lindsay et al., 1987; Bartlett, 
1997; Beattie et al., 1998; Joshi et al., 2007; Huang et al., 2008). Other studies, 
however, report that APNAS provision does not affect perceptions of auditor 
independence (e.g., Firth, 1980; Gul and Yap, 1984; Pany and Reckers, 1984; Gul, 
1989; Hussey, 1999).
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A large number of studies seek to uncover the consequences of APNAS on 
auditor independence (e.g., Graeme, 1994; DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al, 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Hoitash et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2005; Ye 
et al., 2006; Gul et al., 2007; Cahan et al., 2008; Fluang et al, 2008). Graeme (1994) 
finds that auditors are less likely to qualify the audit opinion on a company's financial 
statements when higher levels of APNAS fees are derived, which is an indication of 
impaired auditor independence. However, DeFond et al. (2002) does not find a 
significant association between APNAS fees and impaired auditor independence, where 
auditor independence is surrogated by auditors’ propensity to issue going-concern audit 
opinions. Yq et al. (2006) investigates the association between going-concern audit 
opinions and APNAS and finds a significant negative association. Their results are 
consistent with the argument that APNAS are a potential threat to auditor independence.
Frankel et al. (2002) reports a positive and significant association between 
APNAS fees and the absolute value of discretionary accruals, which is also consistent 
with an argument that APNAS impairs auditor independence and audit quality. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) finds a significant and positive association between APNAS fees 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) reports that the 
poorly performing companies paid higher APNAS fees and that the payment of higher 
APNAS fees by these companies may threaten auditor independence.
Hoitash et al. (2005) finds a significant and positive association between 
APNAS fees and the absolute value of discretionary accruals and argues that the 
economic bonding is the primary determinant of auditor behaviour, which in turn may 
lead to a breach in auditor independence. Chen et al. (2005) investigates auditor 
independence in auditor-client negotiation over financial reporting issues and finds a
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significant negative relation between APNAS fees and the extent to which the client 
agreed with the auditor over the financial reporting issues. Their findings are consistent 
with APNAS fees reducing auditor independence. Gul et al. (2007) finds a positive 
association between APNAS fees and positive discretionary current accruals and argues 
that APNAS fees may impair auditor independence when auditor tenure is short and not 
when auditor tenure is long. Cahan et al. (2008) does not find a relationship between 
APNAS fee growth rates or the length of time of the APNAS fee relationship with the 
client and discretionary accruals.
Prior studies, therefore, report consistent evidence that higher APNAS fees 
impair auditor independence. The results of the current study will be interpreted in the 
light of prior studies. A significant positive (negative) association between interlockings 
and APNAS fees will be interpreted as impaired (enhanced) auditor independence 
because interlocking companies may purchase more APNAS or offer higher APNAS 
fees to pressure the auditor to work in their companies’ favour. The following sections 
develop the hypotheses related to APNAS fees and interlockings.
2.2.1.1 Director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner interlocking and APNAS
fees
The provision of non-audit services by incumbent auditors in linked companies 
may provide benefits for both auditors and clients. The interlocking auditor has 
experience and knowledge about the business of linked companies due to the provision 
of auditing services, and directors may expect that experienced auditors are more 
capable of providing superior, more focused and effective APNAS than other parties, 
which may motivate the interlocking directors to purchase more APNAS that might 
otherwise be the case. Appointing someone other than the incumbent auditor to provide 
APNAS for the linked companies could give rise to considerable setup costs and other
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risks (Ye et al, 2006). The setup costs include the costs of searching for an appropriate 
supplier, and risks include the lack of familiarity of the auditor with the business and the 
probability of receiving low quality APNAS, which comes from the lack of past 
interactions that demonstrate the supplier’s ability (Ye et al., 2006). Abbott et al. (2003) 
argues that the client’s management may prefer to use the incumbent auditor for 
APNAS for two reasons. First, management/directors may want to attain cost savings 
associated with using the incumbent auditors (Beck et al., 1988) and second, they may 
want to create additional economic pressure to allow management enough flexibility to 
attain its goals (Williams, 1988).15 Thus, directors of linked companies may purchase 
APNAS from an incumbent auditor for linked companies in order to reduce setup costs 
and increase the economic dependence of the auditor.
Alternatively, directors of linked companies may limit the purchase of APNAS 
due to their concerns over auditor independence (Lee, 2008). Prior research suggests 
that interlocking directors acquire knowledge capital by serving on more than one board 
and stand to suffer the greatest penalties when there are signal of monitoring failure 
(e.g., Keys and Li, 2005; Linn and Park, 2005; Srinivasan, 2005; Hunton and Rose, 
2008). Lee et al. (2004) argues that in situations involving the possibility of loss of 
auditor independence, there may be incentives for the entire board of directors to 
prevent such occurrences. CLERP 9 (2004) also requires that board of directors take 
responsibility for signing off that APNAS has not impaired auditor independence. The 
above arguments indicate that the number of director interlocks and director-audit
15 Marnet (2004) argues that “in the case of the Andersen/Enron relationship, it was the Houston partners 
who primarily dealt with this client. The compensation of these partners was significantly tied to Enron 
billings both for auditing and consulting services and Enron was likely the largest client of this office. 
Losing this client would have been catastrophic to the Houston office. The forces that can help undermine 
the independence of the firm are, thus, possibly magnified in the case of the relationship partners. The 
consequent threat to the partner’s independence and the resulting risk to the auditing firm’s reputation are 
foreseeable” (p. 273).
28
firm/partner interlocks may be positively16 or negatively associated with APNAS fees 
and that is why the following hypotheses are presented as non-directional:
HI a: Director interlocking is associated with auditor provided non-audit services
fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling for factors that are likely to 
affect APNAS fees.
Hlb: Director-audit firm interlocking is associated with auditor provided non-audit
services fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling for factors that are 
likely to affect APNAS fees.
Hlc: Director-audit partner interlocking is associated with auditor provided non­
audit services fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling for factors 
that are likely to affect APNAS fees.
2.2.1.2 Audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking and APNAS fees
As an independent and active financial monitor, audit committees have
incentives to limit APNAS fees paid to an incumbent auditor to improve auditor
independence and hence perceptions about the effectiveness of the audit committee
(Levitt, 2002; ASX, 2003). The audit committee should assess the independence of the
external auditors and report to the board as to whether the audit committee is satisfied
that auditor independence has been maintained with regard to the provision of APNAS
(ASX, 2003). Abbott et al. (2003) argues that an audit committee can either directly or
indirectly influence the APNAS purchase decision. Under the direct impact scenario,
the perceived threat to auditor independence could be enough for an active and
independent audit committee to actively monitor and influence the company’s APNAS
16 If a positive relation between APNAS and interlockings is found, it may suggest that audit 
firms/partners who face an interlocking relation may have a tendency to sacrifice their independence for 
APNAS fees.
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purchase decisions (Abbott et al., 2003). In the case of audit committee member 
interlocking and audit committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking, audit 
committees may limit the purchase of APNAS for linked companies to improve auditor 
independence (both actual and perceived) and their image as independent monitors in 
linked companies compared to non-linked companies. Abbott et al. (2003) reports that 
audit committees comprises solely of independent directors are significantly and 
negatively associated with the APNAS fee ratio (ratio of APNAS fees to total audit 
fees). This evidence is consistent with the argument that audit committees take action to 
limit the purchase of APNAS to improve perceptions of auditor independence (Abbott 
et al., 2003).
In contrast, audit committee members may recommend purchasing APNAS 
from the incumbent auditor due to the auditor’s familiarity and long established work 
experience in linked companies. Auditors also have frequent meetings and interactions 
with the members of audit committees in linked companies compared to non-linked 
companies, which may provide opportunities for the auditors to sell more APNAS to 
linked companies. The above arguments indicate that the number of audit committee 
member interlocks, audit committee member-audit firm/partner interlocks may increase 
or decrease APNAS fees, which may affect auditor independence positively or 
negatively and that is why the following hypotheses are presented as non-directional:
Hid: Audit committee member interlocking is associated with auditor provided non­
audit services fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling for factors 
that are likely to affect APNAS fees.
17 Audit committees may have these incentives regardless of interlockings but perhaps have more of the 
same incentives if there are interlockings.
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Hie: Audit committee member-audit firm interlocking is associated with auditor
provided non-audit services fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling 
for factors that are likely to affect APNAS fees.
Hlf: Audit committee member-audit partner interlocking is associated with auditor
provided non-audit services fees paid to the incumbent auditor after controlling 
for factors that are likely to affect APNAS fees.
2.2.2 AUDIT FIRM TENURE
Prior research suggests that short auditor tenure could undermine audit quality 
due to a lack of client-specific knowledge or pressure to retain and profit from new 
clients (e.g., Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002). In contrast, 
professional accounting bodies are concerned that longer tenn auditor-client 
relationships may impair audit quality and are a threat to audit independence because 
the longer the relationship, the more likely auditors are to agree to their client’s 
accounting and reporting choices in order to retain the client (A1CPA, 1978, 1992; 
ICAA and CPA Australia, 2001).
The current study argues that when there is a relationship between a director 
and/or audit committee member and an audit firm through one engagement, this 
relationship can be used to ‘market’ the audit firm to other boards of which the director 
is a member (Houghton and Jubb, 2003). Among these linked companies, directors, 
audit committee members and auditors may develop personal relationships over time 
and these personal ties are important for the maintenance of long-term auditor-client 
relationships (Courtney and Jubb, 2005; Ye et al., 2006). The auditor-client relationship 
may also be detennined by the audit partner’s interpersonal relationships with clients 
(Czepiel, 1990) and this type of relationship is a strong detenninant of continuing the
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services (Frankwick et al, 2001) in the linked companies. The relationships between 
director and auditor may result in an alignment of decisions made by each over time 
because there may be a tendency for the auditor to gradually align with the wishes of 
management. This alignment may encourage management to continue engagements 
with the incumbent auditor (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002) in the linked companies. A 
long-term association between directors and the auditor in linked companies may 
threaten auditor independence (Hoyle, 1978) because lengthy audit firm tenure leads to 
a reduced propensity for issuing qualified audit reports (Barkess and Simnett, 1994; 
DeFond et al., 2002; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004), a 
higher level of discretionary accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Chung and Kallapur, 
2003; Myers et al., 2003) and a higher frequency of annual report restatement (Kinney 
et al., 2004; Raghunandan, et al., 2003; Myers et al., 2005).
Therefore, the second proxy for measuring auditor independence is audit firm 
tenure with the current auditee, which is also a commonly used proxy (e.g., DeFond and 
Subramanyam, 1998; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Ghosh and 
Moon, 2003; Myers et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Mansi et al., 2004; Courtney 
and Jubb, 2005; Hamilton et al., 2005; Gul et al., 2007; Jackson et al, 2008). These 
studies are based on the idea of mandatory auditor rotation as a possible solution to the 
auditor independence problem and argue that imposing limits on auditor tenure is 
expected to improve auditor independence and audit quality by reducing client influence 
over auditors (Brody and Moscove 1998; Ghosh and Moon, 2003). Prior studies report a 
negative association between lengthy audit Finn tenure and likelihood of issuing a 
qualified audit report (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Ghosh and 
Moon, 2003; Myers et al., 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004) and a positive association
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with a higher level of discretionary accruals (Myers et al., 2003; Chung, 2004; Davis et 
al., 2009), which may be an indicator of impaired auditor independence.
There are few studies that examine the association between director-auditor 
links and auditor tenure (e.g., Levinthal and Fichman, 1988; Seabright et al., 1992; 
Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Levinthal and Fichman (1988) uses the technique of event- 
history analysis to examine the duration of dyadic interorganisational attachments 
through a study of auditor-client relationships. Their study finds that these attachments 
have positive duration dependence and, in the early stages of these attachments, the rate 
at which these interorganisational relationships ended increased with time. Their study 
also finds that the rate of switches associated with attachments of a few years’ duration 
is relatively low and that the greatest rate of switching is associated with attachments of 
four years’ duration, with the frequency of switching declining for attachments of 
longer duration. Their study argues that both the auditor and the client develop 
relationship-specific skills over time through learning by doing, and that such 
relationship-specific capabilities create an incentive for both sides to continue the 
auditor-client relationship for longer periods, which may impair auditor independence.
In a study on the role of individual attachments and the dissolution of auditor- 
client relationships, Seabright et al. (1992) finds that a change in a client’s resource 
needs increases the likelihood of their switching auditors, but that attachment of 
individuals primarily responsible for the exchange relationship decreases the likelihood 
of switching. Their study reports that an important consequence of the dyadic 
attachment between the auditor and the client is the impact of the relationship features 
on auditor performance and audit quality and that a long-lived relationship may be at
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greater risk of performance problems with respect to audit quality and reduced auditor 
independence.
Courtney and Jubb (2005) investigates the association between director-auditor 
interlocks and auditor tenure and finds that the director-auditor links are positively 
associated with auditor tenure and retention of auditors beyond the critical four year 
period identified by Levinthal and Fichman (1988). Courtney and Jubb (2005) argues 
that the pressure for mandatory auditor rotation on the grounds of ensuring actual or 
perceived independence may gain momentum if auditor tenure is accompanied by 
director-auditor links.
The current study examines the direction of association between interlockings 
and auditor tenure and any significant association can be interpreted in the light of the 
findings of existing studies. A significant positive (negative) association between 
interlockings and audit firm tenure may be interpreted as a decrease (increase) in auditor 
independence. The hypotheses related to audit firm tenure and interlockings are given in 
the next sections.
2.2.2.1 Director interlocking, director-audit firm/audit partner interlocking and audit
firm tenure
There are many factors that influence the length of auditor tenure, for example, 
personal relationships, auditor dependence on auditees and development of mutual 
dependence and trust. Among them, interpersonal associations between the directors 
and auditors in linked companies may diminish the pressure for auditor changes 
(Courtney and Jubb, 2005). The relationships established over time in the presence of 
common director and auditor links allow the development of mutual dependence due to
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the greater stability of the alliance and it can be hypothesised that the trust and 
dependence manifested in the auditor-client relationship in linked companies will be 
influential in client decisions to retain the auditor for a longer period (Levinthal and 
Fichman, 1988; Courtney and Jubb, 2005).
De Ruyter and Wetzels (1999), using the concept of relationship marketing, 
finds that trust and pleasant business relationships increased the commitment of clients 
to the relationships and their intention to continue them. Seabright et al. (1992) argues 
that attachments between client and auditor organisations occur mainly at the individual 
level. Their findings suggest that while other factors may act as pressure for auditor 
change, it is the personal attachments that ease the impact of these influences which are 
critical to the maintenance of long-term relationships. Courtney and Jubb (2005) finds a 
significant positive association between director-auditor links and audit firm tenure. 
Their study argues that the personal association between directors and auditors seems 
important for the maintenance of long-term relationships in linked companies as 
compared to non-linked companies. It can also be argued that in a situation of director 
and audit partner interlocking, the partner has more to lose than if interlocking is not 
present and so will expend more effort keeping directors happy, which may result in 
longer audit firm tenure in the linked companies.18 The greater the number of links an 
auditor has with other companies, the more the auditor has to lose due to a large number 
of audit engagements, therefore, an auditor may try to continue an audit engagement in 
the linked companies for a longer period. Auditor tenure may also be longer in the 
linked companies because lengthy tenure may cause the auditors to develop ‘over-cosy 
relationships’ as well as strong loyalties or emotional relationships with their clients
ls Holtzman (2004) argues that there is intense pressure on audit partners to bring in significant revenue 
from audit clients and there is extreme pressure to keep clients happy even at the expense of sacrificing 
the application of sound accounting practice. Zeff (2003) and Holtzman (2004) also argue that audit 
partners are given perverse incentives by the firm’s top management to modify the client’s demands, 
requests and desires as the clients are driven by their own perverse incentives.
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(Flint, 1988; Nasser et al, 2006), which may encourage both parties to continue their 
relationships.
Furthermore, a long-term relationship and extensive interactions between 
directors and auditor in linked companies may result in a troublesome degree of 
closeness between management and the auditor (Arel et al., 2005). Auditors should 
avoid situations that may lead them to become over-influenced or to be too trusting of 
the client’s directors and key personnel which could consequently lead to audit staff 
being too sympathetic to client interests (Institute of Charted Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW), 2001), which may shorten auditor tenure in linked companies. 
Thus, interlocking directors may recommend changing the auditor more frequently to 
improve auditor independence and hence the audit firm tenure might be shorter in this 
instance.
The above arguments indicate that the number of director interlocks, director- 
audit firm/partner interlocks may increase or decrease audit Finn tenure and that is why 
the following hypotheses are presented as non-directional:
H2a: An association exists between director interlocking and audit firm tenure after
controlling for factors that are likely to affect audit firm tenure.
H2b: An association exists between director-audit firm interlocking and audit firm
tenure after controlling for factors that are likely to affect audit firm tenure.
H2c: An association exists between director-audit partner interlocking and audit firm
tenure after controlling for factors that are likely to affect audit firm tenure.
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2.2.2.2 Audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking and audit firm tenure
An audit committee should report to the board on the selection and appointment 
or removal of the external auditor, and on the rotation of external audit engagement 
partners (ASX, 2003). The Ramsay Report (2001) recommends that the audit committee 
should “make recommendations to the board on the appointment, reappointment or 
replacement, remuneration, monitoring of the effectiveness, and independence of the 
auditor” (p. 16). Beasley et al. (2009) and Cohen et al. (2009) find that the audit 
committee has a significant influence in appointment and dismissal decisions with 
respect to auditors. Therefore, audit committees play a very important role in the 
decision to select/retain or change an auditor. An individual, who is a member of more 
than one audit committee, may have more influence on the auditor selection/removal 
decision role due to his/her involvement in audit committees in other companies 
compared with a situation where he/she is on only one audit committee. The audit 
committee may recommend the same auditor for linked companies due to members’ 
familiarity, close relationships, knowledge/experience of working with the auditor.
Furthermore, audit firm tenure may be affected by the familiarity, friendship, 
trust and social support that emerges from repeated alliances between the same parties 
(Gulati, 1995) and may increase with the number of customer/service provider 
relationships (Ring and Van de Ven, 1989; Parkhe, 1993). In the case of audit 
committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking, there will be more frequent 
meetings with the same audit committee members and audit firm/partner in linked 
companies than without such an interlocking, which may create a close personal 
relationship between the parties. These personal relationships and familiarity among the 
parties may enhance the possibility of retaining the auditor for longer periods in linked
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companies than would otherwise be the case. In addition, as a member of audit 
committees of several companies, he/she may observe numerous auditors and may feel 
comfortable in working with a particular auditor with whom he/she has good 
relationships. Additionally, to gain more audit clients from the audit committee 
members’ interlocking companies and retain engagements for a longer period, the 
auditor may try harder than in the absence of such interlocking to satisfy and maintain a 
good relationship with the audit committee members. The auditor’s motivations in 
securing audit engagements with as many as possible from the linked companies and the 
personal relationship between the auditor and the audit committee members may serve 
to increase audit firm tenure.
Alternatively, the audit committee may recommend changing audit firm more 
frequently to improve auditor independence. Lee et al. (2004) finds that independent 
audit committees demand higher auditor reputation, even though managers may want to 
remain with the existing auditor because of the independence issue.10 Thus, the 
association between the number of committee member interlocks and audit committee 
member-audit firm/partner interlocks may be positively or negatively related to audit 
firm tenure. Therefore, the following hypotheses are tested without predicting direction 
of association between interlockings and audit firm tenure:
H2d: An association exists between audit committee member interlocking and audit
firm tenure after controlling for factors that are likely to affect audit firm tenure.
19 Chen and Zhou (2007) argues that even though managers may have wanted to remain with Andersen if 
it survived, independent directors were more likely to seek the dismissal of Andersen because they 
demanded higher auditor reputation.
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H2e: An association exists between audit committee member-audit firm interlocking
and audit firm tenure after controlling for factors that are likely to affect audit 
firm tenure.
H2f: An association exists between audit committee member-audit partner
interlocking and audit firm tenure after controlling for factors that are likely to 
affect audit firm tenure.
2.2.3 AUDIT OPINION
An auditor’s dependence on a specific client or a group of clients may decrease 
auditor independence, which could degrade audit quality. An auditor’s dependence on 
fees becomes an issue when a large proportion of the gross fees of a practice are 
received from one client or family of group of clients and the client may then exert 
undue influence or pressure on the auditor (Ramsay Report, 2001). Auditors can expect 
to earn more revenue from a family of linked companies than from a single client in 
terms of both audit and APNAS fees. Auditors’ motivation for continuing an audit 
engagement, earning revenues and gaining more clients from a family of linked 
companies may influence their behaviour20, which could motivate them not to qualify 
the audit reports of linked companies when a qualified opinion is warranted.
Prior studies report that interlocking companies tend to choose a common
auditor (e.g., Davison et al, 1984; Jubb and Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000) and this
tendency may influence a decision of the auditor regarding whether or not to issue a
qualified audit opinion for the linked company. Houghton and Jubb (2003) argues that if
the audit firm seeks to qualify the opinion on the accounts of one auditee within a
family of companies linked by shared directors, the decision may be moderated by
20 Marnet (2004) argues that the desire to win future auditing contracts or to cross-sell non-audit services 
suffices to influence judgement and the mere fact of the auditor being an agent of the audit client leads to 
judgements favourable to the client.
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concerns about the loss of multiple clients. Additionally, if a board does not agree with 
an auditor, they may switch the auditors of linked companies for which they have an 
interlocking relationship (Jubb and Houghton, 1999).
Therefore, the first proxy of the current study for actual audit quality is the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the incumbent auditors. Several 
studies use the type of audit opinion as a proxy for measuring audit quality (e.g., 
Graeme, 1994; Wines, 1994; McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996; Pringle and Bushman, 
1996; Crasweil, 1999; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Jubb, 2000; Sharma and Sidhu, 2001; 
DeFond et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; Choi and Doogar, 2005; Jackson et al., 2008; 
Lai and Gul, 2008). Some of these studies do not find significant association between 
going-concern opinion and APNAS fees (e.g., Pringle and Bushman, 1996; Crasweil, 
1999; DeFond et al., 2002).
Graeme (1994) finds that the auditors of companies not receiving an audit 
qualification of any type over the period derived a significantly higher proportion of 
their remuneration from APNAS fees than did the auditors of companies receiving at 
least one audit qualification. This finding indicates that auditors are less likely to qualify 
a given company's financial statements when higher levels of APNAS fees are derived 
and this is an indication of reduced audit quality. Lennox (1999) finds a positive weakly 
significant association between audit qualifications and disclosed APNAS fees.
Wines (1994) and Firth (2002) find that APNAS fees were associated with a 
lower incidence of audit qualifications or modifications. However, Barkess and Simnett 
(1994) finds no association between APNAS fees and the type of audit reports issued. 
Sharma and Sidhu (2001) investigates whether the proportion of APNAS fees to total
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fees is associated with the propensity to issue a going-concern qualification in the year 
preceding bankruptcy and finds a positive relationship. Their finding suggests that 
higher APNAS fees reduce the likelihood that a qualified report will be issued. 
Basioudis et al. (2008) finds that the magnitude of APNAS fees is significantly 
associated with the issuance of a going-concern modified audit opinion.
Jackson et al, (2008) investigates the effect of audit firm rotation on auditor 
independence and audit quality where audit quality is proxied by the propensity of 
issuing going-concern audit reports. Their study finds that audit quality increases with 
audit firm tenure because auditor-client linkage increases the likelihood of the auditor 
issuing a going-concern audit opinion. Contrary to this, other prior studies report that 
lengthy audit firm tenure leads to a reduced propensity to issue a qualified audit report 
(Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2002; Ghosh and Moon, 2003; Myers 
et al, 2003; Carcello and Nagy, 2004).
There are few studies that investigate the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and audit opinion. Abbott et al. (2004) finds that companies with audit 
committees composed of independent directors are less likely to be sanctioned by the 
USA Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for fraudulent or misleading financial 
reporting. Carcello and Neal (2000) finds that the greater the percentage of affiliated 
inside or grey directors on the audit committee, the lower the probability that a 
financially distressed firm will receive a going-concern opinion from the auditor. 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) finds that companies with financial reporting 
problems are less likely to have audit committees composed entirely of outside 
directors. Prior research also investigates the role of corporate governance mechanisms 
in reducing fraudulent financial reporting and reports a negative relation between
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effective corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting decisions (Beasley, 
1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Jiambalvo, 1996). Jubb (2000) finds a significant and 
negative association between director-auditor interlocks and non-clean audit opinions 
indicating that companies with a higher number of director-auditor links are less likely 
to receive qualified audit opinions when a qualification is deserved.
The aim of the audit qualification model used in the current study is to identify 
the association between interlockings and the likelihood of receiving a qualified 
opinion. The current study expects a significant negative (positive) association between 
interlockings and the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion indicating lower 
(higher) qualification rates as the number of interlocking links increases, hence lower 
(higher) audit quality. The following sections develop the hypotheses in relation to audit 
opinions and their expected associations with interlockings.
2.2.3.1 Director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner interlocking and audit
opinion
Director interlocking and director-audit finn/partner interlocking associations 
may enhance or degrade audit quality. Director-auditor links may enhance audit quality 
because both directors and auditors have incentives for high quality audits due to their 
commitment as monitoring authorities. Prior studies argue that the pressure on the 
auditor to issue an unqualified opinion is related to the perceived and actual costs to the 
client arising from audit qualification (e.g., Dopuch et al., 1986; Fields and Wilkins, 
1991; Loudder et al., 1992; Barkess et al., 2002). Monroe and Teh (1993) argues that 
the cost of issuing an inappropriate opinion can result in substantial damage through 
lawsuits, the loss of professional reputation and also could result in the loss of the client.
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These factors may motivate the auditors of linked companies to provide high quality
audits.
Alternatively, director interlocking and director-audit finn/partner interlocking 
may degrade/diminish audit quality. These relationships may degrade audit quality 
because auditors may become compliant for fear of losing not just one audit in linked 
companies, but other audits where the same directors and auditors are associated (Jubb, 
2000). Interlocking directors are also more likely to maintain links with auditors with 
whom they feel comfortable, even at the expense of unfavourable perceptions of auditor 
independence (Jubb, 2000). Moreover, the prestige and reciprocation of mutual favours 
among directors may be more powerful incentives for joining boards than financial 
benefits (Spencer, 1983; Whisler, 1984). If the directors maximise their own interests 
rather than the interests of shareholders, they may pressure the auditor to issue 
unqualified audit reports when they would otherwise receive a qualified opinion.
Furthermore, interlocks are indicators of potential power relationships between 
companies at the highest level (Pettigrew, 1992). It is hypothesised that the directors of 
linked companies have more power to influence the decisions of interlocking companies 
than other directors. In addition, the relationships generated in the presence of director- 
auditor links allow the development of mutual dependence due to the greater stability of 
the alliance (Courtney and Jubb, 2005). This alliance may motivate the auditor to issue 
unqualified opinions for linked companies when they are not deserved. Directors may 
expect unqualified opinions for all the linked companies to protect their directorships 
and reputations, and continuance of directors’ fees. Auditors may also be tempted to 
agree to the wishes of management/directors rather than risk being replaced by a more 
compliant auditor (Goldman and Bariev, 1974).
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Auditors may also align with directors’ decisions so that they can continue 
auditing in the linked companies because, unless there is a reason to believe that 
auditors are different from other economic agents, they also need to be viewed as utility 
maximisers (Miller, 1992). Auditors are likely to command low levels of power in any 
conflict situation due to their close relationships, their willingness to continue the audit 
engagement in linked companies and their financial dependence (on both audit and 
APNAS fees) on audit clients (Barkess et al., 2002). Jubb (2000) finds that companies 
exhibiting higher frequencies of director-auditor links received fewer qualified 
opinions. Hunton and Rose (2008) finds that directors holding multiple directorships are 
less likely to accept an auditor’s restatement recommendation than directors with a 
single directorship. Their study also reports that directors holding multiple directorships 
are more likely to compromise their independence in the face of auditors’ restatement 
recommendations than director with a single directorship due to the potential negative 
effects on their reputational capital. Thus, significant associations are expected between 
director interlocking and director-audit firm/partner interlocking and the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor:
H3a: Director interlocking is associated with the likelihood o f receiving a qualified
audit opinion after controlling for factors that are likely to affect the audit 
opinion.
H3b: Director-audit firm interlocking is associated with the likelihood o f receiving a
qualified audit opinion after controlling for factors that are likely to affect the 
audit opinion.
H3c: Director-audit partner interlocking is associated with the likelihood o f
receiving a qualified audit opinion after controlling for factors that are likely to 
affect the audit opinion.
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2.2.3.2 Audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking and audit opinion
It is argued that audit committee member and audit firm/partner interlocking 
may influence the decision of an auditor to qualify the audit report(s) of linked 
companies. An auditor may be reluctant to qualify the audit reports of audit committee 
member linked companies when it is deserved because the auditor may lose the contract 
with the linked companies. An auditor may also be reluctant to qualify the audit reports 
of linked companies because audit qualifications would adversely affect the interests of 
corporate participants including the audit committee members (Ball et al., 1979). 
Additionally, audit committee members who serve on different audit committees have 
more experience and may play a vital role in mitigating disagreements on issues related 
to audit qualification between management and the auditor and, therefore, there may be 
less need to qualify audit reports of companies linked by audit committee members.
Furthermore, the competence and independence of individual audit engagement 
partners determine the quality of the audit (Levitt, 2002; Meuwissen et al., 2005). Audit 
partners involved in engagements covering several companies at a time have more 
incentives to maintain high audit quality in order to continue auditing the linked 
companies. Audit committee members who serve on different audit committees may 
support the auditor in enhancing audit quality due to their independent roles in the 
organisations. If both the audit partner and audit committee members are performing 
their independent monitoring roles properly, the relationship between them in linked 
companies could improve audit quality and, therefore, there would be less need to 
qualify audit reports. Thus, significant associations between audit committee member 
interlocking, audit committee member-audit finn/partner interlocking and the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor are expected in this study:
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H3d: Audit committee member interlocking is associated with the likelihood o f 
receiving a qualified audit opinion after controlling for factors that are likely to 
affect the audit opinion.
H3e: Audit committee member-audit firm interlocking is associated with the
likelihood o f receiving a qualified audit opinion after controlling for factors that 
are likely to affect the audit opinion.
H3f: Audit committee member-audit partner interlocking is associated with the
likelihood o f receiving a qualified audit opinion after controlling for factors that 
are likely to affect the audit opinion.
2.2.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Interest in the areas of earnings management, corporate governance and audit 
quality has been keen for many years. Earnings management refers to the use of flexible 
accounting principles that allow managers to manage reported earnings to show the 
reported income to be larger or smaller than it would be otherwise (Davidson et al., 
2004). Interlocking relationships may be used by management as an opportunity to 
manage earnings due to the close relationships and familiarity between directors, 
auditors and management and their frequent interactions in more than one company.
The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used in this study to examine the 
association of earnings with interlockings. The absolute value of discretionary accruals 
measure reflects the economic effect of management’s accrual decisions regardless of 
direction (Ruddock and Taylor, 2005). Menon and Williams (2004) argues that:
“using the unsigned value of abnormal accruals more completely identifies the 
discretion afforded to managers by their auditors and in this context does not
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require assumptions about auditor bias with regard to the directional effect of an 
accounting choice” (p. 11).
Numerous studies use discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting or 
earnings quality and hence audit quality (e.g., DeFond et al, 2002; Frankel et al, 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Hoitash et al. 2005; Ruddock and Taylor, 
2005; Cameran et al., 2008; Jackson et al., 2008; Lai and Gul, 2008). There are a 
substantial number of studies on APNAS and earnings management. The results of 
studies by Reynolds et al. (2002), Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Antle et al. (2006) 
establish a negative association between APNAS and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals, which does not support the assertion that fees for APNAS increase abnormal 
accruals, hence diminishing audit quality. Other studies report a positive association 
between APNAS and the absolute value of discretionary accruals (e.g., Frankel et al., 
2002; Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Chen et al., 2005; Hoitash et al, 2005; Ruddock and 
Taylor, 2005) suggesting that APNAS reduces audit quality.
A number of studies investigate the association between audit firm/partner 
tenure and earnings management. DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) reports that firms 
that switch from Big 6 to non-Big 6 audit firms appear to implement more liberal 
accounting, as evidenced by higher unexpected accruals. Myers et al. (2003) finds that 
higher earnings quality is associated with longer auditor tenure and argues that longer 
auditor tenure results in auditors placing greater constraints on extreme management 
decisions in the reporting of financial performance. Davis et al. (2002) investigates 
auditor tenure, auditor independence and earnings management and finds a positive 
relation between tenure and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Their study 
concludes that these findings are consistent with management: (1) gaining greater
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reporting flexibility, and (2) being able to meet earnings forecasts more easily as auditor 
tenure increases, which may reduce audit quality.
Ghosh and Moon (2003) finds that the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
and the use of large negative special items to manage earnings decline with auditor 
tenure. These results are consistent with the claim that audit quality improves with 
auditor tenure. Chung (2004), using a sample of Korean firms, provides evidence that 
under an audit regime similar to mandatory auditor rotation, audit quality (using 
discretionary accruals as a measure of audit quality) appears to improve when the 
duration of the auditor-client relationship is truncated. Jackson et al. (2008) investigates 
the effect of audit firm rotation on auditor independence and audit quality, where audit 
quality is proxied by the level of discretionary accruals. Their study finds that audit 
quality increases as audit firm tenure increases.
Some studies investigate the association between audit partner tenure and 
earnings management. Chen et al. (2008) finds that the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals decreases with the length of audit partner tenure, and the decrease mainly 
occurs after five to seven years of an audit partner-client relationship. These results do 
not suggest that earnings quality deteriorates with extended audit partner tenure. Chi et 
al. (2004) finds no evidence that audit tenure has a negative effect on audit quality, at 
either the audit-partner or the audit-firm level. Cameran et al. (2008) examines the 
effects of auditor tenure and auditor change on audit quality in a unique mandatory audit 
firm rotation environment (Italy) and finds that audit quality—measured in terms of 
earnings management—tends to improve rather than worsen over time. Turner et al, 
(2008) finds a significant and negative association between lead audit partner tenure and 
discretionary accruals. Chi et al. (2009), using both absolute and signed discretionary
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accruals for Taiwanese companies, does not find that mandatory audit partner rotation 
enhances audit quality. Jenkins and Velury (2008) documents a positive association 
between the conservatism in reported earnings and the length of the auditor-client 
relationship.
Several studies investigate the association between audit committee 
characteristics, corporate governance characteristics and earnings management. Klein 
(2002) finds that audit committee independence is negatively associated with abnormal 
accruals, and reductions in audit committee independence are associated with large 
increases in abnormal accruals. Using Korean data, Choi et al. (2004) demonstrates that 
the independence and competency of the audit committee is associated with the earnings 
management. Xie et al. (2003) finds that audit committee members with corporate or 
financial backgrounds are associated with firms that have smaller discretionary current 
accruals. Their study reports that the audit committee activity and members’ financial 
sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to 
engage in earnings management.
There are few studies that include board characteristics and investigate their 
relationship with discretionary accruals. Peasnell et al. (2000) documents that earnings 
management is negatively associated with the independence of the board of directors. 
Klein (2002) finds a negative relation between board independence and abnormal 
accruals, and that a reduction in board independence is accompanied by a large increase 
in abnormal accruals. Xie et al. (2003) argues that board activity and the financial 
sophistication of its members may be important factors in constraining the propensity of 
managers to engage in earnings management. Jubb (2000) examines whether the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is associated with the number of director-
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auditor links and reports a significant positive association between director-auditor 
links and the absolute value of discretionary accruals.
Consistent with Jubb (2000) study, the current study assumes that if interlocking 
associations between directors and/audit committee members and audit firms/partners 
compromise auditor independence then discretionary accruals will increase with the 
increase in number of interlocking links. In contrast, if interlocking links improve audit 
quality due to auditor-client communication and negotiation, then the number of 
interlocking links will be insignificant or negative with discretionary accruals (Jubb, 
2000). The findings of the current study will be interpreted in the light of the findings of 
prior studies. A significant positive (negative) association between interlockings and the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals will be interpreted as a decrease (increase) in 
audit quality. The following two sections develop the hypotheses in relation to 
discretionary accruals as the measure of earnings management, and their associations 
with interlockings.
2.2.4.1 Director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner interlocking and the
absolute value of discretionary accruals
Personal relationships established between the directors and the audit 
firm/partner may be associated with the reported earnings of linked companies. Agency 
theory identifies the importance of incentives and self-interest in organisational 
thinking and assumes that “much of organizational life, whether we like it or not, is 
based on self-interest” (Perrow, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 64). If both the directors and 
auditors are assumed to be self-interested maximisers" , the manipulation of earnings in
21 Marnet (2004) argues that “the subjective nature of accounting and the tight relationships between 
auditing firms and their clients is particularly visible in the dealings of the individual auditing partner and 
the unconscious biases of the auditor, impartiality is difficult to achieve, some would say impossible, as 
all individuals are biased towards their own interests or prejudices” (p. 274).
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the director-audit finn/partner linked companies is likely to be facilitated by appointing 
a common audit firm/partner for the linked companies. The motivation for directors to 
manage earnings may be to show a better financial result for linked companies 
compared to non-linked companies and to signal their credibility as directors of more 
than one company. They may pressure the auditor to accept managed earnings by 
offering financial and/or non-financial incentives. Furthermore, in director-audit 
firm/partner interlocking relationships, the auditor may identify closely with the 
management and may not exhibit sufficient professional scepticism. As a results, 
management may be able to take advantage of the auditor’s/partner’s conflict by making 
a personal appeal for compassion and support (Arel et al., 2005).
Additionally, if the auditor is dependent on the client for a substantial portion of 
their income, the auditor may be more willing to agree with management’s 
representations and inteipretations of accounting matters (Firth, 1997a). In director- 
audit firm/partner interlocking, the auditor may be more dependent on the revenue 
(audit fees and APNAS fees) from the linked companies compared to non-linked 
companies.23 This dependency may increase the auditor’s incentive to give in to client 
pressure, including pressure to allow earnings management. Magee and Tseng (1990) 
and DeAngelo (1981a) argue that audit quality could be impaired when significant 
economic rents exist for the auditor’s engagement with a client. Kinney and Libby 
(2002) argues that a strong economic bond between the auditor and the client will
22 Researchers argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information 
value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public (Jiraporn et. al., 
2006). Jiraporn et. al. (2006) also posits that the scandals at Enron, WorldCom and elsewhere have 
generated a public perception that earnings management is utilised opportunistically by firm managers for 
their own private benefit rather than for the benefit of shareholders. Thus, the directors/management may 
be motivated to manage earnings to show a better financial result to the users.
23 Earlier in this thesis it is argued that the auditor of linked companies may have more clients from a 
family of linked companies and earn more revenue because the directors tend to choose a common 
auditor for their linked companies (Jubb and Houghton, 1999).
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reduce the quality of reported earnings through auditors’ reduced willingness to resist 
client-induced biases in reported accounting information.
Alternatively, Van Der Zahn and Tower (2004) finds that the presence of 
independent directors serving simultaneously on a substantial number of boards is 
effective at constraining earnings management. Prior studies (e.g., Beasley, 1996; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Peasnell et al., 2005; Mather and 
Ramsay, 2006) find that outside directors are associated with reduced earnings 
manipulation, fraud or earnings management. Interlocking associations between 
directors and audit firm/partner may minimise earnings management due to their 
commitment as agents of shareholders to monitoring roles and their greater financial 
and non-financial stakes in linked companies compared to non-linked companies.
The above arguments indicate that the association between the number of 
director interlocks, director-audit finn/partner interlocks and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals may be positive or negative and that is why the following 
hypotheses are presented as non-directional:
H4a: Director interlocking is associated with the absolute value o f discretionary
accruals after controlling for factors likely to be associated with discretionary 
accruals.
H4b: Director-audit firm interlocking is associated with the absolute value o f
discretionary accruals after controlling for factors likely to be associated with 
discretionary accruals.
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H4c: Director-audit partner interlocking is associated with the absolute value o f
discretionary accruals after controlling for factors likely to be associated with 
discretionary accruals.
2.2.4.2 Audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking and the absolute value o f discretionary accruals 
An active audit committee may be an important monitoring mechanism for 
improving the accountability of management and the quality of financial reports by 
minimising earnings management (Xie et a!., 2003; Bradbury et ah, 2004). Audit 
committee members sitting on more than one audit committee across other companies 
may minimise earnings management because audit committee members who sit on 
more than one audit committee may have more experience and may be in the best 
position to serve as active overseers of the financial reporting process and have the 
ability to withstand pressure from management to manipulate earnings (Klein, 2002; 
Baxter, 2005).
Prior studies report a negative relationship between effective audit committees 
and earnings management (Klein, 2002). This may also be the case in the presence of 
audit committee member interlocking and audit committee member-audit firm/partner 
interlocking because experienced and financially literate individuals are normally 
appointed to audit committees and they may be more effective at preventing or at least 
minimising earnings management. Serving on several boards gives audit committee 
members additional experience and this can enhance their effectiveness in applying this 
experience to limiting earnings manipulations (Song and Windram, 2004). Furthermore, 
the external auditor and audit committee members have similar incentives, such as 
minimising legal liability and desire for a good reputation and therefore similar
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incentives to issue high-quality financial reports and these features help to mitigate the 
mechanism of earnings management (Jenkins, 2002). Audit committee members and the 
audit firm/partner who serve several linked companies may have more to lose in respect 
of their reputation if they compromise audit quality. If both parties perform their duties 
to maximise shareholder interests and to protect their own reputations, their links could 
improve audit quality by preventing or constraining earnings management
Prior studies relating to audit committees and earnings management use 
different characteristics of audit committee members to examine their association with 
discretionary accruals. Klein (2002) reports that audit committee independence is 
negatively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Using Korean 
data, Choi et al. (2004) demonstrates that the independence and competency of the audit 
committee are associated with earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) finds that audit 
committee members with corporate or financial backgrounds are associated with smaller 
discretionary accruals. Their study reports that audit committee activity and members’ 
financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the ability of managers 
to engage in earnings management. Baxter and Cotter (2008) finds higher earnings 
quality in companies with a greater proportion of qualified accountants on their audit 
committees. When audit committee members work together with a common audit 
firm/partner across other companies, they may be more cautious about their reputation, 
performance and job security, which may motivate them to minimise or constrain 
earnings management by the linked companies’ management.
Alternatively, an audit committee member who sits on more than one audit 
committee may not be a good monitor of earnings management issues due to time 
constraints and direct and indirect benefits. Wright (1996) reports that a direct financial 
interest (such as stock ownership) by audit committee members is positively associated
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with earnings management. Audit committee members have more interests in linked 
companies compared to non-linked companies due to their large stake and involvement 
in other companies. Auditors also may ignore the earnings management issue due to 
their close relationships with management and their large stake in linked companies.
The above arguments indicate that the association between the number of audit 
committee member interlocks, audit committee member-audit firm/partner interlocks 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals may be positive or negative and that is 
why the following hypotheses are presented as non-directional:
H4d: Audit committee member interlocking is associated with the absolute value o f 
discretionary accruals after controlling for factors likely to be associated with 
discretionary accruals.
H4e: Audit committee member-audit firm interlocking is associated with the absolute
value o f discretionary accruals after controlling for factors likely to be 
associated with discretionary accruals.
H4f: Audit committee member-audit partner interlocking is associated with the
absolute value o f discretionary accruals after controlling for factors likely to be 
associated with discretionary accruals.
2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter describes the conceptual framework and develops the hypotheses 
for this study. It is argued in this study that the relationships between directors, audit 
committee members and the audit firm/partner may enhance or degrade auditor 
independence and audit quality. Chapter 3 describes the research methods used to 
investigate whether the interlocking relationships among the parties enhance or degrade 
auditor independence and audit quality.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHOD
3.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the research methods used to test the hypotheses. It also 
provides the justifications for the choice of variables included in the models and 
describes the way these variables are operationalised. A summary of all variables used 
in testing the hypotheses is provided in Appendix I for ease of reference. This chapter 
also provides definitions and explanations of the test variables.
3.1 RESEARCH METHOD
The following sections describe the research design for this study followed by 
definitions and explanations of the test variables and model specification.
3.1.1 Research design
Publicly available published financial and corporate governance information for 
ASX listed companies during the fiscal years 2003-2005 is used in this study to 
investigate the association of interlocking relationships with auditor independence and 
audit quality. To examine these issues, two proxies for measuring each of auditor 
independence and actual audit quality are used in this study.
The first proxy for auditor independence is auditor provided non-audit services 
fees, and the second proxy is audit firm tenure with the current auditee. To measure 
audit quality, the first proxy is the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the 
auditor, and the second proxy is the level of earnings management/discretionary 
accruals tolerated by the auditor. The following sections discuss test variables followed 
by the models and definitions of variables and the statistical tools used for estimating 
the models.
56
3.1.2 Test variables
The test variables for the current study are common for the APNAS fees model, 
audit firm tenure (AFTENURE) model, audit opinion (OPINION) model and 
discretionary accruals model (DACC). The definition and implementation of the test 
variables is described in detail in this section and referred to frequently in subsequent 
sections due to their importance. The test variables consist of director interlocks 
(DLKS), director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS), director-audit partner interlocks 
(DAPLKS), audit committee member interlocks (ACLKS), audit committee member- 
audit firm interlocks (ACAFLKS), and audit committee member-audit partner 
interlocks (ACAPLKS). The following sections provide an illustration of calculations 
and definitions of the test variables.
For all of the above interlocking variables, the number of total interlocks created 
by the boards of directors and/or audit committee members and audit firms/partners 
with other companies was separately computed, and then the number of common 
interlocks was calculated. The number of total interlocks means how many of the focal 
company’s board members sit together on the boards of other companies, that is, the 
total number of interlocks created by the board of directors of a company with other 
companies. The number of common interlocks indicates that if more than one director 
from a focal company simultaneously sits on the same other companies’ boards, it 
counts only once (Jubb, 2000). Common interlocks for all of the above test variables24 
are used and the procedure employed by Davison et al. (1984), Jubb and Houghton
24 Jubb (2000) and Jubb and Houghton (1999) explain the calculation procedures of interlocking in detail. 
Jubb (2000) argues that interlocking links can be measured on a “presence” or “extent o f’ basis. “The 
presence of measure takes account of a link to another company once only, regardless how many directors 
create the link to that company. The “extent o f ’ measure accumulates the links across all directors 
without attention to whether individual directors sit together on the same (additional) boards” Jubb, 2000, 
p. 125). Most of the prior literature uses “points to the existence of a directorial or shareholder link 
between companies, rather than how many times the same link occurs, as important for information 
dissemination. Hence, it is this “unitary”, “unique” or “presence” form of the measure” (Jubb, 2000, p. 
125) that is used for all interlocking variables in the current study.
57
(1999) and Jubb (2000) to calculate interlocking variables is used. Jubb and Houghton 
(1999) explains that under their method:
“it is important to note that in operationalising common interlocks, regardless of 
how many of the focal company’s board members sit together on the board of 
the same other company, the link to that company is counted only once” (p. 11).
The same was done for the audit committee member interlocks and audit committee 
member-audit finn/partner interlocks. An illustration of the calculations for
interlockings is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Illustration of the number of director and director-audit firm/partner interlocks
Company Directors Audit
firm
Audit
partner
TDLKS DLKS TDAFLKS DAFLKS TDAPLKS DAPLKS
1 A,B,C,D X P 5 2 3 1 1 1
2 E,F,G Y Q 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 B,D,I,J Z R 5 3 0 0 0 0
4 A,B,D,K,L,M X P 6 3 4 2 2 2
5 1,M X R 2 2 1 1 1 1
TDLKS = total director interlocks, DLKS = (common) director interlocks, TDAFLKS = total director- 
audit firm interlocks, DAFLKS = (common) director-audit firm interlocks, TDAPLKS = total director- 
audit partner interlocks, DAPLKS = (common) director-audit partner interlocks.
Total director interlocks (TDLKS) indicates the total number of interlocks 
created by directors of the focal company with other companies. For example, company 
1 has four directors (A, B, C, and D), among them director A sits on company boards 1 
and 4. Director B sits on company boards 1, 3, and 4. Director C sits on company 1 
board only, and director D sits on company boards 1, 3, and 4. Thus, director A creates 
one interlock, B creates two interlocks, C does not create any interlock, and D creates 
two interlocks. The TDLKS is five ( 1 +2 +  2). On the other hand, DLKS indicates the 
number of common interlocks created by the directors of the focal company with other 
companies. From the above example, directors of the focal company (company 1) A, B 
and D sit on companies 1 and 4, which counts once only. The same applies for directors
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B and D who sit on companies 1 and 4 and counts only once. Thus, the DLKS is two 
(1 + 1). Both the TDLKS and DLKS are zero for company 2 because there is no common 
director for company 2.
Calculation of the total director-audit firm interlocks (TDAFLKS) and common 
director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS) followed a procedure similar to that used by 
Jubb and Houghton (1999) and Jubb (2000). For example, let us assume there are 
interlocking relationships between directors in companies 1, 3 and 4. However, only 
companies 1 and 4 (not company 3) have a common audit firm (audit firm X) thus, 
creating director-audit firm interlocking. The TDAFLKS created by common directors 
and the audit firm for company 1 is three (A, B and D) and the DAFLKS is one 
(counted only once for the common directors). If companies 1 and 3 have a common 
audit partner from audit firm X, it creates director-audit partner interlocks (DAPLKS). 
The total number of director-audit partner interlocks (TDAPLKS) is three in companies 
1 and 3 (directors A, B and D and partner P) and DAPLKS is one. The same procedures 
were used for calculating audit committee members and audit firm/partner 
interlockings. The following sections provide definitions of the test variables.
3.1.2.1 Director interlocks (DLKS)
The term “interlocking directorates” or “director interlocking” or “director 
interlocks” typically refers to any situation in which two or more corporations share one 
or more directors in common (Allen, 1974; Stening and Wan, 1984; Stokman and 
Wasseur, 1985; Zajac, 1988; Mizruchi, 1996; Elouaer, 2006). That means, interlocking 
is “a connection between one or more companies created by the presence of common 
directors and such multiple or shared directorships are commonly referred to in the 
relevant literature as interlocking directorates” (Jubb and Houghton, 1999, p. 2). DLKS 
is used to refer to the number of companies linked by common directors, that is, the
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directors of one board create the number of common links with other companies’ 
boards.
3.1.2.2 Director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS)
The links to other companies through common directors that exist for a given or 
focal company, the tied companies, may or may not be audited by the same audit firm 
(Jubb, 2000). DLKS are necessary to director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS) and for 
the existence of systematic director-audit firm links to occur the same director must be 
associated with a common audit firm across a number of companies (Jubb and 
Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000). DAFLKS refers to the number of relationships created 
between common directors and the audit firm to signify that the audit firm is linked to 
companies with common directors (Jubb, 2000). DAFLKS is used when the same audit 
Finn coincides across companies on which the same director is a board member.
3.1.2.3 Director-audit partner interlocks (DAPLKS)
DAFLKS are necessary for director-audit partner interlocks (DAPLKS). For a 
director-audit partner link to occur, the same director must be associated with a 
common audit partner from a common audit firm over two or more companies. 
DAPLKS is used as the number of common interlocks created by the common audit 
partner from the same audit finn with the DAFLKS companies.
3.1.2.4 Audit committee member interlocks (ACLKS)
If a member of the audit committee of one company simultaneously sits on the 
audit committee(s) of other companies, it creates an audit committee member 
interlocking (ACLKS). Similar to DLKS, ACLKS indicates the number of links created 
by audit committee members sitting on other companies’ audit committees.
60
3.1.2.5 Audit committee member-audit firm interlocks (ACAFLKS)
When ACLKS companies are audited by a common audit firm, it creates audit 
committee member-audit firm interlocking (ACAFLKS). The frequency of ACAFLKS 
is calculated as the number of common interlocks created between the audit committee 
members’ linked companies and those companies audited by a common audit fmn.
3.1.2.6 Audit committee member-audit partner interlocks (ACAPLKS)
When ACLKS companies have a common signing audit partner from the same 
audit firm, it creates an audit committee member-audit partner interlock (ACAPLKS). 
ACAPLKS indicates the number of links created by the common audit committee 
members with a common audit firm and a common audit partner across the other 
companies.
3.1.3 Model specification
3.1.3.1 AUDITOR PROVIDED NON-AUDIT SERVICES FEES
Prior studies have modelled auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) fees 
as a function of a company’s auditor choice, audit complexity, audit risk, temporal 
instability, and the demand for consulting services (e.g., Firth, 1997b; Craswell, 1999; 
Ashbaugh et al, 2003; Ikin, 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005). 
This study draws on prior research on APNAS fees to identify the control variables 
considered appropriate when modelling APNAS fees. Specifically, Firth (1997b), 
Craswell (1999), Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Ikin (2003), Ruddock et al. (2004) and 
Ruddock and Taylor (2005) are reviewed to identify variables explaining APNAS fees. 
The natural log of auditor provided non-audit services (LnAPNAS) fees is the 
dependent variable for the following APNAS fee model that is used to estimate the
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relations between interlockings and APNAS fees paid by the companies to their
incumbent auditors:
LnAPNAS = ß0 + ßjINTERLOCKINGS + ß2LnTA + ß3BIG4 + ß4EQUITY + 
ßsMERACQS + ß6ROA + ß7LEVERAGE + ß8NEG ROA + ß9MB + 
ßioINITIAL + ßnBDlNDP + ß,2ACSIZE + ß,3INDEPAC + 
ßi4YEARo3.o5 + ßifZlNDUSTRY + e (1)
Where
LnAPNAS
Test variables 
INTERLOCKINGS
Control variables 
LnTA
BIG 4
EQUITY
natural log of auditor provided non-audit services fees from 
individual client;
interlocking variables, which include: director interlocks 
(DLKS), director-audit firm interlocks (DAFLKS), director- 
audit partner interlocks (DAPLKS), audit committee 
member interlocks (ACLKS), audit committee member- 
audit firm interlocks (ACAFLKS), and audit committee 
member-audit partner interlocks (ACAPLKS). Each of the 
variables is used separately in estimating the model;
natural log of total assets;
1 if a company’s incumbent auditor is a BIG 4 audit firm, 0 
otherwise;
1 if the company issues new shares during the current year, 0
25 Please see sections 3.1.2.1 to 3.1.2.6 for the definitions and explanations of these variables. The terms 
“director-audit firm” and “director-auditor” interlocking are used interchangeably. Similarly, audit 
committee member-audit firm and audit committee member-auditor interlocking are used 
interchangeably. Prior studies (e.g. Jubb and Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000) do not use interlocking links 
with audit partner and hence they used the term “auditor” instead of “audit firm”. The current study uses 
audit partner interlocking with director and/or audit committee member and mentions the links 
specifically.
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otherwise;
MERACQS 1 if the company is engaged in a merger/acquisition activity 
in the current year, 0 otherwise;
ROA = operating income divided by average total assets;
LEVERAGE = ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
NEG ROA = 1 if the finn reports a negative return on assets in the current 
year, 0 otherwise;
MB market-to-book ratio at fiscal-year-end, defined as market 
value of equity divided by shareholders equity;
INITIAL 1 if the audit firm engagement is in either the first or second 
year with the current auditee, 0 otherwise;
BDINDP = 1 if the board comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) 
of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
ACSIZE = number of audit committee members;
1NDEPAC — 1 if the audit committee comprises a majority (fifty per cent 
or more) of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
YEA R03 -05 = dummy variables for year of data;
^INDUSTRY = 1 if in the nominated industry group, 0 otherwise; 25 
dummies for 26 ASX industry groups.
3.1.3.1.1 Control variables
Previous studies report that APNAS fees are affected by many factors. These 
factors are treated as control variables in the APNAS fee model. Explanations of the 
control variables used in the APNAS fee model follow:
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Total assets (LnTA)
Larger companies have more complex systems and undertake a wider range of 
activities so they require more APNAS than smaller companies (Palmrose, 1986; 
Raghunandan et al., 2003). Using Australian data, Morecroft et al. (2005) finds that 
larger companies, as measured by market capitalisation26, have relatively higher 
proportions of APNAS relative to total fees compared to smaller companies. Prior 
studies report a significant positive association between the size of the company 
measured as total assets, and APNAS fees (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Hoitash et al., 
2005; Choi et al., 2006; Ye et al, 2006; Griffin et al., 2008). A significant positive 
association between the size of the entity, measured as the natural log of total assets, 
and APNAS fees is expected in this study.
Big 4 (BIG 4)
There is evidence that BIG 4 audit firms are better placed to provide a range of 
APNAS and offer a broader array of services than other auditors (Raghunandan et al., 
2003). Prior studies report a significant positive association between having a BIG 4/5 
auditor and APNAS fees (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Hoitash et al., 2005; Choi et al., 
2006; Ye et al., 2006; Griffin et al., 2008). Thus, a positive association between 
APNAS fees and audit firm size is expected in this study. BIG 4 is measured by a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if a company’s auditor is a BIG 4 audit firm, 0 
otherwise.
Issue o f equity (EQUITY)
Companies issuing new equity27 require more non-audit services (Firth, 1997b; 
Abbott et al., 2003; Raghunandan et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2005). Firth (1997b) argues
26 Results for the current study were robust whether using market capitalisation, total assets or total 
revenue as a measure of entity size.
27 Data for EQUITY was collected from Annual Cash Flow of the AspectHuntley database, named: 
proceeds from issues.
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that using the incumbent auditor to provide these services may be more efficient and 
effective than hiring external consultants. Prior studies report a significant positive 
association between EQUITY and APNAS fees (e.g., Firth, 1997b; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Raghunandan et al., 2003; Ghosh et al., 2005; Hoitash et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2006). 
Therefore, a positive association between EQUITY and APNAS fees is expected in this 
study. EQUITY is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm issues new equity 
during the year, 0 otherwise.
Merger and acquisitions (MERACQS)
Companies involved in mergers or acquisitions28 require additional work to 
make the merger or acquisition successful (Firth, 2002). These extra consulting 
activities involve aligning the accounting and information systems of the acquired 
company and this requires more non-audit services (Firth, 2002). Thus, the entity may 
appoint the incumbent audit firm and pay more APNAS fees when engaging in mergers 
and/or acquisitions (Firth, 2002). Prior studies report a significant positive association 
between MERACQS and APNAS fees (e.g., Firth, 1997b; Abbott et al., 2003; 
Raghunandan et al, 2003; Ghosh et al., 2005; Hoitash et al., 2005; Choi et al., 2006). 
MERACQS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm was engaged in a 
merger/acquisition activity during the year, 0 otherwise. A positive association between 
APNAS fees and MERACQS is expected in this study.
Return on assets (ROA)
The profitability of a client is considered to be a measure of risk that may affect 
APNAS fees (Simunic, 1980). Hay et al. (2005) argues that the worse the performance 
of a client, the more the risk to the auditor and the higher the APNAS fees. Ashbaugh et 
al. (2003), Hoitash et al. (2005) and Ye et al. (2006) report a significant negative
2X Mergers and acquisition data was collected from the SDC Platinum database.
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association between ROA and APNAS fee. ROA is calculated as the current year’s 
operating income divided by average total assets (Total Assets] + Total Assetst-i)/2. A 
negative association between ROA and APNAS fees is expected in this study.
Debt to total assets (LEVERAGE)
The financial risk of a company is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets (LEVERAGE). High debt ratios increase agency costs and companies with 
greater agency costs are more likely to curtail APNAS purchases (Parkash and Venable, 
1993; Firth, 1997b; Abbott et al, 2003; Raghunandan et al., 2003). Firth (1997b) 
reports a significant negative association between LEVERAGE and APNAS fees. 
However, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005) report a significant 
positive association between LEVERAGE and APNAS fees. Therefore, the expected 
sign of LEVERAGE with APNAS fees is not specified in this study.
Negative return on assets (NEC ROA)
Prior studies argue that a poorly performing company demands more APNAS to 
improve profitability (e.g., Firth, 1997b; Abbott et al., 2003). Ashbaugh et al. (2003) 
reports a significant negative association between a negative return on assets and 
APNAS fees. A negative association between APNAS fees and NEG ROA is expected 
in this study. NEG ROA is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm reports a 
negative return on assets in the current year, 0 otherwise.
Market-to-  book value (MB)
Prior studies use market-to-book ratio (MB) as a proxy for firm performance in 
the APNAS fees model (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Raghunandan et al., 2003; 
Whisenant et al., 2003). Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Whisenant et al. (2003) report a 
significant negative association between MB and APNAS fees while Raghunandan et
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al. (2003) finds no significant association between MB and APNAS fees. Similar to 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Whisenant et al. (2003), a negative association between MB 
and APNAS fees is expected in this study.
Audit engagement (INITIAL)
A company may be less likely to purchase APNAS from the incumbent auditor 
during the early years of an audit engagement, or auditors may be more likely to market 
more APNAS after becoming more familiar with the client (Raghunandan et al., 2003). 
Raghunandan et al. (2003) reports a significant negative association between APNAS 
fees and the early years of an audit engagement. Thus, a negative association between 
APNAS fees and INITIAL is expected in this study. INITIAL is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the audit engagement is in either its first or second year, 0 otherwise.
Board independence (BDINDP)
Independent directors monitor managers and hence managers are less likely to 
opportunistically influence auditors when the percentage of outside directors is high 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, Ghosh et al., 2006). Ghosh et al. (2006) finds a 
significant negative association between board independence and APNAS fees. A 
negative association between BDINDP and APNAS fees is expected in this study.
Audit committee size (ACSIZE)
Size of the audit committee may affect APNAS fees. Abbott et al. (2003) reports 
that audit committees attempt to reduce the level of APNAS purchased by the auditor. 
Ghosh et al. (2006) finds that firms with larger audit committees purchase less APNAS. 
A negative association between ACSIZE and APNAS fees is expected in this study.
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Audit committee independence (INDEPAC)
Auditor independence increases with the percentage of independent directors on 
audit committees (Carcello and Neal, 2000). Abbott et al. (2003) argues that audit 
committee members who are independent and active financial monitors have incentives 
to limit APNAS fees and reports a significant and negative association with the ratio of 
APNAS fees. Lee and Mande (2005) reports that effective audit committees seek to 
increase audit quality by reducing the non-audit services provided by the external 
auditor. Ghosh et al. (2006) finds a significant negative association between audit 
committee independence and APNAS. A negative association between INDEPAC and 
APNAS fees is expected in this study.
Year as dummies (YEAR03-05)
YEARo3_o5 represents dummy variables for each of the years 2003-2004 (with 
2005 the comparison year) of this study. It is designated as 1 if the observation is drawn 
from the year indicated and otherwise as 0. These variables are included to check for 
time-specific factors occurring across the sample period. There are two dummy 
variables for the three years.
Type o f industry (IINDUSTRY)
Companies in some industries may need more consulting advice. For example, 
the mining industry may require more consulting services due to the greater uncertainty 
surrounding the eventual realisation of capitalised assets such as exploration and 
development costs. Ashbaugh et al (2003) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005) use industry 
dummies to control for cross industry differences in APNAS fees. ^INDUSTRY is used 
as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company belongs to the appropriate
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industry group, 0 otherwise. The 26 ASX industry classifications29 are used in this study 
and hence there are 25 dummy variables to account for the industries.
3.1.3.2 AUDIT FIRM TENURE
Audit firm tenure is used in this study as one of the dependent variables to 
measure auditor independence. AFTENURE is a continuous variable representing the 
number of years of the length of the relationship between the audit firm and the client. 
To examine the relation between audit firm tenure and interlocking variables, a 
modified version of the AFTENURE model used by Courtney and Jubb (2005) is 
employed, but some additional variables are included (e.g., unexpected audit fee, 
unexpected APNAS fee) that may affect audit firm tenure. The following AFTENURE 
model is estimated to examine the relation between interlockings and audit firm tenure:
AFTENURE = oto + ß ,INTERLOCKINGS + ß2UXAF + ß3LEVERAGE + ß4PQUAL 
+ ß5LnTA + ß6BIG4 + ß7LnAGE + ß8G_TA + ß9LOSS + 
ß,0UXAPNAS + ß,,AA + ß,2BDINDP + ß^ACSIZE + ß,4INDEPAC 
+ ß,5YEARo3.o5+e (2)
Where
AFTENURE
Test Variables 
INTERLOCKINGS
Control variables 
UXAF
number of years the audit firm has been engaged by the 
current client;
as stated earlier;
unexpected audit fees estimated from the residuals of the 
audit fee model, excluding the interlocking variables;
29 For industry classification, this study uses Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) 4-digit for 
all industry sectors other than Materials, where a 6-digit code is used. Energy (1010) industry is the base 
for dummy variable.
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L E V E R A G E = ra tio  o f  to ta l l ia b ilitie s  to  to ta l a sse ts ;
P Q U A L = 1 i f  the  c o m p a n y  h a s  o th e r  th a n  an  u n q u a lif ie d  o p in io n  in  the  
p re v io u s  y ea r, 0 o th e rw ise ;
L n T A = n a tu ra l lo g  o f  to ta l a sse ts ;
B IG  4 — 1 i f  c o m p a n y ’s in c u m b e n t a u d ito r  is a  B IG  4  a u d it firm , 0 
o th e rw ise ;
L n A G E = n a tu ra l lo g  o f  ag e  o f  th e  c o m p a n y  m e a su re d  as th e  n u m b e r  
o f  y e a rs  th e  c o m p a n y  h a s  b e e n  lis ted  on  th e  A S X ;
G _ T A G ro w th -m e a s u re d  as th e  p e rc e n ta g e  c h a n g e  in to ta l a sse ts  
fro m  th e  p re v io u s  p e r io d 30;
L O S S 1 i f  th e  c o m p a n y  re p o rte d  a lo ss  e ith e r  in  th e  c u rre n t o r 
p re v io u s  y e a r , 0 o th e rw ise ;
U X A P N A S u n e x p e c te d  A P N A S  fees  e s tim a te d  fro m  th e  re s id u a ls  o f  the  
A P N A S  fee  m o d e l, e x c lu d in g  the  in te r lo c k in g  v a ria b le s ;
A A 1 i f  th e  a u d it f irm  w a s  A rth u r  A n d e rse n  d u rin g  2 0 0 1 , 0 
o th e rw ise ;
B D IN D P = 1 i f  th e  b o a rd  c o m p rise s  a m a jo r ity  (f if ty  p e r  c e n t o r m o re )  
o f  n o n -e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to rs , 0 o th e rw ise ;
A C S IZ E = n u m b e r  o f  a u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e rs ;
IN D E P A C = 1 i f  the  a u d it  c o m m itte e  c o m p rise s  a m a jo r ity  (f if ty  p e r  ce n t 
o r  m o re ) o f  n o n -e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to rs , 0 o th e rw ise ;
Y E A R 03-05 = d u m m y  v a r ia b le s  fo r  y e a r  o f  data .
30 Growth can be measured by sales growth, asset growth or the ratio of market to book value (MB). This 
model uses asset growth so all types of companies can be included in the sample. Studies that use sales 
growth have had to exclude financial entities due to their specific nature. The AFTENURE model 
(Equation 2) was re-run substituting G_TA to sales growth. The results were the same.
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3.1.3.2.1 Control variables
The following sections discuss the control variables for the AFTENURE model. 
Unexpected audit fees (UXAF)
Audit Finn tenure may be influenced by unexpected audit fees (UXAF) earned 
by the audit Finn for auditing the client’s Financial statements. Haskins and Williams 
(1990) argues that audit fees that are perceived to be excessively high are influential for 
auditor changes. Courtney and Jubb (2005) reports a signiFicant positive association 
between audit Firm tenure and audit fees. If an auditor earns more than the expected fees 
from a client it may motivate the auditor to continue the engagement with the auditee 
for a longer period. Alternatively, it may also motivate the client to change auditors to a 
lower fee auditor. No direction of association between UXAF and AFTENURE is 
predicted in this study. UXAF is measured as the residuals from the estimated audit fees 
model.31
Debt to total assets (LEVERAGE)
The total liabilities to total assets ratio (LEVERAGE) reflects the leverage of the 
company and is an indicator of the long-term solvency and Financial risk position of the 
company (Monroe and Teh, 1993; Jubb, 2000). A relatively risky client (high 
LEVERAGE) may have shorter auditor tenure than a less risky client (Sinason et al., 
2001). Financially stressed clients are more likely to replace their audit Firms than 
healthier companies (Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Hudaib and Cooke, 2005; Nasser et
This study estimates the following model for calculating UXAF. The natural log of audit fees (LnAF) 
as the dependent variable (same as Eq. 1 excluding INTERLOCKING variable):
LnAF = ß0 + ßiLnTA + ß2BIG4 + ß3EQUITY + ß4MERACQS + ß5ROA + ß6LEVERAGE + 
ß7NEG ROA + ßxMB + ßylNITIAL + ß 10BDINDP + ß„ACSIZE + ß12INDEPAC + ß l3YEAR()3-05 + 
ß 14IINDUSTRY + e
UXAF is the residual from the above model. Unexpected fees can also be calculated by taking the 
difference between estimated fees and actual fees for each observation. Results were robust in both cases.
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al., 2006). Nasser et al. (2006) reports that a client’s financial risk is significantly 
associated with auditor switching. Courtney and Jubb (2005) argues that high 
LEVERAGE acts as a disincentive to auditors to continue the auditor-client 
relationship. However, their study does not find any significant association between 
financial risk and audit firm tenure. A negative association between LEVERAGE and 
AFTENURE is expected.
Previous year audit opinion (PQUAL)
Auditors may lose an audit engagement by qualifying the audit report. Prior 
studies argue that receiving an opinion other than unqualified in the previous year may 
induce the client to find a new auditor or to have a higher tendency to switch auditors 
(e.g., Chow and Rice, 1982; Schwartz and Menon, 1985; Krishnan, 1994; Sinason et al., 
2001). However, prior studies report that firms that received qualified audit opinions are 
not more likely to switch audit firms (e.g., Chow and Rice, 1982; Schwartz and Menon, 
1985; Courtney and Jubb, 2005). A dichotomous variable is used, coded 1 if the audit 
report of a company is other than unqualified in the prior year, 0 otherwise. A negative 
association between PQUAL and AFTENURE is expected.
Total assets (LnTA)
Audits of large companies may incur greater start-up costs for both the auditor 
and the client, which may discourage large companies from switching auditors. The 
increased costs may cause enhanced nurturing of the auditor-client relationship, which 
increases auditor tenure (Sinason et al., 2001). Larger companies generally hire BIG 4 
auditors that provide high quality audits, which also decrease the likelihood of auditor 
switching (DeAngelo, 1981a). Courtney and Jubb (2005) does not find a significant 
association between auditor tenure and size of the company. Nasser et al. (2006) finds a
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significant positive association between company size and auditor tenure. The size of 
the company is measured by using the natural log of total assets (LnTA). A positive 
association between LnTA and AFTENURE is expected.
Big 4 (BIG 4)
The size of the audit firm may affect the duration of the auditor-client 
relationship (Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Larger clients may require larger audit firms 
due to their audit resource requirements and these auditor and client relationships may 
be longer than those of non-BIG 4 audit firms (Sinason et al., 2001). Levinthal and 
Fichman (1988) reports that client relations with BIG 8 firms are likely to last longer 
than those with non-BIG 8 auditors. Courtney and Jubb (2005) also reports a positive 
association between BIG 6 auditors and audit firm tenure. Nasser et al. (2006) reports a 
significant negative association between BIG 4 audit firms and audit firms’ switching. 
BIG 4 is captured by a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if a company’s auditor 
is a member of the BIG 4 audit firms, 0 otherwise. A positive association with 
AFTENURE is expected in this study.
Company age (LnAGE)
Audit firm tenure may depend on the age of the company (Courtney and Jubb, 
2005). Relatively younger companies are more likely to experience financial distress 
and may receive a qualified audit report and consequently there is a higher probability 
of auditor switching (Chow and Rice, 1982; Dopuch et al., 1987; Monroe and Teh, 
1993; Jubb, 2000). Courtney and Jubb (2005) reports a significant positive association 
between company age and auditor tenure. Their study argues that the older companies 
have had the time to build a personal attachment with the auditors compared to newer or 
younger companies that have had less time to have had an auditor. A positive
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association between company age and AFTENURE is expected. LnAGE is measured as 
the natural log of the number of years the company has been listed on the ASX.
Growth (G TA)
A client’s growth may affect audit firm tenure. Growth of the company may 
influence the decision to change auditors because the current auditor may not have 
enough resources to provide auditing services for the new resource requirements of a 
client that is experiencing significant growth (Seabright et al., 1992; Courtney and Jubb, 
2005). Haskins and Williams (1990) reports that the growth of a client is a significant 
determinant of auditor change. Courtney and Jubb (2005) reports a significant negative 
association between growth and audit firm tenure. G TA is operationalised as the 
percentage change in total assets from the prior year. A negative association between 
G TA and AFTENURE is expected.
Current or previous year loss (LOSS)
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reports a loss for either 
the current or previous year, 0 otherwise. Companies that incur losses are more likely to 
receive a qualified audit opinion due to a higher litigation risk (Lai and Yim, 2003). A 
company receiving a qualified audit opinion may be motivated to switch auditors in 
order to gain a clean report from the new auditor (Teoh, 1992; Lai and Yim, 2003). In 
addition, companies that incur losses are more likely to be associated with damages to 
the reputation of auditors in the event of litigation, and auditors may be less likely to 
retain such clients (Menon and Williams 1994; DeFond et al, 1997; Krishnan and 
Krishnan, 1997). A negative association between LOSS and AFTENURE is expected.
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Auditor provided unexpected non-audit services (UXAPNAS) fees
Auditor reliance on auditor provided non-audit fees may affect auditor tenure. 
Auditors earning unexpectedly high APNAS fees may be motivated to continue the 
audit engagement for a longer period and earn future positive unexpectedly high 
APNAS fees. UXAPNAS is measured as the residuals from the estimated APNAS fee 
model (Eq. 1). A positive association between UXAPNAS fees and AFTENURE is 
expected.
Arthur Andersen (AA)
Arthur Andersen (AA) was dissolved in 2001 and all of its clients had to change 
auditor. This affects audit firm tenure during the period of study. In order to control for 
the impact of this issue on audit firm tenure, a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the 
audit firm was A A during 2001, 0 otherwise is used. A negative association between 
AA and AFTENURE is expected.
Board independence (B DIN DP)
Independent directors are more likely to draw on their broader experience and 
expertise in management oversight and to perform better as board members (Kosnik 
1987). Beasley and Petroni (2001) finds that boards with a higher percentage of outside 
directors are more likely to select a specialist Big 6 auditor, hence there is less 
likelihood of switching auditor. Chen and Zhou (2007) finds that clients with more 
independent boards were more likely to dismiss Andersen earlier due to their concern 
for auditor independence. A negative association between BDINDP and AFTENURE is 
expected.
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Audit committee size (ACSIZE)
Prior research (e.g., Pincus et al, 1989) suggests that audit committee size 
influences their effectiveness. Lennox and Park (2007) claims that the audit committee 
is the most important governance mechanism with respect to audit firm appointments 
because the audit committee is responsible for hiring the external auditor and overseeing 
audit quality. Chen and Zhou (2007) argues that larger audit committees with increased 
organizational status and power delegated by boards of directors are thus more likely to 
be recognized as an authoritative body by management, external auditors, and internal 
auditors. Larger audit committees are also more likely to care about auditor reputation 
and were more likely to dismiss Andersen earlier (Chen and Zhou, 2007). A negative 
association between ACSIZE and AFTENURE is expected.
Audit committee independence (INDEPAC)
An active audit committee composed entirely of outside directors is a key 
element of effective corporate governance (Jemison and Oakley, 1983; Chen and Zhou, 
2007). Carcello and Neal (2003) observes that greater audit committee independence 
and expertise can help reduce the likelihood of auditor dismissal after the issuance of 
new going-concern reports. Using a sample of 821 firms, which dismissed Arthur 
Andersen as their auditor between October 15, 2001 and August 31, 2002, Chen and 
Zhou (2007) finds that firms with more independent audit committees dismissed 
Andersen earlier. Hoitash and Hoitash (2008) investigates whether audit committee 
expertise, size and diligence are associated with auditor dismissal and reports that 
stronger audit committees are less likely to dismiss their auditors. A negative 
association between INDEPAC and AFTENURE is expected.
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Year as dummies (YEAR03-05)
Definitions and reasons for use are the same as previously described.
3.1.3.3 AUDIT OPINION
This section describes the model used to examine the association between 
interlockings and audit quality where audit quality is proxied by the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor. OPINION is the dependent variable to 
investigate whether the interlockings are associated with the likelihood of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion by the auditor after controlling for factors that are likely to affect 
audit opinion. OPINION is a dummy variable set to 0 if the company has an unqualified 
opinion in the current year and set to 1 for other than an unqualified opinion.
Prior studies develop models for predicting audit opinions. The current study 
uses the independent variables used by Monroe and Teh (1993, 2000) and includes 
other variables considered appropriate for predicting the likelihood of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion. The following logistic regression model is estimated to 
investigate the associations between interlockings and OPINION:
OPINION = oto + ßilNTERLOCKINGS + ß2BIG4 + ß3LnTA + ß4UXAF + 
ß5LEVERAGE + ß6PQUAL + ß7LnAGE + ß8UXAPNAS + 
ß9AFTENURE + ßi0LOSS + ß, 1 INITIAL + ß12ROA + ß,3SQRSUBS + 
ß,4INDEPAC + ß15BDINDP + ßi6ACSIZE + ß17YEAR03.o5 +e
(3)
Where
OPINION = 1 if the auditor issues other than an unqualified opinion in the
current year, 0 otherwise;
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Test Variables
INTERLOCKINGS = as stated earlier;
Control variables
BIG 4
PQUAL
LnTA
UXAF
LEVERAGE
LnAGE
UXAPNAS
AFTENURE
LOSS
INITIAL
ROA
SQRSUBS
INDEPAC
= 1 if company’s incumbent auditor is a BIG 4 audit Finn, 0
otherwise;
= 1 if the company has other than an unqualified opinion in the
previous year, 0 otherwise;
= natural log of total assets;
= unexpected audit fees estimated from the residuals of the audit 
fee model;
= ratio of total liabilities to total assets;
= natural log of age of the company measured as the number of 
years the company has been listed on the ASX;
= auditor provided unexpected non-audit fees estimated from 
the residuals of the APNAS fee model;
= number of years that the audit firm has been engaged with the 
current auditee;
= 1 if the company reported a loss either in the current year or
previous year, 0 otherwise;
= 1 if the audit firm engagement is in either the first or second
year with the current auditee, 0 otherwise;
= operating income divided by average total assets;
= square root of number of subsidiaries;
= 1 if the audit committee comprises a majority (fifty per cent or
more) of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
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BDINDP = 1 if the board comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) of
non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
ACSIZE = number of audit committee members;
Y EA R .03-05 = dummy variables for year of data.
3.1.3.3.1 Control variables
The following sections discuss the control variables of the OPINION
model.
Big 4 (BIG 4)
Auditor quality is frequently measured by audit firm size. Smaller audit firms 
may not have effective audit technology compared to BIG 4 audit firms to detect 
situations requiring an audit qualification (Monroe and Teh, 1993). Smaller audit firms 
could also be less willing to issue qualified audit opinions due to their smaller client 
base and the possibility of auditor switching (Monroe and Teh, 1993). Kida (1980) finds 
that an auditor’s opinion decision could be influenced by the perceived consequences of 
qualifying or not qualifying the opinion. Jubb (2000) finds that the presence of a BIG 6 
auditor is negatively associated with the likelihood of receiving an audit qualification. 
Mutchler (1984) reports that smaller auditing firms tended not to qualify smaller 
companies given similar or worse levels of financial distress as those experienced by 
larger companies and audit firms. Monroe and Teh (2000) and Jackson et al. (2008) find 
a significant negative association between BIG 6 and the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified audit opinion. Larger clients may also choose BIG 4 audit firms and are 
generally in a sound financial position with less need to issue a qualified opinion. BIG 4 
is captured by a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if a company’s auditor is a 
member of the BIG 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise. Similar to other studies (e.g., Jubb, 2000;
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Monroe and Teh, 2000; Jackson et al., 2008), a negative association between BIG 4 and 
the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
Total assets (LnTA)
The natural log of total assets (LnTA) is used to control for the effect of 
company size on the audit opinion. A larger entity can represent a healthy, growing and 
prosperous company and it is less likely that any uncertainties will be material enough 
to issue a qualified opinion compared to a smaller entity (Monroe and Teh, 1993; Jubb, 
2000). Smaller companies receive qualified opinions more often than large companies 
(Monroe and Teh, 1993; Krishnan, 1994; Carcello et al., 1995, Lennox, 2002; Li et al., 
2003; Jackson et al., 2008; Lai and Gul, 2008). A negative association between LnTA 
and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
Unexpected audit fees (UXAF)
An audit firm’s dependence on a particular client or group of clients for audit 
fees may provide incentives not to qualify the audit report when it should be qualified. 
When audit firms earn high fees, they may face economic pressure to give clean 
opinions in order to deter clients from switching to other auditors (Lennox, 2003). 
Hoitash et al. (2005) reports that clients with higher than normal fees were more likely 
to exercise influence on their auditors. Geiger and Rama (2003) finds a significant 
positive association between the magnitude of audit fees and the likelihood of receiving 
a going-concern qualified audit opinion. A negative association between UXAF and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected. UXAF is the residual from 
the estimated audit fee model.
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Debt to total assets (LEVERAGE)
The total liabilities to total assets ratio (LEVERAGE) is used as an indicator of 
the long-term solvency and financial risk position of the company (Monroe and Teh, 
1993; Jubb, 2000). Mutchler (1984) and Levitan and Knoblett (1985) find that financial 
leverage is an important consideration for auditors in assessing a company’s going- 
concern ability. Li et al. (2003) and Ye et al. (2006) find that leverage is significant and 
positively related to the type of audit opinion, suggesting that companies with higher 
leverage are more likely to receive a qualified or modified audit opinion. Monroe and 
Teh (1993) and Jubb (2000) report a significant positive association between 
LEVERAGE and OPINION. A positive association between LEVERAGE and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
Previous year audit opinion (PQUAL)
The current year’s audit opinion might be influenced by the prior year’s audit 
opinion (Mutchler, 1985; Monroe and Teh, 1993). A company receiving an uncertainty 
qualification in the previous year is likely to receive a qualification for the same reason 
in the current year as the uncertainties could extend beyond one year (Monroe and Teh, 
1993). Several studies find that auditors are more likely to issue going-concern opinions 
in the presence of previous going-concern problems (e.g., Mutchler, 1985; Lennox, 
2003). Prior studies report a significant positive association between PQUAL and less 
likely to issue a going-concern opinion (Jubb, 2000; Monroe and Teh, 2000; Jackson et 
al, 2008; Lai and Gul, 2008). A dichotomous variable is used, coded 1 if the audit report 
of a company was other than unqualified in the prior year, 0 otherwise. A positive 
association between PQUAL and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is 
expected.
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Company age (LnAGE)
Younger companies are more likely to experience financial distress and, 
consequently, they are more likely to receive an audit qualification (Dopuch et al., 
1987; Monroe and Teh, 1993; Jubb, 2000). Lincoln et al. (1992) argues that older 
companies enjoy reputation and status because of their longevity and are less likely to 
receive a qualification. Firth (2002) argues that as older companies are better known by 
investors, they are less likely to be involved in litigation with investors and, therefore, 
have a lower probability of receiving qualified opinions. LnAGE is the natural log of 
the number of years the company has been listed on the ASX. A negative association 
between LnAGE and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
Auditor provided unexpected non-audit (UXAPNAS) fees
UXAPNAS fees from a client may influence the auditor’s judgment about what 
type of audit opinion to issue. When auditors earn a significant amount of positive 
UXAPNAS fees from an individual client or a group of clients it may make auditors 
more economically dependent on those clients and, as a result, auditors may not qualify 
audit reports for those clients (Magee and Tseng, 1990; Becker et al, 1998). If 
UXAPNAS fees influence auditor judgment, then the incidence of qualified audit 
reports may decline (Firth, 2002). UXAPNAS fee is the residual from the estimated 
APNAS fees model (Eq. 1). A positive association between UXAPNAS and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
Audit firm tenure (AFTENURE)
The type of audit opinion received may influence a client’s decision to switch or 
retain the incumbent auditor (Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2006). The probability of retaining 
the incumbent auditor will be higher when a company receives a clean audit opinion
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(Ruiz-Barbadillo et al, 2006). If there is a disagreement between the client and the 
auditor and the auditor has issued a qualified audit opinion, then the client may switch 
auditors (Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan and Stephens 1995; Lennox, 2000). Prior studies 
provide evidence that extended audit firm tenure does not reduce the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit report (Barkess and Simnett, 1994; Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002; Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Jackson et a/., 2008). Alternatively, when auditors have 
long-term relationships with their clients, expected future rents may be higher and the 
auditor may not qualify the audit opinion (Lennox, 2003). AFTENURE is a continuous 
measure of the number of years the current auditor has been audited the client. Direction 
between AFTENURE and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is not 
predicted in this study due to the conflicting arguments mounted in previous studies.
Current or previous year loss (LOSS)
LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company reports a loss in either 
the current or previous year, 0 otherwise. LOSS increases the likelihood of a qualified 
opinion because of the higher litigation risk, and profitable firms are less likely to 
receive a qualified opinion because of the lower likelihood of a lawsuit against the 
auditor (Lai and Yim, 2003) and also more likely to have going-concern issues. 
Shareholders are more likely to sue the auditors of clients that have poor profitability 
and auditors may defend themselves by qualifying the audit report (Firth, 2002). 
Monroe and Teh (1993), Yq et al. (2006) and Lai and Gul (2008) find a significant 
positive association between recurring losses and the likelihood of receiving a qualified 
audit opinion. DeFond et al. (2002) finds a positive and significant relation between a 
qualified audit opinion and incurring a loss in the prior year. A positive association 
between LOSS and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
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Audit engagement (INITIAL)
New auditors are less likely to issue a qualified audit opinion (Ruiz-Barbadillo 
et al., 2006). Both the auditor and auditee accrue some initial costs in an audit 
engagement (Johnson, 2006). Auditors who do not want to lose the client in the initial 
year and want to recover their initial costs in subsequent years may not issue a qualified 
audit opinion because it is assumed that receiving an opinion other than unqualified may 
motivate the client to find a new auditor (Chow and Rice, 1982; Krishnan, 1994; 
Sinason et al., 2001). Alternatively, DeAngelo (1981b) suggests that the auditor’s initial 
start-up costs become sunk costs in subsequent audits and do not affect the auditor’s 
reporting decision. A longer tenure may mean audit firms better understand clients’ 
financial conditions and are more likely to detect going-concern difficulties (Lennox, 
2003). INITIAL is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit engagement is in either 
the first or second year, 0 otherwise. Direction of association between INITIAL and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is not predicted.
Return on assets (ROA)
Return on assets (ROA) is used to measure the profitability of the client. An 
auditor may consider this ratio for issuing a going-concern qualified audit decision 
because poor profitability may increase the inherent risk of the audit (Monroe and Teh, 
2000). Poor operating results are likely to place pressure on management and they may 
mis-state the financial statements to show a more favourable financial position by 
enhancing the results of the operations (Monroe and Teh, 2000). This pressure increases 
the likelihood that the auditor will issue a qualified audit opinion (Monroe and Teh, 
2000). ROA is measured from current year operating profit divided by average total 
assets (Total Assets] + Total Assets,_i)/2. A negative association between ROA and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is expected.
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Number o f subsidiaries (SQRSUBS)
The number of subsidiaries of a company is used as a proxy for the complexity 
of the client’s organisation (Monroe and Teh, 2000). An auditor considers the 
complexity of the entity when assessing inherent risk and issuing audit opinion (Monroe 
and Teh, 2000).32 An auditor may qualify the audit report to avoid future litigation for a 
risky client (Monroe and Teh, 2000). Monroe and Teh (2000) argues that a complex 
organisational structure may signal manipulated financial information or complex 
transactions, which increases audit risk and this increases the likelihood that the auditor 
will issue a qualified audit opinion. Monroe and Teh (2000) does not find a significant 
association between the number of subsidiaries and audit opinion. The square root of 
the number of subsidiaries (SQRSUBS) is used as a measure for audit complexity. A 
positive association between SQRSUBS and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit 
opinion is expected.
Audit committee independence (1NDEPAC)
Prior research suggests that independent audit committees improve the quality of 
external financial reporting and facilitate the audit process (Monroe and Teh, 2000). 
Monroe et al. (1995) finds a significant positive association between the independence 
of audit committees and qualified audit opinions. However, Monroe and Teh (2000) 
finds no significant association between them. Carcello and Neal (2000) finds that the 
higher the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee, the lower the 
probability the auditor would issue a going-concern audit qualification. INDEPAC is 
proxied by a dummy variable of 1 if the majority (fifty per cent or more) of the audit 
committee members are non-executive directors, 0 otherwise. Direction of association
~’2 Most of the prior studies use receivable plus inventory to total assets as proxy for audit complexity. 
Monroe and Teh (2000) uses the number of subsidiaries as a measure of complexity for predicting audit 
opinion. The current study uses the number of subsidiaries to include all types of companies (financial 
companies do not have receivables and inventory). The model (Equation 3) was re-run replacing 
receivable plus inventory to total assets, however, the results remained the same.
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between INDEPAC and the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion is not 
predicted.
Board independence (BDINDP)
Prior research (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003) has shown that 
board characteristics have an important impact on the quality of financial reporting. 
Beasley (1996) predicts that the inclusion of larger proportion of outside directors on 
the board significantly reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud and finds that 
no-fraud finns have boards with significantly higher percentage of outside members 
than fraud firms. Farinha and Viana (2009) reports that firms with more diligent and 
independent boards are less likely to receive a modified audit opinion. A negative 
association between BDINDP and OPINION is expected.
Audit committee size (ACSIZE)
Audit committee size may affect audit quality. Beasley (1996) finds that smaller 
audit committees may be more effective than larger committees. Carcello and Neal 
(2000) argues that if smaller committees are more effective, audit committee size might 
be associated with a higher incidence of going-concern reports for financially distressed 
companies. Their study does not find noticeable differences in audit committee size 
between companies receiving going-concern or unmodified reports. A positive 
association between ACSIZE and OPINION is expected.
Year as dummies (YEAR03-05)
Two dummy variables are used (representing 2003 and 2004) for the three years 
of data in the OPINION model to check for time-specific factors occurring across the 
sample period. The definition is the same as previously described in this thesis.
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3.1.3.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
This section describes the model for calculating discretionary accruals, which 
are used to investigate whether interlockings are associated with earnings management. 
Hoitash et al. (2005) argues that discretionary accruals provide a metric for assessing 
the degree of bias infused into the financial statements by management and tolerated by 
the auditor. If interlockings are related to higher discretionary accruals, this would 
provide evidence that interlocking companies manipulate financial reports through 
earnings management to a greater extent than do non-interlocking companies.
Following the studies of Hribar and Collins (2002) and Coulton et al. (2005), the 
total accruals (TACC) component of earnings is measured as the difference between 
operating income/profit (OI) and cash flow from operations (CFO). Hribar and Collins 
(2002) argues that this direct measure of accruals was less subjective to measurement 
error. The following equation is used to calculate total accruals:
TACC = Ol -CFO (4)
Where
TACC = total accruals;
OI = operating income;
CFO = cash flow from operations.
Estimates of discretionary accruals are often criticised due to the lack of power
33of the models in detecting earnings management. The current study uses the cross-
33 There are a few studies that examine the prediction capability of accruals models. Dechow et al. (1995) 
evaluates the relative performance of five earnings management models in detecting earnings 
management by comparing the specification and power of commonly used tests across discretionary 
accruals generated by the models. Their study shows that the Modified Jones Model provides the most 
powerful test of earnings management. Bartov et al. (2001) investigates the ability to detect earnings 
management for six discretionary accruals models and the contingency-table tests for the association 
between high discretionary accruals and audit qualifications shows significant results for the Modified 
Jones Models, and the two cross-sectional models.
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sectional forward-looking Modified-Jones model of Dechow et al. (2003) to estimate
the magnitude of discretionary accruals. An Australian study by Coulton et al. (2005) 
compares three Modified-Jones models and suggests that:
“researchers attempting to identify expected accruals using Australian data 
should consider extending the Modified-Jones model in the manner suggests by 
Dechow et al. (2003)” (p. 562).
Dechow et al. (2003) includes sales growth (S GROWTH) in the cross- 
sectional modified forward-looking Jones model, which doubled the explanatory power 
of the Modified-Jones model. Their study includes the lagged value of total accruals 
(LTACC) to capture the extent to which a current year’s accruals are a function of the 
previous year’s accruals. Coulton et al. (2005) argues that accruals are less persistent 
than cash flow as a result of the way they reverse, so the inclusion of lagged total 
accruals should help capture the predictable component. The current study includes both 
S GROWTH and LTACC in estimating discretionary accruals. Subject to a minimum 
of 10 observations in each industry category for each year, this model is estimated 
cross-sectionally for each 4-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) (6- 
digit for the Materials sector) industry group in each of the years 2003-2005 as follows:
TACC = a + ßi(AREV-AREC) + ß2PPE + ß3LTACC + ß4S GROWTH + s
(5)
Where
TACC total accruals are the difference between operating income (OI)
and cash flow from operations (CFO);
AREV change in revenue from period t-1 to period t;
AREC change in net accounts receivables from period t-1 to period t;
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PPE gross value of property, plant and equipment;
LTACC = value of total accruals in year t-1, that is the difference between
the operating income (01) and cash flow from operation (CFO) in 
previous year scaled by average of total assets of t-1 and t-2;
S GROWTH = next year sales minus current year sales divided by current year 
sales;
8 = error terms.
Following Dechow et al. (2003), all variables, other than S GROWTH, are 
scaled by the average value of total assets.
This section describes the discretionary accruals model used in recent studies 
(e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ruddock et al., 2004; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005). The 
model is used to investigate whether interlockings are associated with the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals. The absolute value of discretionary accruals ABSDACC is the 
dependent variable for testing the hypotheses. Discretionary accruals are the residuals 
estimated from the above model (equation 5).
DACC = a, + ß, INTERLOCKINGS + ß2UXAF + ß3UXAPNAS + ß4AFTENURE + 
ß5BIG4 + ß6CASHFLOW + ß7LTACC + ßgLnMVE + ß9LEVERAGE + 
ß10MB + ß,,LOSS + ß12MERACQS + ßnEQUITY + ß14BDINDP + 
ß15ACSIZE + ßi6INDEPAC + ß17YEAR03.05 + e (6)
Where
DACC = discretionary accruals calculated as the residuals from the
TACC model (equation 5).
Test Variables
INTERLOCKINGS = as stated earlier;
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Control variables
U X A F =  u n e x p e c te d  a u d it fe e s  e s tim a te d  fro m  th e  re s id u a ls  o f  the  
a u d it  fee  m o d e l, e x c lu d in g  in te r lo c k in g  v a r ia b le s ;
U X A P N A S =  a u d ito r  p ro v id e d  u n e x p e c te d  n o n - a u d i t  fees  e s tim a te d  fro m  
th e  re s id u a ls  o f  th e  A P N A S  fee  m o d e l, e x c lu d in g  
in te r lo c k in g  v a r ia b le s ;
A F T E N U R E =  n u m b e r  o f  y e a rs  th a t th e  a u d it  F inn h a s  b e e n  e n g a g e d  w ith  
th e  c u rre n t a u d itee ;
B IG  4 =  1 i f  c o m p a n y ’s in c u m b e n t a u d ito r  is a B IG  4  a u d it firm , 0
o th e rw ise ;
C A S H F L O W =  c a sh  flo w  fro m  o p e ra tio n s  sc a le d  b y  c u rre n t y e a r ’s to ta l 
a sse ts ;
L T A C C =  v a lu e  o f  to ta l a c c ru a ls  in y e a r  t-1 sc a le d  b y  a v e ra g e  to ta l 
a sse ts ;
L n M V E =  n a tu ra l lo g  o f  m a rk e t v a lu e  o f  e q u ity , a  c o m p a n y ’s m a rk e t 
v a lu e  o f  e q u ity  is c a lc u la te d  a s  its p ric e  p e r  sh a re  a t f isca l 
y e a r  e n d  tim es  the  n u m b e r  o f  sh a re s  o u ts ta n d in g ;
L E V E R A G E =  ra tio  o f  to ta l l ia b ilitie s  to  to ta l a sse ts ;
M B =  m a r k e t- to - b o o k  ra tio  a t f i s c a l - y e a r - e n d ,  d e f in e d  as m a rk e t 
v a lu e  o f  e q u ity  d iv id e d  by  s h a re h o ld e rs  eq u ity ;
L O S S =  1 i f  the  co m p a n y  re p o r te d  a lo ss  e ith e r  in  th e  c u rre n t y e a r  o r
p re v io u s  year, 0 o th e rw ise ;
M E R A C Q S =  1 i f  the  co m p a n y  is e n g a g e d  in  a m e rg e r /a c q u is itio n  a c tiv ity
in the  c u rre n t y ea r, 0 o th e rw ise ;
E Q U IT Y =  1 i f  th e  co m p a n y  is su e s  n e w  sh a re s  d u r in g  th e  c u rre n t y e a r , 0
o th e rw ise ;
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BDINDP 1 if the board comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) of
non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
ACSIZE = number of audit committee members;
INDEPAC = 1 if the audit committee comprises a majority (fifty per cent
or more) of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise;
YEARq3_ 0 5 = dummy variables for year of data.
3.1.3.4.1 Control variables
The following sections discuss the control variables for the DACC model. 
Unexpected audit fees (UXAF)
UXAF are the residuals from the estimated audit fees model. Hoitash et al. 
(2005) argues that higher audit fee premiums (abnormal audit fees) are associated with 
lower audit quality. Their study finds a significant positive association between UXAF 
fees and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. However, Choi et al. (2006) finds 
no significant association between UXAF fees and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. The direction of association between UXAF and ABSDACC is not predicted.
Auditor provided unexpected non-audit (UXAPNAS) fees
Auditor quality may be influenced by the amount of UXAPNAS fees (Hoitash et 
al., 2005). UXAPNAS fees are the residuals from the estimated APNAS fees model 
(Eq. 1). Choi et al. (2006) finds no significant association between UXAPNAS and the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. However, Hoitash et al. (2005) finds a 
significant positive association between UXAPNAS fees and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. The direction of association between UXAPNAS and 
ABSDACC is not predicted.
91
Audit firm tenure (AFTENURE)
Longer audit firm tenure may allow management greater scope to participate in 
opportunistic earnings management activities (Rusmin et a l, 2005). Prior research (e.g., 
Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Myers et al., 2003) includes AFTENURE to control for the 
effect of auditor tenure on earnings management. Myers et al. (2003) finds that both 
discretionary and current accruals had significant and negative relations with auditor 
tenure. Chung and Kallapur (2003) and Gul et al. (2007) find a significant and negative 
association between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and auditor tenure. 
AFTENURE is used as a continuous variable for the number of years of audit firm 
engagement with the current auditee. A negative association between AFTENURE and 
ABSDACC is expected.
Big 4 (BIG 4)
Auditor quality may be associated with the magnitude of earnings management 
(Frankel et al., 2002; Gul et al., 2003). Prior research suggests that BIG 4/5 auditors are 
less likely to allow earnings management than non-BIG 4/5 auditors (e.g., Becker et al., 
1998; Francis et al., 1999). BIG 4/5 auditors are commonly perceived to provide a 
higher quality audit than their counterparts (Heninger, 2001; Mayhew and Wilkins, 
2003). Ashbaugh et al. (2003), Ruddock and Taylor (2005), Choi et al. (2006) and 
Jackson et al. (2008) find a significant negative association between BIG 5 auditors and 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals. BIG 4 is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if the audit firm is BIG 4, 0 otherwise. A negative association between BIG 4 and 
ABSDACC is expected.
Cashflow from operations (CASHFLOW)
Companies with a high cash flow (CASHFLOW) from operations may be more 
likely to attain earnings benchmarks (Frankel et al., 2002). Following Ashbaugh et al.
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(2003), the current study uses CASHFLOW to control for current performance, which is 
the cash flow from operations scaled by current year’s total assets. Prior studies report a 
significant negative association between CASHFLOW and the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005; Choi et al., 
2006; Gul et al., 2007; Jackson et al, 2008; Lai and Gul, 2008). A negative association 
between CASHFLOW and ABSDACC is expected.
Lagged total accruals (LTACC)
The lagged value of total accruals (LTACC) can capture the extent to which the 
current year’s accruals are a function of the previous year’s accruals (Ruddock and 
Taylor, 2005). Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005) find a significant 
negative relation between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and LTACC. 
Similar to Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005), operating income 
less operating cash flow from the previous year lagged by average (TAt-i +TAt.2)/2 total 
assets is used and a negative association with ABSDACC is expected.
Market value o f equity (LnMVE)
The size of the client company may influence the earnings management 
decisions of management (Jubb, 2000). Large companies are less likely to engage in 
earnings management because large companies are more likely to face scrutiny from 
financial analysts and investors (Zhou and Elder, 2001; Rusmin et al., 2005). Client 
company size is measured as the natural log of market value of equity (LnMVE).34 
Previous studies find a significant negative association between the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and LnMVE (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Hoitash et al., 2005;
34 The alternative measures of company size are total assets and revenue. This study also ran the 
regression using the natural log of total assets (LnTA) and natural log of revenue (LnREVENUE) 
separately replacing LnMVE. The results were similar.
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Ruddock and Taylor, 2005; Lai and Gul, 2008). A negative association between 
ABSDACC and LnMVE is expected.
Debt to total assets (LEVERAGE)
Companies with higher levels of debt may manipulate discretionary accruals to 
loosen debt covenant constraints (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Prior studies show that 
Finns with a higher likelihood of violating debt agreements are more likely to have an 
incentive to engage in earnings management (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeney, 1994). Ruddock and Taylor (2005) finds a significant positive association 
between LEVERAGE and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Frankel et al. 
(2002), Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Jackson et al. (2008) report a significant negative 
association between LEVERAGE and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Direction is not predicted due to the mixed findings between LEVERAGE and 
ABSDACC.
Market-to-book-value (MB)
Prior research uses MB as a measure of a company’s growth opportunities and 
shows that high growth firms have a greater incentive to engage in earnings 
management (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Rusmin et al., 
2005). Hoitash et al. (2005) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005) find that the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals is significant and positively associated with MB. A positive 
association between MB and ABSDACC is expected.
Current or previous year loss (LOSS)
Prior research documents that discretionary accruals are dependent on a firm’s
financial performance (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Frankel et al., 2002; Kothari et al.,
2005). This is because a firm’s financial performance may affect management’s
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opportunistic window and the incentives for managing earnings (Rusmin et al., 2005). 
Previous studies find a significant positive association between LOSS and the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals (e.g., Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; 
Ruddock and Taylor, 2005; Rusmin et al., 2005; Gul et al., 2007). LOSS is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the company reported a loss either in the current year or 
previous year, 0 otherwise. A positive association between LOSS and ABSDACC is 
expected.
Mergers and acquisitions (MERACQS)
Merger and acquisition activities may be associated with discretionary accruals 
(Ruddock and Taylor, 2005). The acquiring company may manage earnings prior to 
acquisition to increase the share price (Koumanakos et al., 2005). The higher value 
shares will be used to pay for the acquisition and therefore, the manipulation of earnings 
can ultimately result in a lower price for the acquisition (Koumanakos et al., 2005). 
Ruddock and Taylor (2005) finds no significant relation between MERACQS and the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) finds a significant 
positive relation between MERACQS and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
MERACQS is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the company is engaged in a 
merger or acquisition during the year, 0 otherwise. A positive association between 
MERACQS and ABSDACC is expected.
Issue o f equity (EQUITY)
Issues of new equity may be associated with higher abnormal accruals. 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Ruddock and Taylor (2005) find a significant positive 
association between issue of new equity and the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals. Similar to Ruddock and Taylor (2005), EQUITY as a dummy variable is used
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taking the value of 1 if the company issued equity during the year, 0 otherwise. A 
positive association between EQUITY and ABSDACC is expected.
Board independence (BDINDP)
Board composition will influence whether or not a company engages in earnings 
management (Xie et al., 2003). The National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD, 1999) suggests that if audit committee members are independent of 
management, they are likely to be more effective in protecting the credibility of the 
firm’s financial reporting. Klein (2002) documents that the presence of independent 
outside directors on the board is associated with lower levels of unexpected or 
discretionary accruals (in absolute tenns). Xie et al. (2003) argues that companies with 
a greater proportion of independent directors will be less likely to engage in earnings 
management. The current study expects a negative association between BDINDP and 
ABSDACC.
Audit committee size (ACSIZE)
Audit committee size plays an important role in constraining earnings 
management (Zhou and Chen, 2004). For high earnings management banks, Zhou and 
Chen (2004) finds that audit committee size is significantly related to loan loss 
provision. However, Xie et al. (2003) finds no significant relation between audit 
committee size and earnings management as measured by discretionary current 
accruals. A negative association between ACSIZE and ABSDACC is expected.
Audit committee independence (INDEPAC)
Audit committee independence may affect earnings management. DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1991) finds that firms with accounting errors are less likely to have audit
committees. Klein (2006) finds a non-linear negative relation between audit committee
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independence and earnings manipulation. Dechow et al. (1996) finds a negative relation 
between audit committee existence and the probability of manipulating earnings. The 
current study expects a negative association between INDEPAC and ABSDACC.
Year as dummies (YEAR.03.05)
Definition and reasons for use are the same as previously described.
3.2 C H A P T E R  S U M M A R Y
This chapter discusses the research methods adopted in this study and provides 
the calculation procedures for determining the interlocking variables. This chapter also 
includes model specifications for testing the hypotheses and provides definitions of the 
dependent variables and control variables. Chapter 4 provides details of the sample 
selection procedures, data collection procedures and other descriptive statistics for the 
sample companies and interlocking variables.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA SOURCES, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the sample and the data sources and provides descriptive 
statistics for the sample. The descriptive statistics include sample characteristics, board 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics, and interlocking scenarios of directors, 
director-audit firm/partner, audit committee members, and audit committee member- 
audit firm/partner for the sample of ASX listed companies during 2003-2005. This 
chapter also provides descriptive statistics for the positions held by directors and audit 
committee members of the sample companies during this period.
4.1 DATA SOURCES
Mostly hand collected data from annual reports of the companies, available 
either in the AspectHuntley or ConnectA databases, is used. Some of the financial data 
were downloaded directly from the AspectHuntley database and verified with annual 
report information. Mergers and acquisitions data were collected from the SDC 
Platinum database. Audit firm/partner related data were collected directly from the audit 
reports published in company annual reports. The names of directors and audit 
committee members were also collected directly from annual reports. The data for the 
classification of directors and audit committee members as executive or non-executive 
were collected from the corporate governance or director report sections of the annual 
reports. The ASX database was used to collect the year of listing and GICS industry 
classification. The AspectHuntley database was used for the GICS industry codes.
98
A full list of directors and audit committee members was compiled for each 
company for each year separately.35 From this data set, the surnames and two initials if 
used, otherwise one, of each individual director of each company, and also of each audit 
committee member of each company, were collected. Where only one initial was used, 
efforts were made to determine the first name in full and to check it with other 
sources.36 Verification is necessary in the matching of director/audit committee member 
names and initials to verify whether the same individual is referenced in connection 
with more than one company (Jubb, 2000).
Names of all the directors were sorted according to their last names and 
identification was carried out where directors were members of other companies’ 
boards. As a first step, the number of positions held by each director in other companies 
including his/her own company was calculated separately for 2003, 2004 and 2005. 
This procedure helps to identify each director and his/her position on other companies’ 
boards to calculate the total number of board positions held by each director. The 
sample was then sorted according to the ASX code and the frequency of interlocking 
directors for each of the companies was calculated. The same procedure was followed 
for calculating audit committee member interlockings.
For calculating director-audit firm/partner interlocks, the names of the audit 
firms and their signing partners were collected from the audit reports of each company 
for each year separately. For identifying director-audit firm interlocks, the data were 
sorted according to directors’ name and identification of the name of the audit firm
35 To calculate interlocking, this study includes director if he/she attended at least one directors’ meeting 
during the financial year and for audit committee member who has attended at least one audit committee 
meeting during the financial year.
36 Sources were from the ASX web site, the AspectHuntley database’s directors list for each company, or 
information from different sections in the annual report, or from the list of directors on the companies’ 
websites.
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corresponding to each director. When a director sat on more than one company’s board 
and those companies were audited by the same audit firm, the situation was considered 
a director-audit firm interlocking. The interlocks created by each director and audit firm 
were identified and companies were sorted according to the ASX code and the director- 
audit firm interlocking frequencies were calculated.
For director-audit partner interlockings, the data were sorted according to 
directors’ names, including the names of audit firms as well as signing audit partners. 
There is a necessary condition that to form a director-audit partner interlock there 
should be first a director-audit firm interlock. When there is director-audit firm 
interlock and those companies have a common signing audit partner, it creates a 
director-audit partner interlock. Similar procedures were followed separately for 
calculating audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking and audit committee member-audit partner interlocking. An example of 
calculating frequencies of interlocking is shown in Chapter 3, Table 3.1.
4.2 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
Financial data for the listed companies was downloaded from the 
AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis database. ’7 The available number of companies was 1,473, 
1,555 and 1,644 during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Companies were excluded 
from the final sample if their data were not available either in AspectHuntley or 
Connect4 databases, if delisted during 2003, 2004 or 2005, if two audit firms/partners 
were named or if required data were missing. Companies having two audit 
firms/partners were excluded because it would be difficult to separate and calculate 
which audit firm/partner had more involvement or influence on the client (Jubb, 2000).
'7 Connecl4 database was used for annual reports of companies, SDC Platinum for mergers and 
acquisitions data and ASX database for industry classification and company age data.
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The final sample consisted of 1,254 (85.13 per cent) of the available companies in 2003, 
1,265 (81.35 per cent) in 2004 and 1,302 (79.20 per cent) in 2005.38 The number of 
companies remaining after each deletion is shown in Table 4.1. The industry 
representation of the sample using GICS is shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.1
Sample selection (number of companies)
S a m p le  se le c tio n 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
Total companies available in database 1,473 1,555 1,644
Companies delisted 176 225 176
Double audit firms/partners 5 5 5
Missing or non available data 38 60 161
F in a l S a m p le 1 ,254 1 ,265 1,302
The justification for using the data from 2003, 2004 and 2005 is that these were 
the most current years at the time this aspect of this study was completed. This study 
also included data from 2006 in order to calculate the discretionary accruals for the 
forward-looking Modified-Jones (1991) model. Furthermore, audit committees for 
many listed companies were voluntary before 2003. The ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (2003) and the CLERP 9 Act (2004) require audit committees for the Top 500 
listed companies. The ASX amended its listing rules in 2003 to require any company 
that is included in the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index at the beginning of the financial 
year to have an audit committee during that year. These changes increased the rate of 
disclosure and made it easier to find the data for directors, audit committee members 
and other corporate governance mechanisms, which may not be disclosed in the earlier 
years. These features also give the opportunity of using audit committee members and 
audit firm/partner interlockings in an in-depth study of the ASX listed companies.
Table 4.2 provides details of the GICS 4-digit (6-digit for Materials) for the 
final sample. Comparative data for the population of all ASX listed companies shows 
the sample is representative. Industry representation shows that Metals and Mining is
38 The sample used to calculate discretionary accruals is described in section 4.1.1.
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the single largest industry making up 23.68 per cent of the sample in 2003, 23.72 per 
cent in 2004 and 26.19 per cent in 2005. This is followed by Diversified Financials, 
which represented 9.41 per cent, 10.04 per cent and 8.99 per cent of the sample 
respectively.
4.2.1 Sample for discretionary accruals model
A separate sample was used to calculate discretionary accruals due to the 
requirements of the Modified-Jones model. The Jones (1991) model or Modified-Jones 
models cannot be applied to the financial sector because accounting accruals are not 
comparable to those used by financial companies (Gupta et al, 2008); hence it is 
necessary to exclude the entire financial sector (GICS industry code 4010 to 4040). 
Another condition of using the forward-looking Modified-Jones model is that there 
should be at least 10 observations for each industry in each year (Coulton et al, 2005). 
For calculating discretionary accruals, it is also necessary to have sales revenue data for 
the following year, which is up to 2006 for this study, to calculate sales growth. 
Observations were excluded if they did not have the required data for using the 
forward-looking Modified-Jones model. Table 4.3 shows the final sample for 
calculating the discretionary accruals, which consisted of 948, 933 and 936 observations 
for the financial years 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Table 4.4 shows the industry 
representation of the sample companies.
Table 4.3
Sample for calculating discretionary accruals
S a m p le 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
Total companies in AspectHuntley’s FinAnalysis database (as at 13/3/06) 1,473 1,555 1,644
Financial (4010 to 4040) 253 277 288
Food and Staples Retailing (3010) 8 7 6
Chemicals (151010) 9
Construction Materials (151020) 9 8 8
Containers & Packaging (151030) 3 3 3
Paper & Forest Products (151050) 8 7
Companies delisted 176 225 176
Missing or non available data 67 94 220
F in a l sa m p le 94 8 933 9 3 6
Empty cells show that there were at least 10 observations to calculate discretionary accruals.
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4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INTERLOCKING CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE SAMPLE COMPANIES 
4.3.1 Characteristics o f sample companies
Characteristics of the sample companies are shown in Table 4.5. The table 
shows that the average size of the sample companies (total assets) was $1,684 million. 
The average audit fees and auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) fees for the 
sample companies were $228,173 and $181,793 respectively. On average, the 
companies had been listed on the ASX for 13.51 years. The average board size of the 
companies was 5.55, and 68 per cent of the board members were non-executive 
directors.39 Kiel and Nicholson (2006) reports the average board size was 5.7 for 1,250 
ASX companies during 2003 and this figure corresponds to other Australian studies 
(e.g., Stapledon and Lawrence, 1996; Arthur, 2001; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).40
Fifty seven (57) per cent of the companies in the sample were audited by BIG 4 
audit firms and the average audit firm tenure was 7.57 years.41 The average partner 
tenure was 3.21 years. During the period of this study, 17 per cent of companies 
received other than unqualified audit opinions and there was a similar percentage in the 
previous year.42 Seventy three per cent of the sample companies had audit committees 
during the period of study. The average size of the audit committee was 2.99. For the 
sample of companies that had audit committees during the period of study, 73 per cent 
of audit committees had majority of non-executive directors (n = 874, 915 and 990 
respectively for 2003, 2004 and 2005).
39 Due to the inclusion of both small and large companies, the average board size is lower than in other 
studies. Kiel and Nicholson (2006) reports that average board size for the top 100 companies was 8.2; for 
the top 200 companies was 7.6. For companies ranked 201 to 1250 it was 5.2; and for all companies it 
was 5.7 during 2003.
40 Stening and Wan (1984) reports the average board size was 6.6 in 1959 and 8.4 in 1979 for the largest 
250 Australian companies. Alexander and Murray (1992) reports the average board size of the top 250 
Australian companies was 6.6 in 1959, 9.33 in 1979, 8.62 in 1986 and 8.37 in 1991. Jubb (2000) reports 
the average board sizes for the top 319 Australian companies was 7.07 in 1990.
41 Jubb (2000) reports that 60 per cent of her sample companies were audited by the Big 6 in 1990 for the 
top 319 ASX companies.
42 Jubb (2000) reports that 16.6 per cent of her sample companies received a qualified opinion in 1990.
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4.3.2 Interlocking links of sample companies
A summary of the number of interlocked companies is shown in Table 4.6 for 
2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The percentages (number) of companies with at least 
one common director interlock were 85.65 per cent (1,074), 84.58 per cent (1,070) and
85.02 per cent (1,107) for the sample companies.4'’ This result indicates that the 
majority of ASX listed companies during the sample period were linked by common 
directors.
Interlocking companies with at least one common director and a common audit 
firm link were 45.45 per cent (570), 43.87 per cent (555) and 42.01 per cent (547) for 
the sample companies during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. This result indicates 
that almost half of the sample companies were linked by common directors and those 
companies were audited by a common audit firm.44
Two companies may be audited by a common audit firm. However, the signing 
audit partner may not be common (Jubb, 2000). The percentages (number) of companies 
that had director-audit firm interlocking and engaged a common audit partner from the 
same audit finn were 20.26 per cent (254), 19.68 per cent (249) and 20.12 per cent 
(262) during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively.43'
There were a substantial number of interlockings among audit committee 
members and audit firms/partners for the ASX listed companies. The percentages 
(number) of companies linked by common audit committee members were 43.54 per
43 Jubb (2000) reports that the companies with at least one common director interlock were 79.40 per cent 
using a sample of the top 319 ASX listed companies for 1990.
44 Jubb and Houghton (1999) and Jubb (2000) report that 50.30 per cent of the top 319 ASX companies 
had at least one common director-audit firm link in 1990.
45 Jubb and Houghton (1999) and Jubb (2000) report that 20.00 per cent of the top 319 ASX companies 
had at least one common director-audit partner link in 1990.
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cent (546) during 2003, which increased to 46.88 per cent (593) in 2004 and to 51.46 
per cent (670) in 2005 for the sample companies. The percentages (number) of 
companies that had audit committee member interlocking where those companies were 
audited by a common audit firm were 18.10 per cent (227), 19.92 per cent (252) and 
22.12 per cent (288) during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The percentages 
(number) of companies that had common audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking where those companies also had a common signing audit partner were 6.22 
per cent (78), 6.01 per cent (76) and 7.99 per cent (104) during 2003, 2004 and 2005 
respectively for the sample of companies.
4.3.3 Interlocking characteristics of sample companies
Table 4.7 shows the interlocking characteristics of sample companies during 
2003-2005. For the sample companies, 14.35 per cent, 15.34 per cent and 14.98 per 
cent had no director interlocking during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. For the 
sample companies 12.84 per cent, 13.36 per cent and 13.29 per cent had at least one 
director interlock during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. During the period of study, 
42.34 per cent, 39.05 per cent and 39.40 per cent respectively of the sample companies 
had five or more director interlocks.46
For the sample companies, 54.55 per cent, 56.13 per cent and 57.99 per cent of 
sample companies had no director-audit Finn interlock during 2003, 2004 and 2005 
respectively, while 79.67 per cent, 80.32 per cent and 79.88 per cent had no director- 
audit partner interlock. For the sample companies 8.77 per cent, 7.59 per cent and 7.37
46 The Australian Shareholders’ Association (ASA) claims that there is a link between companies with 
difficulties and the workloads of their board of directors (Galacho, 2004). The ASA also believes that any 
director who sits on more than five publicly listed boards is doing a disservice to the companies’ 
shareholders (Kiel and Nicholson, 2006).
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per cent respectively had five or more director-audit firm interlocks while 5.10 per cent, 
4.19 per cent and 4.15 per cent respectively had five or more director-audit partner 
interlocks. This finding indicates a substantial number of director-audit firm/partner 
interlocks for ASX listed companies.
The interlocking scenarios for audit committee member and audit committee 
member and audit firm/partner are also shown in Table 4.7 (companies that had audit 
committees during the period of study). Table 4.7 shows that 37.53 per cent, 35.52 per 
cent and 32.53 per cent respectively of sample companies had no audit committee 
member interlocking during the period of study. For the sample companies 11.44 per 
cent, 11.59 per cent and 12.52 per cent respectively had five or more audit committee 
member interlocks. For the sample companies 74.03 per cent, 72.57 per cent and 71.01 
per cent respectively had no audit committee member-audit firm interlocks while 91.08 
per cent, 91.80 per cent and 89.60 per cent respectively had no audit committee-audit 
partner interlocks. For the sample companies 1.83 per cent, 1.86 per cent and 0.81 per 
cent respectively had five or more audit committee member-audit firm interlockings 
while 0.67 per cent, 1.20 per cent and 0.03 per cent had five or more audit committee 
member-audit partner interlocking during the period of study. This finding also 
provides evidence that a large number of ASX listed companies were linked by audit 
committee member and audit committee member-audit firm/partner for the sample 
companies during the period of study.
4.3.4 Board of director characteristics
The number of board positions held by executive and non-executive directors 
during 2003, 2004 and 2005 for the sample companies are shown in Table 4.8. There 
were 7,320, 7,353 and 7,665 board positions associated with 1,254, 1,265 and 1,302 of
1 1 1
sample companies during the financial years 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The 
majority of the board positions were held by non-executive directors, which was 68.40 
per cent (5,007) in 2003, 68.11 per cent (5,008) in 2004 and 69.17 per cent (5,302) in 
2005 for the sample companies. At the same time, the executive directors held only 
31.60 per cent (2,313), 31.89 per cent (2,345) and 30.81 per cent (2,363) of board 
positions respectively.47
Table 4.8
The number of board position held by executive and non-executive directors 
______________ during 2003-2005 for the sample companies______________
B o a r d  c h a r a c te r is t ic s 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
No. of Companies 1,254 1,265 1,302
Board seats 7,320 7,353 7,665
Positions held by 
executive directors
2,313 31.60% 2,345 31.89% 2,363 30.81%
Positions held by non­
executive directors
5,007 68.40% 5,008 68.11% 5,302 69.17%
From this result, it is clear that the majority of the board positions for the ASX 
listed companies were held by non- executive directors. This finding is consistent with 
the Australian Corporate Practices and Conduct Guidelines (1995) and ASX Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice (2003) recommendations, where it is 
suggested that boards of listed public companies be comprised of a majority of non­
executive directors.
4.3.5 The number of directorships per director
Table 4.9 reports the results of multiple directorships within the ASX listed 
companies during 2003-2005 held by individuals sitting on the boards of the 1,254, 
1,265 and 1,302 sample companies respectively. There were 7,320, 7,353 and 7,665 
board positions in the sample companies, which were held by 5,468, 5,538 and 5,720
47 Clifford and Evans (1997) finds approximately a two-thirds (66.10 per cent) majority of non-executive 
directors boards for Australian companies and this finding is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
McMichael, 1976; Hunt, 1984; Logan and Dunstan, 1993; Clifford and Evans, 1996).
112
individuals during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. The average directorship per
48director was 1.34, 1.33 and 1.34 respectively for the sample companies.
Out of 5,468 directors for the sample companies during 2003, 4,316 (78.93 per 
cent) held only one directorship. Kiel and Nicholson (2006) reports this as 78.95 per 
cent for 2003. There were 751 individuals (13.73 per cent) who held two directorships. 
Kiel and Nicholson (2006) reports 13.42 per cent. There were 65 (1.18 per cent) 
individuals who held between five and eight directorships. There were two directors 
who held ten directorships during 2003.
The scenario for individual board membership and multiple directorships during 
2004 and 2005 was almost the same in 2003. There were 7,353 and 7,665 board 
positions during 2004 and 2005 for the sample companies and among them 4,416 (79.74 
per cent) and 4,519 individuals (79.00 per cent) held only one board position. There 
were 735 (13.27 per cent) and 752 (13.15 per cent) individuals who held two positions 
each during 2004 and 2005 respectively. There were 385 individuals (6.96 per cent) 
who held at least three and a maximum of eight positions in 2004 and 447 (7.81 per 
cent) in 2005. There were two individuals who held ten positions each during 2004 for 
the sample companies. There were two individuals who held nine positions in 2005.
4S Alexander and Murray (1992) reports the average directorship per director was 1.16 in 1959, 1.29 in 
1979, 1.31 in 1986, and 1.19 in 1991 for the top 250 Australian companies. Jubb (2000) reports the 
average directorship per director was 1.38 for the top 319 Australian companies in 1990. Kiel and 
Nicholson (2006) reports that the average directorship per director was 1.3 for 1,250 ASX listed 
companies during 2003.
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4.3.6 Descriptive statistics for director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner
interlocking
The descriptive statistics for director interlocking, director-audit firm 
interlocking, and director-audit partner interlocking are shown in Table 4.10. The 
maximum number of links of common (total) director interlocking was 29 (33), 26 (37) 
and 21 (35) respectively during 2003, 2004 and 2005, which indicates the links created 
by the boards of directors of a focal company with other companies. The mean common 
(total) director interlocking was 4.23 (5.06), 3.99 (4.81) and 3.86 (4.59) during 2003, 
2004 and 2005 respectively.49
The maximum number of interlocks created by common (total) director and a 
common audit firm was 9 (24), 7 (22) and 9 (21) respectively during the period of the 
study. The average number of common (total) director-audit firm interlocking was 0.94 
(1.46), 0.90 (1.35) and 0.84 (1.25) during the period of the study.50 The maximum 
number of common (total) interlocking between common director and audit partners 
was 6 (19), 8 (20) and 7 (21) during 2003, 2004 and 2005 for the sample companies. 
The mean for the same was 0.31 (0.72), 0.29 (0.64) and 0.31 (0.64) respectively during 
the period of the study.
49 Hall (1983) reports the mean for director interlocks was 5.6 in 1971, 5.4 in 1972, 5.8 in 1973 and 5.4 in 
1974 for 1200 Australian companies. Davison et al. (1984) reports the average number of directors’ 
interlocks was 5.65 for the top 250 companies. Jubb (2000) reports 3.38 during 1990 for the top 319 ASX 
listed companies.
50 Davison et al. (1984) reports that the average number of director-audit firm interlocks was 0.65. Jubb 
(2000) reports the average was 0.55.
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4.3.7 Audit committee characteristics
Audit committee (AC) characteristics are shown in Table 4.11. During the 
period of the study, 69.70 per cent (874) in 2003, 72.27 per cent (915) in 2004 and 
76.04 per cent (990) in 2005 of sample companies had audit committees. This result 
indicates that the number of audit committees for ASX listed companies has increased 
over time. During these periods, the majority of the audit committee members were 
non-executive directors (61.75 per cent, 62.71 per cent and 64.41 per cent respectively). 
During the same period, 38.25 per cent, 37.29 per cent and 35.59 per cent of the 
members of the audit committees were executive directors. The higher percentage of 
executive directors in the audit committees may be due to including small companies in 
the sample, which had very few non-executive directors on their boards.
Table 4.11
Audit committee characteristics during 2003-2005 for the sample companies
A u d i t  C o m m i t t e e  ( A C ) 2 003 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5
(n  = 1 ,2 5 4 ) (n = 1 ,2 6 5 ) (n = 1 ,3 0 2 )
T o ta l P e rc e n ta g e T o ta l P e rc e n ta g e T o ta l P e rc e n ta g e
C o m p a n ie s  w ith  a n  A C 8 7 4 1 6 9 .7 0 % 9 1 5 7 2 .2 7 % 9 9 0 7 6 .0 4 %
N o n -e x e c u t iv e  A C  m e m b e rs 1,605 6 1 .7 5 % 1,724 6 2 .7 1 % 2 ,0 3 4 6 4 .4 1 %
E x e c u tiv e  A C  m e m b e rs 994 3 8 .2 5 % 1,025 3 7 .2 9 % 1,124 3 5 .5 9 %
T o ta l A C  m e m b e rs 2 ,5 9 9 100% 2 ,7 4 9 100% 3 ,1 5 8 100%
4.3.8 The number o f audit committee memberships per audit committee member
Audit committee memberships per audit committee member are shown in Table 
4.12. During 2003, there were 2,100 individuals who held 2,599 audit committee 
positions. The same statistics were 2,179 and 2,747 in 2004 and 2,450 and 3,158 in 
2005 for the sample companies. There were 1,757 (83.67 per cent), 1,778 (81.60 per 
cent) and 1,965 (80.20 per cent) individuals who held only one audit committee member 
position during 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. During the period of study, 11.38 per 
cent (239), 13.54 per cent (295) and 13.51 per cent (331) of individuals respectively 
held two audit committee memberships. There were 104 (4.95 per cent) individuals who 
held at least three but less than six audit committee positions during 2003 and this
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number was almost the same during 2004 and 2005. There were two individuals who 
held more than seven audit committee memberships during 2004. This finding indicates 
that around one-fifth of audit committee members had more than one audit committee 
membership in other companies during the period of study.
4.3.9 Descriptive statistics for audit committee member interlocking, audit committee 
member-audit firm/partner interlocking
An audit committee member sitting on more than one audit committee creates 
audit committee member interlocking. Most audit committee members were non­
executive directors, who may have had more experience and expertise to provide audit 
committee related services in more than one company than executive directors who 
were working full-time. Table 4.13 reveals that the maximum numbers of common 
(total) audit committee member interlockings were 11 (16) during 2003, 11 (11) in 2004 
and 12 (13) in 2005. The means for the same were 1.11 (1.19), 1.19 (1.30) and 1.42 
(1.48) respectively during the period of the study for the sample companies.
When interlocking audit committee members come into contact with a common 
audit firm in other companies, it creates an audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking. The maximum numbers of common (total) links created by audit 
committee member and audit firm were 6 (6), 4 (9) and 4(10) respectively during 2003, 
2004 and 2005. The means for the same were 0.27 (0.33), 0.32 (0.39) and 0.33 (0.39) 
respectively during the period of the study. When audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking companies have a common audit partner, it creates audit committee 
member-audit partner interlocking. The maximum numbers of common (total) audit 
committee member and audit partner interlocking were 3 (6), 3 (9) and 3(10)
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respectively during the period of the study for the sample companies. The means for the 
same were 0.08 (0.12), 0.08 (0.15) and 0.10 (0.15) respectively.
4.4 CONCLUSION
The foregoing descriptive statistics provide evidence of a substantial number of 
interlockings among directors and/or audit committee members and an audit 
firm/partner during the period 2003-2005 for the sample companies. The majority of 
the sample companies were linked by common directors and/or audit committee 
members and many of those companies also had a common audit firm/partner. Chapter 
5 reports descriptive statistics and results for the APNAS fees and AFTENURE models. 
Chapter 6 provides the results for the OPINION and discretionary accruals models.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE MODELS
5.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides the results of applying the auditor independence models. 
First, this chapter provides descriptive statistics, audit and non-audit fee differences 
between interlocking and non-interlocking companies and correlation coefficients for 
the variables in the auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) fee model, followed 
by regression results and sensitivity analyses. Second, this chapter provides descriptive 
statistics, differences in audit firm tenure between interlocking and non-interlocking 
companies and correlation coefficients for the audit firm tenure (AFTENURE) model 
variables. These are followed by regression results for the second measure of auditor 
independence, examining the association between AFTENURE and interlockings. 
Various sensitivity tests are also conducted to validate the estimated models.
5.1 AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The following sections discuss the results from applying the APNAS fee model:
5.1.1 AUDITOR PROVIDED NON-AUDIT SERVICES FEES
APNAS fee is the first dependent variable used in testing the interlocking 
hypotheses. The dependent variable, LnAPNAS, is the natural log transformation of 
auditor provided non-audit services fees' 1 received by the incumbent auditors from the 
individual clients. The following sections provide the descriptive statistics for variables 
included in the APNAS fee model.
51 Following the study of Ashbaugh el al. (2003), this study sets APNAS fees to one dollar for firms 
reporting zero APNAS fees to allow for log transformation.
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5.1.1.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics for the sample companies are shown in Table 5.1. The 
average size (total assets) for the sample companies was $1,684 million. The average 
audit fee (AF) for the sample companies was $228,172. The average APNAS fee was 
$181,792, which was substantially lower than the average audit fee, supporting the 
findings of Buffini (20 06).52 During the period of study, 57 per cent of the sample 
companies were audited by BIG 4 audit firms. These characteristics are consistent with 
the findings of other Australian studies (e.g., Jubb and Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000, 
Ruddock and Taylor, 2005).
Table 5.1
Descriptive statistics for the LnAPNAS fee model variables 
_____________________ (N = 3,821)____________________
V a r i a b l e s Mean Median Std. Deviation
Audit fees ($) 228,172.00 47,000 885,700.00
APNAS fee ($) 181,792.00 15,000 924,770.00
DLKS 4.03 3.00 3.82
DAFLKS 0.89 0.00 1.36
DAPLKS 0.30 0.00 0.75
ACLKS 1.24 0.00 1.83
ACAFLKS 0.31 0.00 0.70
ACAPLKS 0.09 0.00 0.35
Total assets ($M) 1,684.00 22.00 17,818.00
BIG4 0.57 1.00 0.50
LEVERAGE 0.43 0.33 0.67
EQUITY 0.57 1.00 0.47
ROA -0.12 -0.01 0.61
NEG ROA 0.52 1.00 0.50
INITIAL 0.22 0.00 0.42
MERACQS 0.16 0.00 0.36
MB -5.20 1.58 37.65
BDINDP 0.68 0.71 0.19
ACSIZE 2.99 3.00 1.00
INDEPAC 0.73 1.00 0.44
APNAS = auditor provided non-audit services fees; DLKS = director interlocks; DAFLKS = director and 
audit firm interlocks; DAPLKS = director and audit partner interlocks; ACLKS = audit committee 
member interlocks; ACAFLKS = audit committee member and audit firm interlocks; ACAPLKS = audit 
committee member and audit partner interlocks; BIG 4 = 1 if company’s incumbent auditor is a BIG 4 
audit firm, 0 otherwise; LEVERAGE = ratio of total liabilities to total assets; EQUITY = 1 if the firm 
issues any new equity during the year, 0 otherwise ROA = operating income divided by average total
52 Buffini (2006) reports that the consulting fees fell for the third year in a row since 2001, which might 
be supported by the two complementary issues. Buffini (2006) argues that he first one is that the 
Australian listed companies’ audit fees were expected to rise by 10 to 30 per cent due to the introduction 
of new international accounting standards in 2005, and the second was the controversy over auditors’ 
provision of non-audit services and auditor independence and audit quality after the collapse of major 
companies, which may have decreased APNAS fees.
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assets; NEGROA = 1 if the firm reports negative return on assets in the current year, 0 otherwise; 
INITIAL = 1 if the audit firm engagement is either in the first or second year with the current auditee, 0 
otherwise; MERACQS = 1 if the firm was engaged in a merger/acquisition activity during the year, 0 
otherwise; MB = market-to-book ratio at fiscal-year-end; BDINDP = 1 if the board comprises a 
majority (fifty per cent or more) of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE = number of audit 
committee members; INDEPAC = 1 if the audit committee comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) 
of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise.
5.1.1.2 Comparison of fees between interlocking and non-interlocking companies
Descriptive statistics for the final sample of 3,821 companies for the three audit 
fee metrics are shown in Table 5.2. The main interest in this section of this study is to 
investigate any differences in audit fees, APNAS fees and total audit plus APNAS 
(TOTAL) fees between interlocking and non-interlocking companies. The average audit 
fees of director interlocking (DLKS) and non-interlocking companies were $256,220 
and $68,203 respectively. The average APNAS fees were $206,754 and $39,428 
respectively. The average audit fees and APNAS fees of director interlocking 
companies were significantly different (p < 0.001) and higher than those of non­
interlocking companies. This result indicates that director interlocking companies had 
higher audit and APNAS fees compared to non-interlocking companies.
The average audit fees of DAFLKS and non-interlocking companies were 
$390,878 and $101,582 respectively. The average APNAS fees were $318,580 and 
$75,367 respectively. The average of both audit and APNAS fees of DAFLKS were 
higher than those for non-interlocking companies and were significantly different (p < 
0.001). This result indicates that director-audit firm interlocking companies also had 
higher audit and APNAS fees than those of non-interlocking companies. Additionally, 
both the average audit fees and APNAS fees of DAPLKS and non-interlocking 
companies were significantly different indicating that there were significant differences 
in audit fees and APNAS fees between DAPLKS and non-interlocking companies. 
However, both the average audit and APNAS fees of DAPLKS companies were lower
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than those of non-interlocking companies. This may be due to the fact that firms with 
DAPLKS are of smaller size. The more companies the audit partner audits, the smaller 
the companies probably are, so that would explain the lower audit and APNAS fees.
The average audit fees and APNAS fees were significantly different between 
ACLKS and non-interlocking companies as well as ACAFLKS and non-interlocking 
companies (p <0.001). The average audit fees ($393,295) and APNAS fees ($323,628) 
of ACLKS companies were significantly higher than those of non-interlocking 
companies ($79,710 and $54,268 respectively). The average audit fees and APNAS fees 
were also higher for ACAFLKS companies ($536,793 and $416,001 respectively) than 
non-interlocking ($150,664 and $122,972 respectively) companies. This result indicates 
that both audit and APNAS fees were higher for ACLKS and ACAFLKS companies 
than non-interlocking companies. The average audit fees and APNAS fees of 
ACAPLKS companies were not significantly different from those of non-interlocking 
companies. The average audit fees and APNAS fees was lower for ACAPLKS 
companies ($175,862 and $134,272 respectively) than those of non-interlocking 
($231,960 and $185,234 respectively) companies. The lower audit and APNAS fees 
could be for the same reason as given in respect of DAPLKS.
The average TOTAL fees were significantly different for interlocking 
companies (other than ACAPLKS) compared with non-interlocking companies. The 
average TOTAL fees were higher for DLKS, DAFLKS, ACLKS and ACAFLKS than 
non-interlocking companies. However, the average TOTAL fees for DAPLKS and 
ACAPLKS were lower than for non-interlocking companies.
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5.1.1.3 Correlations
Table 5.3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between LnAPNAS and the 
hypotheses and control variables included in the APNAS fee model. As expected (p- 
values are two-tailed), the LnAPNAS fee is significantly correlated with all interlocking 
variables (other than ACAPLKS). LnAPNAS fee is significantly and positively 
associated with DLKS (p < 0.001) and DAFLKS (p < 0.001). The results indicate that 
APNAS fees are positively associated with the number of links between directors, and 
director and an audit firm in other companies. The correlation coefficient of LnAPNAS 
fees and DAPLKS is significant and negative (p < 0.001). This result indicates that 
APNAS fees are negatively associated with the number of links between director and 
audit partner in other companies.
The test variables relating to audit committee member and audit firm/partner 
interlocking are also significantly correlated with APNAS fees. The relationships 
between ACLKS (p < 0.001), ACAPLKS (p < 0.001) and LnAPNAS fees are positive 
and significant. Results indicate that APNAS fees are positively associated with the 
number of links between audit committee members, and an audit committee member 
and audit firm in other companies. The correlation coefficient between LnAPNAS fees 
and ACAPLKS is not significant (p = 0.325). This result indicates that APNAS fees are 
not associated with the number of audit committee members and audit partner links in 
other companies.
As expected, entity size (LnTA) and auditor type (BIG 4) are positive and 
significantly associated with LnAPNAS fees (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001 respectively), 
indicating that larger companies and companies audited by the BIG 4 audit firms 
purchase more APNAS. The ROA is also positive and significant (p < 0.001) indicating
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that profitable companies may purchase more APNAS than non-profitable companies, 
which is supported by a significant (p < 0.001) negative association between 
NEG ROA and LnAPNAS fees. That companies issuing new equity (EQUITY) and 
undergoing mergers/acquisitions during the year require extra non-audit services is 
supported by the fact that there are significant positive associations between EQUITY, 
MERACQS (p = 0.028 and p < 0.001) and APNAS fees. There is a significant (p = 
0.011) positive association between LnAPNAS fee and MB. Companies that are either 
in the first or second year with their auditor purchase less APNAS, which is supported 
by a significant negative correlation coefficient (p < 0.001) between INITIAL and 
LnAPNAS fees. The correlation coefficients of BDINDP (p < 0.001), ACSIZE (p < 
0.001) and INDEPAC (p < 0.001) are significantly and positively associated with 
APNAS fees. The correlation between LEVERAGE and LnAPNAS fees is not 
significant (p = 0.364) indicating that APNAS fees are not univariately associated with 
leverage.
5.1.1.4 Multivariate results
Table 5.4 reports the OLS regression results using the dependent variable 
LnAPNAS fees after controlling for factors that may affect APNAS fees.53 All the 
hypotheses in this section are non-directional (p-values are two-tailed) due to 
competing arguments with respect to association between APNAS fees and 
interlockings. Overall, the model is significant (p < 0.001) and the adjusted R“s range 
from 0.317 to 0.321.54 Four of the six test variables are significant (Eq. 1).
53 The LnAPNAS fees models are estimated separately for each of the test variables because the 
interlocking variables are highly correlated with each other. Doing this, avoids the impact of 
multicollinearity on the regression results.
54 The relatively low adjusted R2 of the LnAPNAS fees model is partially due to inclusion of 883 
companies that did not purchase non-audit services from their incumbent auditors. The LnAPNAS fee 
model (Equation 1) was run separately, after excluding observations that did not have APNAS fees. The 
adjusted R2 for that model is 0.561. Other APNAS fees studies report similar adjusted R2s, for example, 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) reports an adjusted R2 for their APNAS fee model of 0.340.
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Hypothesis la
DLKS is significantly and positively (p = 0.027) associated with LnAPNAS fee, 
supporting hypothesis la, which posits an association between director interlocking and 
APNAS fees. The result indicates that APNAS fees are positively associated with the 
number of DLKS links. Interlocking directors may offer higher APNAS fees to pressure 
the auditor to act in their companies’ favour. Auditors of director linked companies may 
be motivated to act in favour of directors to secure the future APNAS fees from a family 
of linked companies. Therefore, a significant positive association between the number 
of DLKS and APNAS fees may be an indication of impaired auditor independence.
Hypothesis lb
The coefficient of DAFLKS is not significant (p = 0.494), rejecting hypothesis 
lb, which is the posited association between director-auditor interlocking and APNAS 
fees. An insignificant association between the number of DAFLKS and APNAS fees 
does not provide evidence of impaired auditor independence. Jubb (2000) argues that 
directors and auditors value personal contact in auditor-client relationships but are 
aware of the potential damage from such interpersonal associations, which may affect 
auditor independence in either fact or appearance.
Hypothesis lc
The coefficient of DAPLKS is negative and significant (p = 0.017), supporting 
hypothesis lc, which posits an association between director-audit partner interlocking 
and APNAS fees. The result indicates that the number of DAPLKS is weakly negatively 
associated with APNAS fees. A negative significant association may indicate the 
benefits of knowledge-spillovers due to the joint provision of audit and APNAS, which 
may not impair auditor independence.
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Hypothesis Id
The regression result shows that the coefficient of ACLKS is insignificant (p = 
0.731), rejecting hypothesis Id, which posits an association between audit committee 
member interlocking and APNAS fees. The result supports the argument that audit 
committees may control the purchase of APNAS from the incumbent auditors.
Hypothesis le
The coefficient of ACAFLKS is significantly and negatively associated with 
AFTENURE (p = 0.031), supporting hypothesis le, which posits an association 
between audit committee member-audit firm interlocking and APNAS fees. Given the 
regulatory encouragement for non-executive domination of audit committees and the 
responsibilities of audit committees for the selection, fee determination and supervision 
of the external auditors, this may discourage them from purchasing expensive APNAS 
or paying higher APNAS fees due to independence issues. This result does not provide 
evidence consistent with impaired auditor independence.
Hypothesis If
ACAPLKS is negative and significant (p < 0.001), supporting hypothesis If, 
which posits an association between audit committee member-audit partner interlocking 
and APNAS fees. The findings indicate that the relationship between an audit 
committee member and audit partner in linked companies may motivate them to 
emphasise their independent monitoring roles to improve perceptions of auditor 
independence and may limit the purchase of non-audit services from incumbent 
auditors or this could be discounted fees. Additionally, due to the independent 
monitoring roles, audit committees should consider whether the compensation of the
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individuals employed by the external auditor who are performing the audit of the
company:
“is tied to the provision of non-audit services and, if so, consider whether this 
impairs or appears to impair the external auditor’s judgment or independence in 
respect of the company” (Ramsay Report, 2001, p. 17).
The result does not support impairment of auditor independence.
Control variables
Most of the control variables are significant (two-tailed p-values). That large 
companies purchase more APNAS is supported by a significant and positive association 
(p < 0.001) between LnTA and LnAPNAS fees. A significant positive (p < 0.001) 
association between BIG 4 and APNAS fees indicates that large audit firms (BIG 4) 
either charge higher APNAS fees or provide more such services to their clients. A 
positive significant (p = 0.003) association between EQUITY and LnAPNAS fee 
indicates that companies which issue new equity for financing purchase more non-audit 
services from their auditors. LEVERAGE is also positive and significant (p = 0.013) 
indicating that an auditor of a risky company charges higher APNAS fees or provides 
more such services. ROA is negative and significant (p = 0.023) suggesting that more 
profitable companies purchase less APNAS. A negative and significant (p < 0.001) 
association between INITIAL and LnAPNAS fee indicates that auditors provide lower 
APNAS in the first or second year of an audit engagement. Audit committee size 
(ACSIZE) and a majority of the audit committee members as non-executive are 
significantly and positively associated (p < 0.001 and p = 0.001) with APNAS fees. 
YEARi (2003) is significant and positive (p = 0.027) with APNAS fees. Out of 25 
industry dummy variables, IND1010 - Energy; IND2510 -  Automobile and 
Components; IND2550 - Retailing; IND3010 -  Food and Stables Retailing; IND3510 -
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Health Care Equipment and Services; IND5010 -  Telecommunication Services are 
significantly associated with APNAS fees. The control variables NEG ROA (p = 
0.657), MB (p = 0.313), MERACQS (p = 0.555) and BDINDP (p = 0.290) are not 
significant.
5.1.1.5 Sensitivity analyses
Petersen (2007) argues that when the residuals are correlated across observations 
in panel data sets, OLS standard errors could be biased and the true variability of the 
coefficient estimates could be over or underestimated. This can occur because the 
residuals of a given firm may be correlated across years for a given firm (finn effect) or 
the residuals of a given year may be correlated across different firms (time effect) 
(Petersen, 2007). Petersen (2007) argues that among the other techniques (Newey-West 
standard errors, the Fama-MacBeth standard errors) clustered standard errors are 
unbiased as they account for the residual dependence created by the firm effect as well 
as a time effect. To overcome these issues, Petersen (2007) suggests that:
“since many panel data sets have more firms than years, a common approach is 
to include dummy variables for each time period (to absorb the time effect) and 
then cluster by firm” (Petersen, 2007, p. 24.).
(see also, Gross and Souleles, 2002; Lamont and Polk, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2004; 
Sapienza, 2004; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). The APNAS fees for the same firm 
across the year may be highly correlated. Thus, the OLS regression was re-run after 
clustering observations and including year dummies to address the above issues. The 
results show that adjusted R2s range from 0.315 to 0.317. The test variables DLKS (p = 
0.032), DAPLKS (p = 0.017) ACAFLKS (p = 0.022) and ACAPLKS (p < 0.001) 
remained significant in the same directions as before (Appendix II, Table 1, Panel A).
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The result of associations between interlockings and APNAS are not biased by firm 
effect or time effect.
Prior research indicates that the strength of the economic bonding between the 
audit firm and its clients affects auditor independence (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981a; Beck et 
al., 1988; Magee and Tseng, 1990). Ashbaugh et al. (2003) argues that the fee ratio 
captures the relative monetary value of the audit versus APNAS to a client, which may 
have an impact on perceptions of auditor independence. There are also concerns that 
auditors may compromise their independence by allowing high fee clients more 
financial statement discretion relative to low fee clients (Ashbaugh et al., 2003). 
Ruddock and Taylor (2005) argues that an auditor would be more concerned with 
avoiding the loss of audit clients to whom a large amount of APNAS fees relative to 
audit fees are sold.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000a, 2000b) and most prior 
studies (e.g., DeFond et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003; 
Ruddock and Taylor, 2005) focus on the relative magnitude of APNAS fees, typically 
computed as APNAS fees divided by total fees, where fees is equal to the sum of the 
total audit and APNAS fees (FEERATIO). Equation 1 was re-run using APNAS fees to 
the total of APNAS and audit fees (FEERATIO).The results show that DLKS (p = 
0.086) is weakly significant and positive and ACAPLKS (p = 0.026) is significantly and 
negatively associated with FEERATIO. Test variables DAPLKS (p = 0.357) and 
ACAFLKS (p = 0.347) became insignificant (Appendix II, Table 1, Panel B), which 
were significant in the original analysis (Equation 1). The results are inconsistent with 
the original analysis (Equation 1).
137
There are studies (e.g., Abbott et al. 2003; Whisenant et al., 2003) which 
exclude financial institutions when explaining variation in APNAS fees and argue that 
the inclusion of financial institutions reduces the comparability of included financial 
statement data. Equation 1 was re-run excluding 665 observations pertaining to the 
financial sector (GICS code 4010 to 4040). The results (n = 3,156) show that DAFLKS 
(p = 0.063) and ACAFLKS (p = 0.022) are significantly (albeit weakly for the former) 
and positively associated with APNAS fees (Appendix II, Table 1, Panel C). Test 
variables DAPFKS (p = 0.943) and ACAPFKS (p = 0.150) became insignificant, which 
were significant in the original analysis (Equation 1). The results are inconsistent with 
the original analysis (Equation 1).
Firms without audit committees are likely to have different characteristics so the 
inclusion of these firms in the analyses may expose the study to self-selection bias. 
Equation 1 was re-run excluding 1,042 observations which did not have audit 
committees. The results (n = 2,779) show that DLKS (p = 0.023) is significantly and 
positively associated with APNAS fees. DAPLKS (p = 0.002), ACAFLKS (p = 0.020) 
and ACAPLKS (p < 0.001) are significantly and negatively associated with APNAS 
fees (Appendix II, Table 1, Panel D). The results are consistent with the original 
analysis (Equation 1).
5.1.2 AUDITOR FIRM TENURE
Audit firm tenure (AFTENURE) is the dependent variable to examine whether 
interlockings are associated with audit firm tenure. AFTENURE is a continuous 
measure of the number of uninterrupted years of relationship between the auditor and 
the current auditee. The following sections provide descriptive statistics for the 
AFTENURE model:
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5.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.5 reports the descriptive statistics for the AFTENURE model. 
Descriptive statistics show that the average audit firm tenure for the sample companies 
was 7.57 years and the average audit partner tenure was 3.51 years. More than 57 per 
cent of the sample companies were audited by BIG 4 audit firms. The average listing 
age of the companies was 13.51 years. The PQUAL variable shows that, on average, 17 
per cent of the companies were issued other than an unqualified opinion in the prior 
year.
Table 5.5
Descriptive statistics for the AFTENURE model (N = 3,821)
V a r ia b le s Mean Median Std. Deviation
AFTENURE 7.57 5.00 7.12
APTENURE 3.51 3.00 2.95
Total Assets ($M) 1,684.00 22.00 17,818.00
G_TA 1.07 0.07 12.91
LEVERAGE 0.43 0.33 0.67
LOSS 0.58 1.00 0.49
AGE 13.51 11.00 10.96
BIG4 0.57 1.00 0.50
PQUAL 0.17 0.00 0.38
AA 0.05 0.00 0.23
UXAF 0.00 0.00 0.71
UXAPNAS 0.00 1.24 3.90
BDINDP 0.68 0.71 0.19
ACSIZE 2.99 3.00 1.00
INDEPAC 0.73 1.00 0.44
AGE = age of the company as measured as the number of years the company has been listed on ASX; 
PQUAL =1 if the company has other than an unqualified opinion in the previous year, 0 otherwise; 
UXAF = unexpected audit fees; UXAPNAS = unexpected auditor provided non-audit fees; LOSS = 1 
if the company reported a loss either in the current or previous year, 0 otherwise; AA = 1 if the auditor 
was Arthur Andersen during 2001, 0 otherwise. Other variables have been defined earlier in Tables 5.1 
and 5.4.
5.1.2.2 Comparison of audit firm tenure between interlocking and non-interlocking 
companies
Table 5.6 shows the mean audit firm tenure for interlocking and non­
interlocking companies. The average audit firm tenure was longer for DLKS, DAFLKS
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and DAPLKS compared to that of non-interlocking companies. The average audit firm 
tenure between DLKS and DAFLKS was significantly different from non-interlocking 
companies (p = 0.001 and p < 0.001 respectively) However, the average audit firm 
tenure between DAPLKS and non-interlocking companies was not significantly 
different (p = 0.628).
The average audit firm tenure for ACLKS and ACAFLKS companies was 
significantly different from that of non-interlocking companies (p = 0.006 and p <0.001
Table 5.6
Audit firm tenure for interlocking and non-interlocking companies
Test
Variables
I n t e r l o c k i n g N o n - i n t e r l o c k i n g t p-value
Sig.
(two-
tailed)
n Mean Std.
Deviation
N Mean Std.
Deviation
DLKS 3,251 7.73 7.274 570 6.65 6.060 3.344 0.001
DAFLKS 1,672 8.27 8.105 2,149 7.02 6.185 5.411 <0.001
DAPLKS 765 7.68 7.799 3,056 7.54 6.935 0.485 0.628
ACLKS 1,809 7.90 7.484 2,012 7.27 6.756 2.734 0.006
ACAFLKS 767 8.52 8.118 3,054 7.33 6.822 4.154 <0.001
ACAPLKS 258 7.38 7.243 3,563 7.58 7.107 -0.434 0.664
Variables have been defined earlier in Table 5.1.
respectively). The average audit firm tenure was longer for the interlocking companies
compared to non-interlocking companies. However, the average audit firm tenure
between ACAPLKS and non-interlocking companies was not significantly different (p 
= 0.664).
5.1.2.3 Correlations
Table 5.7 provides Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the test variables 
included in the AFTENURE model and other control variables. The results show that 
four of the six interlocking variables are positive and significantly (p-values are two- 
tailed) correlated with audit firm tenure (DAPLKS and ACAPLKS are not significant). 
The correlation coefficients between DLKS, DAFLKS and AFTENURE are positive
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and significant (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001 respectively). ACLKS and ACAFLKS are also 
significant (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001 respectively) and positively associated with 
AFTENURE. A significant positive correlation between the test variables and audit firm 
tenure indicates that the number of interlocking links is significantly associated with 
longer audit firm tenure. There are insignificant correlations between DAPLKS (p = 
0.374), ACAPLKS (p = 0.765) and AFTENURE. These indicate that audit firm tenure 
may not be affected by the number of audit partner links with either director or audit 
committee members in other companies.
Most of the control variables are significantly correlated with AFTENURE. A 
significant positive association between the entity size (LnTA) (p < 0.001), company 
age (LnAGE) (p < 0.001) and AFTENURE indicates that audit firm tenure is longer for 
large companies and companies listed on the ASX for longer periods. A significant and 
positive association between AFTENURE and BIG 4 indicates that audit firm tenure is 
longer if the entities are audited by BIG 4 audit firms (p < 0.001). A significant negative 
(p < 0.001) association between AFTENURE and LOSS indicates that audit firm tenure 
is shorter if entities incur losses. UXAF is positive and highly correlated (p = 0.001) 
with AFTENURE indicating that audit firms have higher unexpected audit fees for 
companies with longer tenure. There is a significant (p < 0.001) negative association 
between AFTENURE and AA. PQUAL is significantly and negatively (p = 0.010) 
associated with AFTENURE. BDINDP (p = 0.037), ACSIZE (p = 0.001) and 
INDEPAC (p = 0.012) are significantly and positively correlated with AFTENURE. 
The control variables G TA (p = 0.100) and LEVERAGE (p = 0.915) and UXAPNAS 
(p = 0.487) are not significantly correlated with AFTENURE.
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5.1.2.4 Multivariate statistics
AFTENURE is the dependent variable for the audit Finn tenure model. Table 5.8 
reports the regression results for the AFTENURE model. The model is significant (p < 
0.001) with adjusted R2s of 0.33.55 All the hypotheses relating to this model are non- 
directional (p-values are two-tailed) due to competing arguments in respect of 
associations between AFTENURE and interlockings.
Hypothesis 2a
DLKS is not significant (p = 0.696), rejecting hypothesis 2a, which posits an 
association between director interlocking and audit firm tenure. This result indicates that 
the number of director links is not associated with audit firm engagement tenure in 
linked companies. The issue of auditor independence with longer audit firm tenure in 
the director interlocking situation appears not to be an issue based on this finding.
Hypothesis 2b
DAFLKS is significant and positive (p = 0.003), supporting hypothesis 2b, 
which posits an association between director-audit firm interlocking and audit firm 
tenure. A significant positive association between the number of director-audit firm 
links and audit firm tenure would raise concerns with respect to perceptions of auditor 
independence (Courtney and Jubb, 2005). Thus, the finding may provide evidence of 
impaired auditor independence.
Hypothesis 2c
DAPLKS is not significant (p = 0.171), rejecting hypothesis 2c, which is the 
posited association between director-audit partner interlocking and audit firm tenure.
55 Courtney and Jubb (2005) reports an adjusted R2 of 0.4316 for their auditor tenure model.
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This result indicates that the number of director and audit partner links in other 
companies is not associated with audit firm tenure. This finding does not support the 
reduction of auditor independence with higher number of director-audit partner links in 
other companies.
Hypothesis 2d
ACLKS is weakly significant and negative (p = 0.065), supporting hypothesis 
2d, which is the posited association between audit committee member interlocking and 
audit firm tenure. This result indicates that the number of audit committee member links 
is negatively associated with audit firm tenure. This supports the proposition that audit 
committee members may recommend changing auditors more frequently to improve 
auditor independence.
Hypothesis 2c
ACAFLKS is not significant (p = 0.227), rejecting hypothesis 2e, which posits 
an association between audit committee member-audit firm interlocking and audit firm 
tenure. This result indicates that the number of links between audit committee member 
and an audit firm is not associated with audit firm tenure and, therefore, auditor 
independence.
Hypothesis 2f
ACAPLKS is not significant (p = 0.648), rejecting hypothesis 2f, which is the 
posited association between audit committee member-audit partner interlocking and 
audit firm tenure. This result indicates that the number of links between audit committee 
member and an audit partner in other companies is not associated with audit firm tenure 
and, therefore, auditor independence.
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Control variables
Most of the control variables are significantly associated with AFTENURE. The 
coefficient of UXAF is positive and significant (p = 0.023). However, the coefficient of 
UXAPNAS is not significant (p = 0.429). The size of the company (LnTA), company 
age (LnAGE), and BIG 4 audit firms are significant and positive (p = 0.003, p < 0.001 
and p < 0.001, respectively) indicating that large companies and companies listed on the 
ASX for longer periods and companies audited by BIG 4 audit firms have longer audit 
firm tenure. The control variable AA is significant and negative (p < 0.001). Control 
variables G TA (p = 0.053) and PQUAL (p = 0.091) are weakly significant and 
negative. The coefficients of control variables LEVERAGE (p = 0.575), LOSS (p = 
0.167), BDINDP (p = 0.739), ACSIZE (p = 0.169), INDEPAC (p = 0.356), YEAR, (p 
=0.653) and YEAR2 (p = 0.356) are not significantly associated with AFTENURE.
5.1.2.5 Sensitivity analyses
All regression models were re-run after clustering observations and including 
year dummies to avoid standard errors bias as they account for the residual dependence 
created by the firm effect as well as a time effect in a panel data set (Petersen, 2007).36 
The test variables DAFLKS (p = 0.003) and ACLKS (p = 0.094) remained significant 
(two-tailed) (albeit weakly in the case of ACLKS) and in the same directions 
(Appendix II, Table 2, Panel A). Thus, the results of the AFTENURE model are not 
biased by firm effect and time effect.
Furthermore, to test the impact of the Arthur Andersen (AA) dissolution on 
AFTENURE, all the models were re-run excluding the AA variable (207 observations) 
and all observations with a change in auditor in 2001 due to the dissolution of Arthur
56 Please see section 5.1.1.5 for the arguments for clustering observations and including year dummies.
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Andersen. DAFLKS (p = 0.001) and ACLKS (p = 0.082) remained significant (albeit 
weakly in the case of ACLKS) and in the same directions (Appendix II, Table 2, Panel 
B). That is, the results were robust.
Equation 2 was re-run excluding 1,042 observations observation which did not 
have audit committees. Firms without audit committees are likely to have different 
characteristics so the inclusion of these firms in the analyses may expose the study to 
self-selection bias. The results show that DAFLKS (p = 0.026) and ACLKS (p = 0.088) 
remained significant (albeit weakly in the case of ACLKS) as before (Equation 2) and 
ACAFLKS (p = 0.087) becomes weakly significant (Appendix II, Table 2, Panel C).
5.2 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter reports the results of examining interlockings and their association 
with auditor independence. A summary of the findings for the test variables is provided 
in Table 5.9. The test variable DLKS is significantly and positively associated with 
APNAS fees, which provides evidence consistent with impaired auditor independence. 
In contrast, DAPLKS, ACAFLKS and ACAPLKS are significantly and negatively 
associated with APNAS fees, which does not support impaired auditor independence.
Table 5.9
Summary of findings for auditor inde pendence hypotheses
Test Variables APNAS TENURE
DLKS Positive NS
DAFLKS NS Positive
DAPLKS Negative NS
ACLKS NS Negative (weak)
ACAFLKS Negative NS
ACAPLKS Negative NS
NS = not significant
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Audit firm tenure, the second measure of auditor independence, results show a 
significant and positive association between DAFLKS and AFTENURE, which may 
support the argument for an audit firm rotation policy in interlocking environments to 
improve auditor independence. A significant negative association between ACLKS and 
AFTENURE support the argument that the audit committee members may recommend 
changing the incumbent audit firm more frequently to improve auditor independence. 
Chapter 6 reports the results of test for the association between interlockings and audit 
quality.
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CHAPTER SIX
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF AUDIT QUALITY MODELS
6.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the association between interlockings and audit quality. 
First, this chapter examines whether interlockings are associated with the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor. Second, this chapter examines the 
association between interlockings and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals are calculated using the forward-looking Modified-Jones 
models.
6.1 AUDIT QUALITY
The following sections discuss the findings of the OPINION model.
6.1.1 AUDIT OPINION
This section uses an opinion prediction model to examine whether the 
interlockings are associated with the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by 
the auditor. The current year audit opinion (OPINION) is the dependent variable for 
testing the hypothesised variables. The dependent variable, OPINION, is the type of 
audit opinion: unqualified or other than unqualified. An unqualified audit opinion is 
coded as 0 and all other opinions as 1. The purpose of the OPINION prediction model is 
to examine the significance and direction of the coefficients of interlocking variables, 
after controlling for factors known to be associated with audit qualification. If the 
association is significant and negative (positive) then the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified opinion decline (increase) as the number of interlocking links increases 
(decreases). The following sections provide descriptive statistics for the OPINION 
model.
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6.1.1.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the OPINION model. Table 6.1 
shows that 17 per cent of audit reports were other than an unqualified audit opinion 
during the period of study and this was consistent with the previous years’ audit 
opinions (PQUAL, 17 per cent). Among the sample, 57 per cent of the companies were 
audited by BIG 4 audit firms. The average size of the companies (total assets) was 
$1,684 million.
Table 6.1
Descriptive statistics for the variables of the OPINION model
(N = 3, 821)
V a r i a b l e s Mean Median Std. Deviation
OPINION 0.17 0.00 0.38
DLKS 4.03 3.00 3.82
DAFLKS 0.89 0.00 1.36
DAPLKS 0.31 0.00 0.75
ACLKS 1.24 0.00 1.83
ACAFLKS 0.31 0.00 0.70
ACAPLKS 0.09 0.00 0.35
TA ($M) 1,684.00 22.00 17,818.00
BIG4 0.57 1.00 0.50
UXAF 0.00 0.00 0.71
UXAPNAS 0.00 1.24 3.90
LEVERAGE 0.43 0.33 0.67
LOSS 0.58 1.00 0.49
ROA -0.12 -0.01 0.61
SQRSUBS 2.78 2.24 2.77
PQUAL 0.17 0.00 0.38
AFTENURE 7.57 5.00 7.12
INITIAL 0.22 0.00 0.42
BDINDP 0.68 0.71 0.19
ACSIZE 2.99 3.00 1.00
INDEPAC 0.73 1.00 0.44
OPINION = 1 if the auditor issues an other than unqualified opinion in the current year, 0 otherwise; 
DLKS = director interlock, DAFLKS = director-audit firm interlock; DAPLKS = director-audit partner 
interlock; ACLKS = audit committee member interlock; ACAFLKS = audit committee member-audit 
firm interlock; ACAPLKS = audit committee member-audit partner interlock; AFTENURE = number of 
years that the audit firm has been engaged with the current auditee; INDEPAC = 1 if the audit committee 
is comprised of a majority (fifty per cent or more) of non—executive directors, 0 otherwise; SQRSUBS = 
square root of subsidiaries; TA = total assets in millions of dollars; BIG 4 = 1  if a company’s incumbent 
auditor is a BIG 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise; UXAF = unexpected audit fee; UXAPNAS = auditor provided 
unexpected non-audit fee; ROA = operating income divided by average total assets; LEVERAGE = ratio 
of total liabilities to total assets; INITIAL = 1 if the audit firm engagement either in the first or second 
year with the current auditee, 0 otherwise; PQUAL = 1 if the company has other than an unqualified 
opinion in the previous year, 0 otherwise; LOSS = 1 if the company reported a loss either in the current 
year or previous year, 0 otherwise; BDINDP = 1 if the board comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) 
of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise; ACSIZE = number of audit committee members.
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6.LI.2 Comparison of OPINION between interlocking and non-interlocking
companies
Table 6.2 shows the percentage of qualified audit opinions issued by auditors for 
interlocking and non-interlocking companies. The percentage of qualified audit 
opinions issued by the auditor of interlocking companies was significantly lower (p < 
0.001) than non-interlocking companies for all cases. Auditors qualified 16 per cent of 
audit reports for DLKS companies and 24 per cent for non-DLKS companies. The 
percentage of qualified opinions between DAFLKS and non-interlocking was also 
significant (p < 0.001) with 12 per cent and 21 per cent receiving other than an 
unqualified opinion respectively. The percentage of qualified audit opinions for 
DAPLKS was also lower than that of non-interlocking companies (14 per cent and 18 
per cent respectively) and the percentages were significantly different (p = 0.008). 
These results indicate that auditors of interlocking companies issued proportionately 
fewer qualified opinions than those of non-interlocking companies, but do not take 
account of factors suggesting deserved qualifications that may apply differently within 
each group of companies. This result may provide evidence of reduced audit quality in 
interlocking environments.
The percentages of qualified audit opinions issued by auditors for ACALKS, 
ACAPLKS and ACAPLKS were significantly different (p < 0.001) from those of non­
interlocking companies. The percentage of qualified audit opinions for ACLKS 
companies was 11 per cent and 23 per cent for non-ACLKS interlocking companies. 
The percentage of qualified audit opinions for non-audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking was 2.5 times higher than that of ACAFLKS companies (7 per cent and 20 
per cent respectively). The percentage of qualified audit opinions of ACAPLKS 
companies was lower than that of non-interlocking companies (8 per cent and 18 per
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cent respectively) and was therefore significantly different (p < 0.001). This result may 
provide evidence of reduced audit quality in an audit committee member-audit 
finn/partner interlocking environment.
6.1.1.3 Correlations
Table 6.3 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables included in 
the OPINION model. As expected, all the test variables are negative and significantly 
correlated with OPINION. This result indicates that the number of interlocking links is 
negatively associated with receiving a qualified audit opinion (p-values are two-tailed). 
The correlation coefficients of DLKS, DAFLKS and DAPLKS are significant and 
negative (p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.008 respectively). A significant negative 
association between DLKS, DAFLKS, DAPLKS and the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified opinion may constitute evidence of a compliant auditor in the issuing of audit 
opinions for linked companies. The correlation coefficients of ACLKS, ACAFLKS, 
ACAPLKS and the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion are significant and 
negative (p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p = 0.003 respectively). A significant negative 
association between ACLKS, ACAFLKS, ACAPLKS and the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified opinion might be evidence of sound corporate governance resulting in disputes 
resolved to the auditor’s satisfaction and hence fewer qualified opinions for linked 
companies.
Additionally, auditors of linked companies may issue fewer qualified opinions 
due to the desire to continue an audit engagement and earn revenue from audit and 
APNAS fees. This is supported by the significant and positive correlations between the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion and UXAF and negative association with 
AFTENURE (p < 0.001 and p = 0.020 respectively). The prior year audit opinion is
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significantly correlated with the current year’s audit opinion (p < 0.001). Companies’ 
age (LnAGE) and whether the audit engagement is in either its first or second year 
(INITIAL) are also significant and positively correlated with OPINION (p < 0.001 
and p < 0.001), indicating that these companies are less likely to receive a qualified 
opinion. BIG 4 is negative and significant (p < 0.001) indicating that companies 
audited by BIG 4 audit firms are less likely to receive a qualified opinion. The size of 
the company (LnTA), ROA, and number of subsidiaries (SQRSUBS) are significantly 
and negatively correlated with OPINION (p < 0.001, p < 0.001 and p < 0.001 
respectively) indicating that large, profitable and complex companies are less likely to 
receive a qualified opinion. A board as well as an audit committee comprising a 
majority of non-executive directors (BDINDP and INDEPAC) are significantly and 
negatively associated with OPINION (p = 0.006 and p < 0.001 respectively) 
indicating that companies comprising a majority of non-executive directors on their 
boards and audit committees are less likely to receive qualified audit opinions. 
ACSIZE is also significantly (p < 0.001) and negatively associated with OPINION. 
The LOSS variable is significantly and positively correlated with OPINION (p < 
0.001) indicating that companies that incur a loss either in the previous or current year 
are more likely to receive a qualified audit opinion. Correlations for all other control 
variables are insignificant.
6.1.1.4 Multivariate statistics
Table 6.4 reports the logistic regression results for the OPINION model. The 
results provide evidence of whether the interlockings are associated with the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor after controlling for other 
characteristics that could affect the type of opinion to be received. The model is well
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fitted with pseudo R2s range from 0.536 to 0.541.57 Direction for the hypotheses 
related to OPINION and interlockings (tabulated results are two-tailed) is not 
predicted.
Hypothesis 3a
DLKS is significant and negative (p = 0.014), supporting hypothesis 3a, which 
posits an association between director interlocking and the likelihood of receiving a 
qualified opinion. The result suggests that a higher number of links between directors 
in other companies may decrease audit quality as companies with more interlocking 
directors are less likely to receive a qualified opinion. Directors may pressure an 
auditor to issue an unqualified audit opinion because they want to be directors of more 
than one company. Prior research argues that directors of companies experiencing 
adverse events such as poor performance or financial distress or directors of 
companies which have switched their auditor after issuing a going-concern qualified 
audit report subsequently are less likely to serve as directors of other companies 
(Gilson, 1990; Carcello and Neal, 2003). Thus, directors may pressure the auditor not 
to qualify audit reports of linked companies even though it reduces audit quality.
Hypothesis 3b
DAFLKS is significant and negative (p = 0.004), supporting hypothesis H3b, 
which is the posited association between director-audit firm interlocking and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. This result indicates that the number of 
links between directors and an audit firm in other companies is negatively associated 
with the company receiving a qualified audit opinion. This may provide evidence of
57 Jubb (2000) uses the modified version of Dopuch et al. ’s (1987) model and reports a pseudo R2 of 
0.431 for the sample of all qualifications and 0.452 for the sample of subject to qualification.
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reduced audit quality because auditors qualified less than the appropriate level of 
qualification for director-audit firm interlocking companies (Jubb, 2000). Auditors 
may not qualify the audit reports of linked companies due to their closeness to a 
client’s management and eagerness to satisfy the client (Arel et al., 2005). Thus, a 
significant negative association between the number of director-audit firm 
interlockings and OPINION supports the proposition of reduced audit quality.
Hypothesis 3c
DAPLKS is significant and negative (p < 0.001), supporting hypothesis 3c, 
which is the posited association between director-audit partner interlocking and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. This result indicates that the number of 
links between directors and an audit partner in other companies is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion. This result 
suggests that the personal relationships between the signing audit partner and 
directors who sit on more than one company’s board may affect the audit partner’s 
willingness to issue a qualified audit opinion. If an audit partner qualifies one or more 
audit reports from a family of linked companies, the linked companies may switch the 
incumbent auditor from the linked companies (Jubb and Houghton, 1999). To protect 
the audit engagement and continue to earn revenue in linked companies, the audit 
partner may not qualify the audit reports. Thus, a large number of director-auditor 
partner links in other companies decreases audit quality.
Hypothesis 3d
ACLKS is not significant (p = 0.329), rejecting hypothesis 3d, which is the 
posited association between audit committee member interlocking and the likelihood
159
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of receiving a qualified opinion. This result indicates that the number of audit 
committee member interlockings is not associated with the likelihood of issuing a 
qualified audit opinion by the auditors of linked companies, hence audit quality.
Hypothesis 3e
ACAFLKS is not significant (p = 0.136), rejecting hypothesis 3e, which is the 
posited association between audit committee member-audit firm interlocking and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. This result indicates that the number of 
links between audit committee members and an audit firm is not associated with the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor and therefore, audit 
quality.
Hypothesis 3f
ACAPLKS is significant and negative (p = 0.006), supporting hypothesis 3f, 
which is the posited association between audit committee member-audit partner 
interlocking and the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. This result indicates 
that the number of audit committee member-audit partner links is negatively 
associated with the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the auditor. An 
audit partner may have the intention to secure and maintain more audit engagements 
from a family of linked companies and so try to satisfy audit committee members by 
not qualifying audit reports where a qualification is warranted. As the personal 
relationship between audit committee members and a common audit partner gets 
closer in linked companies, the audit partner’s incentives to challenge the client over 
accounting issues may decrease and he/she may not qualify the audit report in 
circumstances where a qualification is warranted (Jeppesen, 1998). Thus, a higher
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number of audit committee member-audit partner links in other companies decreases 
audit quality.
Control variables
Most of the control variables are significantly associated with OPINION. The 
prior year audit opinion (PQUAL) is an important predictor of current year audit 
opinion evidenced by a significant (p < 0.001) and positive association between 
PQUAL and OPINION. A significant (p < 0.001) and negative association between 
auditee size (LnTA) and OPINION indicates that larger companies are less likely to 
receive a qualified opinion. ROA is negative (p = 0.001) and LOSS is positive and 
significant (p < 0.001), indicating that the auditor’s opinion is affected by the 
profitability of the company. The association between the age of the company 
(LnAGE) and OPINION is positive and significant (p = 0.010) suggesting that 
auditors are more likely to issue a qualified opinion for older companies. SQRSUBS 
is significant (p < 0.001) and positive indicating that complex companies are more 
likely to receive a qualified opinion. BIG 4 is significant (p = 0.017) and negative 
indicating that companies audited by BIG 4 audit firm are less likely to receive a 
qualified opinion. YEAR2 (2004) is weakly significant and negative (p = 0.088) with 
OPINION. All other control variables are insignificant.
6.1.1.5 Sensitivity analysis
The logistic regression was re-run after clustering observations and including 
year dummies.58 The test variables DLKS (p = 0.020), DAFLKS (p = 0.004), 
DAPLK.S (p < 0.001) and ACAPLKS (p = 0.006) remained significant and negative
See section 5.1.1.5 for the arguments regarding clustering observations and including year dummies.
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as before (Appendix II, Table 3, Panel A). Thus, the results of the OPINION model 
are not biased by firm effect or time effect.
The OPINION model (Equation 3) was re-run after redefining OPINION. 
Audit opinion was redefined as 1 for audit opinion if it involves a disagreement with 
management over accounting issues (not using acceptable accounting policies, not 
making required disclosures, valuation disagreements, etc.) and going-concern issues, 
0 otherwise. The test variables DLKS (p = 0.046), DAFLKS (p = 0.065), DAPLKS (p 
= 0.031), and ACAPLKS (p = 0.067) remained significant, although less strongly for 
DAFLKS and ACAPLKS, and negative as before (Appendix II, Table 3, Panel B). 
Thus, the result is robust regardless of classification of audit opinion.
Prior research (e.g., Bartov et al., 2001) argues that if discretionary accruals
indicate earnings manipulations, they should be associated with the likelihood of
auditors’ issuing qualified audit reports. Bartov et al. (2001) finds a significant
positive association between discretionary accruals and the likelihood of receiving a
qualified opinion. Thus, the OPINION model was re-run including the absolute value
of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) as an additional control variable in equation
3.59 The absolute value of discretionary accruals is not significant. The test variables
DLKS (p = 0.095), DAFLKS (p = 0.055), DAPLKS (p = 0.002) and ACAPLKS (p =
0.001) remained significant, albeit more weakly for DLKS and DAFLKS, and
negative as before (Appendix II, Table 3, Panel C). These results do not support the
association between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the likelihood of
receiving a qualified opinion. Herbohn and Ragunathan (2008), using Australian data
59 In the original OPINION model, DACC was not included because the objective of this study is to 
examine the OPINION of all types of companies including financial sector ones. DACC cannot be 
calculated for the financial sector.
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over the period 1999-2003, reports that there is no evidence of earnings management 
leading to an audit opinion modification.
The OPINION model was re-run using interactions between ABSDACC and 
INTERLOCKINGS to capture any interaction effects. The test variables DLKS 
(weakly) (p = 0.065), DAFLKS (p = 0.048), DAPLKS (p = 0.001) and ACAPLKS (p 
= 0.003) remained significant, albeit weakly for DLKS, and negative as before 
(Appendix II, Table 3, Panel D). However, the interaction variable is insignificant. 
These results do not support the association between interaction of 
INTERLOCKINGS and ABSDACC and the likelihood of receiving a qualified 
opinion.
Chen et al. (2005) uses the interaction of non-audit fees and auditor tenure to 
capture any interaction effects between the two measures of auditor independence on 
the outcome of auditor-client negotiation over financial reporting issues. Their study 
finds a significant positive relation between the interaction of non-audit fees and the 
auditor tenure variable and the extent of client agreement, suggesting that non-audit 
fees do not affect the auditor's ability to resist client management pressure when 
auditor tenure is longer. The current study also examines the interaction between 
INTERLOCKINGS and APNAS and INTERLOCKINGS and AFTENURE. 
However, none of the interaction variables are significant with OPINION (Appendix 
II, Table 3, Panel E). Test variables DLKS (p = 0.789), DAFLKS (p -  0.473), 
DAPLKS (p =0.270) and ACAPLKS (p = 0.346) became insignificant, which were 
significant in Equation 3. The results are inconsistent with the original analysis 
(Equation 3).
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Prior studies (e.g., DeFond et al, 2002; Carcello and Neal, 2000) exclude 
financial institutions when attempting to explain opinion variation. Equation 3 was re­
run excluding 665 observations pertaining to financial institutions (GICS code 4010 
to 4040) and documents (n = 3,156) that DLKS (p = 0.007), DAFLKS (p = 0.013), 
DAPLKS (p < 0.001), ACLKS (p = 0.082) and ACAPLKS (p = 0. 012) are 
significantly and negatively associated with OPINION (Appendix II, Table 3, Panel 
F). The results are robust (Equation 3). ACLKS became significant, which was 
insignificant in the original analysis (Equation 3).
Equation 3 was re-run excluding 1,042 observations which did not have audit 
committees. Finns without audit committees are likely to have different 
characteristics so the inclusion of these firms in the analyses may expose the study to 
self-selection bias. However, the result is robust (n = 2,779) (Equation 3) for audit 
committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking companies indicating that ACLKS 
(p = 0.585) and ACAFLKS (p = 0.205) remained insignificant and ACAPLKS (p = 
0.003) is significant and negative (Appendix II, Table 3, Panel G). The results are 
consistent with those for the analysis of Equation 3 for audit committee member-audit 
firm/partner interlocking.
6.1.2 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
The absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) is used as a second 
proxy for measuring audit quality. Discretionary accruals are the focus of hypotheses 
H4a to H4f, which examine the association between the number of interlockings and 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals is calculated by 
using the cross-sectional forward-looking Modified-Jones (1991) model suggested
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by Dechow et al. (2003). The following sections provide descriptive statistics 
followed by analysis of any differences in the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
between interlocking and non-interlocking companies and then the results of 
correlation coefficients and regression.
6.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6.5 shows descriptive statistics for the variables in the cross-sectional forward- 
looking Modified-Jones discretionary accruals model. Consistent with prior earnings 
management studies (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005, Marciukaityte and 
Szewezyk, 2007), in all models, extreme observations were winsorised by setting
Table 6.5
Descriptive statistics for the variables of the DACC model 
_____________________(N=2,8f 7) ______________
V a r ia b le s M ean M edian Std.
D eviation
25th
P ercentile
75the
P ercen tile
TA C C -0.024 -0.012 0.087 -0.038 0.002
LTA.CC -0.028 -0.014 0.101 -0 .042 0.001
(A REV -A REC ) 0.005 0.004 0 .146 -0 .010 0.040
P P E 0.088 0.052 0.103 0.012 0.137
S G R O W T H 0.358 0.078 10.187 -0.242 0.492
SD A C C 0.001 0.008 0.068 -0.018 0.030
A B SD A C C 0.042 0.025 0.053 0.011 0.051
+  D A C C 0.036 0.024 0.039 0.012 0.046
- D A C C -0.051 -0.027 0.067 -0.063 -0.010
B IG 4 0.564 1.000 0 .496 0.000 1.000
E Q U IT Y 0.580 1.000 0.470 0.000 1.000
M E R A C Q S 0.203 0.000 0.403 0.000 0.000
L E V E R A G E 0.370 0.322 0.325 0.101 0.533
LnM V E 17.201 16.873 1.984 15.762 18.391
M B 2.261 1.743 48.664 0.980 3.124
C A SH FL O W -0.286 -0.032 6.422 -0.183 0.082
LO SS 0.663 1.000 0.473 0.000 1.000
A FT E N U R E 7.582 5.000 6.898 3.000 10.000
U X A F -0.002 0.001 0.538 -0.351 0.334
U X A PN A S -0.009 1.191 3.808 -1.934 2.623
B D IN D P 0.886 1.000 0.318 1.000 1.000
A C SIZE 2.116 2.000 1.587 0.000 3.000
IN D E PA C 0.686 1.000 0 .464 0.000 1.000
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TACC = total accruals; (AREV -  AREC) = change in revenue from period t-1 to period t minus change 
in accounts receivable from period t-1 to period t; PPE = gross value of property, plant and equipment; 
LTACC = value of total accruals in year t-1; S_GROWTH = next year sales minus current year sales 
divided by current year sales. All variables, other than S GROWTH, are scaled by the average value of 
total assets. SDACC = signed discretionary accruals; ABSDACC = absolute value of discretionary 
accruals; (+) DACC = income-increasing discretionary accruals; (-) DACC = income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals; MB = market to book value; LnMVE = natural log of market value of equity; 
BDTNDP = 1 if the board comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) of non-executive directors, 0 
otherwise; ACSIZE = number of audit committee members; INDEPAC = 1 if the audit committee 
comprises a majority (fifty per cent or more) of non-executive directors, 0 otherwise; other variables 
have been defined in Table 6.1. Observations were winsorised at the top and bottom 1 per cent of 
discretionary accruals to control outliers.
the values in the bottom and top one per cent to the values of the 1st and 99th 
percentiles for discretionary accruals. The mean and median of total accruals (TACC) 
for the sample companies were -0.024 and -0.012 respectively. The same statistics for 
the lagged total accruals (LTACC) were -0.028 and -0.014 respectively. The mean 
and median for the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDACC) were 0.042 
and 0.025 respectively. The same statistics for the income-increasing discretionary 
accruals (+DACC) and income-decreasing discretionary accruals (-DACC) were 
0.036 and 0.024, and -0.051 and -0.027 respectively. These results are consistent with 
other Australian studies (e.g., Coulton et al., 2005; Ruddock and Taylor, 2005).
6.1.2.2 Absolute value of discretionary accruals between interlocking and non­
interlocking companies
Table 6.6 shows the mean of ABSDACC for interlocking and non-interlocking 
companies. The mean ABSDACC of DAPLKS companies (0.049) was significantly 
higher (p = 0.002) than for non-interlocking companies (0.041). This finding 
indicates that audit quality might be reduced if there are links between director and 
audit partners. The mean ABSDACC of ACLKS (0.035) and ACAFLKS companies 
(0.032) was significantly lower than for non-interlocking (0.058 and 0.055 
respectively) companies. This finding indicates that links between audit committee
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members, audit committee members and an audit firm may improve audit quality. The 
mean ABSDACC between DLKS, DAFLKS and ACAPLKS companies was not 
significantly different from those of non-interlocking companies.
Table 6.6
ABSDACC for interlocking and non-interlocking companies
Test
Variables
Interlocking Non-interlocking t p-value 
Sig. (two- 
tailed)n Mean Std.
Deviation
n Mean Std.
Deviation
DLKS 2,365 0.043 0.054 452 0.039 0.046 1.274 0.203
DAFLKS 1,137 0.041 0.054 1,680 0.043 0.052 -1.182 0.237
DAPLKS 457 0.049 0.059 2,360 0.041 0.052 3.044 0.002
ACLKS 1,266 0.035 0.045 1,551 0.048 0.058 -6.341 <0.001
ACAFLKS 473 0.032 0.040 2,344 0.044 0.055 -4.417 <0.001
ACAPLKS 122 0.042 0.056 2,695 0.042 0.053 0.007 0.995
Variables have been defined earlier in Table 6.1.
6.1.2.3 Correlations
Table 6.7 shows Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the variables of the 
ABSDACC model (tabulated results are two-tailed). DAPLKS and ACAPLKS are 
positively and significantly correlated (p < 0.001 and p = 0.005) with ABSDACC.
This result indicates that the number of links between directors and/or audit
c
committee members and audit partners in other companies are positively associated 
with ABSDACC. This finding may provide evidence of reduced audit quality when 
there is a higher number of links between directors and/or audit committee members 
and an audit partner in other companies. There are significant and negative 
associations between DLKS (p = 0.028), ACLKS (p < 0.001) and ACAFLKS (p = 
0.001) and ABSDACC. A significant and negative association may provide evidence 
of improved audit quality because higher quality audits are associated with lower 
levels of discretionary accruals (Francis et al., 1999; Jubb, 2000).
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The control variables EQUITY, LEVERAGE and LOSS are significantly and 
positively correlated (p = 0.003, p < 0.001 and p < 0.001 respectively) with ABSDACC 
indicating that companies that issued new equity, had higher leverage and had 
incurred losses in the previous or current year, reported higher ABSDACC. There are 
significant and negative associations between BIG 4 (p < 0.001), LnMVE (p < 0.001) 
and ABSDACC indicating that companies audited by the BIG 4 audit firms as well as 
larger companies reported lower ABSDACC. Companies engaged in 
mergers/acquisitions (MERACQS) (p < 0.001) during the current period and 
companies that had higher CASHFLOW (p < 0.001) also reported lower ABSDACC. 
The correlation coefficient for AFTENURE is significant (p = 0.004) and negative 
indicating that audit firm tenure is negatively associated with ABSDACC. LTACC is 
significant (p < 0.001) and negative indicating that the previous year total accruals is 
negatively associated with ABSDACC. There is a significant and positive (p = 0.023) 
association between UXAF and ABSDACC. Audit committee size (ACS1ZE) and 
audit committee comprises majority of non-executive directors (1NDEPAC) are 
significantly (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001) and negatively associated with OPINION. All 
other control variables are insignificant.
6.1.2.4 Multivariate statistics
Table 6.8 reports the OLS regression results for the association between
ABSDACC and interlockings (tabulated results are two-tailed). The model is
significant (p < 0.001) with adjusted R2s of 0.12.60 The purpose of this regression is to
determine whether there is a significant association between interlockings and
ABSDACC after controlling for other factors that have an association with
60 Ruddock and Taylor (2005) reports adjusted R2s for the absolute value of discretionary accruals of 
0.053 for ASX listed companies during 1993-2000. The regression results for the ABSDACC model 
remained the same after clustering observations and including year dummies.
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ABSDACC. A positive association between the number of interlockings and 
ABSDACC might be interpreted as evidence of lower quality auditing in the presence 
of interlockings (Jubb, 2000). Alternatively, a negative association between the 
number of interlockings and ABSDACC may be interpreted as higher quality audit in 
the presence of interlockings (Francis et al., 1999; Jubb, 2000). All the hypotheses in 
this section are non-directional due to competing arguments about associations 
between ABSDACC and interlockings.
Hypothesis 4a
DLKS is weakly significant (p = 0.085) and positive, supporting hypothesis 
4a, which predicts an association between director interlocking and the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals. This result indicates that the number of director interlocks is 
positively associated with ABSDACC. Directors sitting on more than one company 
board may influence the earnings of linked companies because management and 
boards of directors which have the authority to specify the content of annual reports, 
may manage earnings to satisfy earnings estimates (Levitt, 1998). This finding may 
provide evidence of reduced audit quality when there is a higher number of director 
interlockings.
Hypothesis 4b
DAFLKS is significant (p = 0.046) and positive, supporting hypothesis 4b, 
which posits an association between director-audit firm interlocking and the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. A significant positive association may support the fact 
that audit quality is reduced when there is more director-audit firm interlocking.
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Hypothesis 4c
DAPLKS is marginally significant (p = 0.062) and positive, providing some 
support for hypothesis 4c, which posits an association between director-audit partner 
interlocking and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This result indicates that 
the number of links between director and a common audit partner in other companies is 
positively associated with ABSDACC. Discretionary accounting choices are used to 
‘smooth’ reported earnings around some pre-determined target, and sometimes pressure 
is placed on audit partners to accept the managed earnings when client’s income figures 
do not meet earnings forecasts (Ronen and Sadan, 1981; DeFond and Park, 1997; 
Gibbins et al., 2005). An audit partner may tolerate managed earnings in order to 
continue the audit engagements with the family of linked companies. Thus, audit quality 
may be reduced when there is a higher number of links between directors and an audit 
partner, which is reflected in a significant positive association between DAPLKS and 
ABSDACC.
Hypothesis 4d
ACLKS is not significant (p = 0.706), rejecting hypothesis 4d, which is the 
posited association between audit committee member interlocking and the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals. This result indicates that the number of audit committee 
member interlockings is not associated with ABSDACC. This result does not provide 
support for reduced audit quality when there are more links between audit committee 
members in other companies.
Hypothesis 4e
ACAFLKS is not significant (p = 0.558), rejecting hypothesis 4e, which is the 
posited association between audit committee member-audit firm interlocking and the
175
absolute value of discretionary accruals. This result indicates that the number of links 
between an audit committee member and an audit firm in other companies is not 
associated with ABSDACC. This finding does not provide support of reduced audit 
quality when there is a higher number of links between audit committee members and 
audit firms in other companies.
Hypothesis 4f
ACAPLKS is significant (p = 0.018) and positive, supporting hypothesis 4f, 
which is the posited association between audit committee member-audit partner 
interlocking and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This finding can be 
interpreted to suggest that the personal relationships between audit committee members 
and an audit partner in linked companies may affect audit quality. Audit partners may 
become too close to audit committee members by working together in more than one 
company and, due to their personal relationships and the incentive to continue providing 
their services to linked companies, audit partners may overlook the managed earnings of 
linked companies. Therefore, audit quality may decrease when there is a higher number 
of links between audit committee members and a common audit partner in other 
companies.
Control variables
Control variables CASHFLOW (p < 0.001), LnMVE (p < 0.001) and LTACC (p 
= 0.001) are negative and significant with respect to ABSDACC. EQUITY (p < 0.001) 
is positive and significantly associated with ABSDACC. LOSS is positive and 
significant (p < 0.001) indicating that where companies incur a loss either in the current 
year or previous year they report higher absolute value of discretionary accruals. The 
leverage of the company (LEVERAGE) is also positive and significant (p < 0.001)
176
indicating that leveraged companies may manipulate earnings. UXAF is significantly 
(weakly) (p = 0.066) and positively associated with ABSDACC. ACSIZE is 
significantly (p < 0.001) and negatively associated with ABSDACC. The dummy 
variables YEARi (2003) and YEAR2 (2004) are significantly (YEARiweakly) and 
negatively associated (p = 0.086 and p <0.001) with ABSDACC. All other control 
variables are insignificant.
6.1.2.5 Sensitivity analyses
The regression was re-run without winsorising discretionary accruals (Appendix 
II, Table 4, Panel A). This produced adjusted R2s range from 0.079 to 0.081 (N = 
2,817), which are lower than in the earlier models. Only the test variable DLKS (p = 
0.011) is significant. This result indicates that the outliers in the observations affect the 
association between the dependent and independent variables.
The industry levels regression was also re-run excluding observations of DACC 
> 3a (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel B). The adjusted R2s range from 0.085 to 0.087 (N = 
2,758). The test variables DLKS (p = 0.045), DAFLKS (p = 0.091) and ACAPLKS (p = 
0.069) are significant, albeit that the latter two are weakly so, which is consistent with 
the original analysis (other than DAPLKS, which became insignificant, Equation 6). 
The regression was re-run again, after winsorising observations at the top 1 per cent and 
bottom 1 per cent of DACC, which produced adjusted R2s range from 0.090 to 0.091 (N 
= 2,758) (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel C). Only ACAPLKS (p = 0.056) is weakly 
significant. The result is not consistent with the original model. This result indicates that 
outliers affect the association between the dependent and independent variables.
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Resource dependence theory predicts that the largest companies in a market will 
be the most interlocked due to their greater demand for information and resources 
(Etheridge et al., 2008). Both Dooley’s (1969) and Ong et al.'s (2003) results support 
this prediction, using US and Singaporean samples respectively. Using Australian data, 
Etheridge et al. (2008) finds that the largest decile of companies is the most interlocked 
and the smallest decile of companies is the least interlocked. For testing the robustness 
of the discretionary accruals models, the regression for the larger and smaller companies 
was re-run. To identify the larger and smaller companies, the median value of LnMVE 
(16.8728) is used.61 For the larger companies, the adjusted R2s range from 0.088 to 
0.090 (n = 1,408) and none of the test variables is significantly associated with the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel D). However, for 
the smaller companies (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel E), DLKS (p = 0.007), DAFLKS (p 
= 0.013), DAPLKS (p = 0.054), ACAFLKS (p = 0.077) and ACAPLKS (p = 0.002) are 
positive and significantly (some weakly) associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, which is similar (ACAFLKS was insignificant and now it is 
significant) to the results of the original absolute value of discretionary accruals’ model 
(Equation 6). The adjusted R2s range from 0.086 to 0.092 (n = 1,409). These results 
may provide evidence of associations between interlockings and earnings management 
for the smaller companies but not in the case of the larger companies. The results may 
be interpreted as larger companies being less likely to engage in earnings management 
because they are more likely to face scrutiny from financial analysts and investors 
(Zhou and Elder, 2001; Rusmin et al., 2005). Larger companies may choose Big 4 audit 
firms and are less likely to allow earnings management. Palmon et al. (2008) finds that 
the negative abnormal returns documented in Sloan (1996) primarily come from larger 
companies whereas positive abnormal returns come from smaller companies. Their
61 Equation 6 was re-run using the median value of total assets to classify the largest and smallest 
companies, however, the results were consistent with the analyses of median value of LnMVE.
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result suggests accrual anomaly to be a size dependent phenomenon and therefore 
brings an additional dimension to this well known anomaly. Francis and Wang (2006) 
finds that earnings quality increases for firms with Big 4 auditors based on abnormal 
accruals are smaller and earnings conservatism is greater. Thus, the results regarding 
associations between interlockings and the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
should be interpreted with caution.
There is research evidence of association between interlocking and profitability 
of a company. Fligstein and Brantley (1992) finds a negative association between 
director interlocks and profitability in their sample of large US firms, while other 
studies find that poorly performing firms are more likely to interlock than others 
(Dooley, 1969; Allen, 1974; Richardson, 1987; Mizruchi and Steams, 1988; Lang and 
Lockhart, 1990; Boeker and Goodstein, 1991). Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) suggests 
that the amount of managed earnings could be positively related to firm’s performance. 
Lee et al. (2006) argues that the endogenously determined market response to reported 
earnings is more sensitive for firms with higher performance, which gives managers of 
these firms greater motivation to overstate earnings. Thus, the sample was split into two 
groups on the basis of median value of ROA (median ROA = -0.026) and two separate 
tests were mn. The results show that DLKS (p = 0.071) and ACAPLKS (p = 0.049) are 
significantly, albeit weakly, associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
for lower ROA (below median ROA = -0.026, n = 1,442) companies (Appendix II, 
Table 4, Panel F). The results are not consistent with the previous analyses (Equation 6). 
The results for the higher ROA (above median ROA = -0.026, n = 1,375) indicate that 
none of the test variables are significantly associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel G). The results are consistent with 
previous (size) analysis. The results provide evidence of association between
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interlockings and discretionary accruals for lower profitable companies but not for 
higher profitable companies. Thus, the earnings management incentives of management 
may be affected by the performance of companies.
There are concerns among regulators, researchers and financial statement users 
about the distortions in earnings that can occur due to inappropriate income-increasing 
and/or income-decreasing accruals (Myers et al., 2003). Myers et al. (2003) argues that 
income-increasing accruals can be used to inflate current earnings while income- 
decreasing accruals can be used to create “cookie jar reserves”, which allow managers 
to increase future earnings. Therefore, discretionary accruals are classified into income- 
increasing and income-decreasing accruals to examine whether interlocking companies 
are engaged in earnings manipulation positively or negatively. Panels H and I of 
Appendix II, Table 4 report the OLS regression results for income-increasing and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals respectively. The income-increasing 
discretionary accruals model is significant (p < 0.001) with an adjusted R2 range from 
0.075 to 0.076 (n = 1,675). None of the interlocking variables is significant with 
income-increasing discretionary accruals (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel H). These 
findings indicate that the number of interlocking links may not be associated with 
income-increasing discretionary accruals.
However, the income-decreasing discretionary accruals model is significant (p < 
0.005) with adjusted R2s of 0.20 (n = 1,142). Among the six interlocking variables, 
DLKS and DAFLKS are significant, albeit weakly for DAFLKS, (p = 0.047 and p = 
0.076 respectively) and negative (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel I). The results indicate 
that companies with more links between directors and audit firms in other companies 
report income-decreasing discretionary accruals (conservative reporting due to the
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expectation of earnings smoothing in the future). Rath and Sun (2007), using ten 
Australian industries during 2000-2006, finds that income-decreasing manipulations 
are employed more often than income-increasing earnings management. The above 
results of associations between income-decreasing and interlockings may indicate a 
higher quality audit as the auditor knows the directors better or could be indicative of 
directors trying to show auditors that they make conservative accounting choices.62
Equation 6 was re-run excluding 836 observations which did not have audit 
committees. Finns without audit committees are likely to have different characteristics 
so the inclusion of these firms in the analyses may expose the study to self-selection 
bias. However, the result is robust (n = 1,981) indicating that ACLKS (p = 0.438) and 
ACAFLKS (p = 0.523) remained insignificant as before and ACAPLKS (p = 0.006) is 
significant and negative (Appendix II, Table 4, Panel J).
Chen et al. (2005) finds a significant positive relation between the interaction of 
non-audit fees and the auditor tenure variable and the extent of client agreement. Their 
results suggest that non-audit fees do not affect the auditor's ability to resist client 
management pressure when auditor tenure is longer. The current study uses interactions 
between LnAPNAS and INTERLOCKINGS and AFTENURE and INTERLOCKINGS 
to investigate the joint effects of APNAS and AFTENURE and interlockings on 
earnings management. The interaction variable AFTENURE*ACAPLKS is weakly 
significantly and positively (p = 0.081) associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals and none of the other interaction variables are significant 
(Appendix II, Table 4, Panel K). The results indicate that longer audit firm tenure and 
audit committee member and audit partner links are weakly positively associated with
62 Zhou (2007) argues that reporting more conservatively (lower discretionary accruals) could be 
consistent with greater earnings management.
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the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The test variable DAPLKS (p = 0.062) is 
weakly significant and DLKS (p = 0.124), DAFLKS (p = 0.167) and ACAPLKS (p = 
0.757) became insignificant, which is inconsistent with the original analysis (Equation 
6). The findings do not support the associations between the joint effects of APNAS and 
INTERLOCKINGS and AFTENURE and INTERLOCKINGS and absolute value of 
discretionary accruals.
6.2 CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter examines the association between audit quality and interlockings. 
The first proxy for audit quality, OPINION is significantly and negatively associated 
with DLKS, DAFLKS and DAPLKS. The results indicate that the number of links 
among these parties is negatively related to the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit 
opinion. There are significant and positive associations between DLKS, DAFLKS, and 
DAPLKS and ABSDACC, the second proxy for audit quality. Both proxies for audit 
quality provide consistent results with interlockings indicating reduced audit quality. A 
summary of findings for the test variables is provided in Table 6.9.
Table 6.9
Summary of findings for audit quality hypotheses
Test Variables OPINION ABSDACC
DLKS Negative Positive (weakly)
DAFLKS Negative Positive
DAPLKS Negative Positive (weakly)
ACLKS NS NS
ACAFLKS NS NS
ACAPLKS Negative Positive
NS = not significant
In contrast, ACLKS and ACAFLKS are not significantly associated with 
OPINION as well as with ABSDACC. However, the possibility that a personal 
relationship between audit committee members and an audit partner in linked
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companies may affect audit quality is supported by a significant association between 
ACAPLKS and OPINION as well as ABSDACC. Again, both proxies for measuring 
audit quality provide consistent results with interlockings. Chapter 7 provides 
conclusion, limitations and opportunity for future research.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.0 INTRODUCTION
The associations between interlockings and auditor independence and audit 
quality are examined in this study. The types of interlocking used in this study are -  
director interlocking, director-audit firm interlocking, director-audit partner 
interlocking, audit committee member interlocking, audit committee member-audit firm 
interlocking and audit committee member-audit partner interlocking. The impact of 
interlockings on auditor independence and audit quality is an important issue because 
links created between director and/or audit committee member and a common auditor 
may undennine the appearance of auditor independence (Davison et al., 1984; Jubb and 
Houghton, 1999; Jubb, 2000), which can affect actual or perceived audit quality. The 
current study uses four proxies for measuring audit quality. Auditor independence (a 
component of audit quality) is proxied by auditor provided non-audit services (APNAS) 
fees and audit firm engagement tenure (AFTENURE) with an existing client. Audit 
quality is proxied by the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion (OPINION) by 
an auditor and discretionary accruals (DACC) tolerated by the auditor. The following 
sections discuss the findings from this study:
7.1 THE RESULTS
7.1.1 AUDITOR PROVIDED NON-AUDIT SERVICES FEES
The argument against the joint provision of audit and APNAS in this study is 
that directors of linked companies may purchase non-audit services from the incumbent 
auditor to create additional economic pressure that could result in a more compliant 
auditor who would allow management enough flexibility to attain its goals, such as 
receiving a favourable audit opinion and managing earnings (Williams, 1988). APNAS
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may shorten the distance between the auditor and directors of linked companies when 
auditors perform work for an audit client that eventually feeds into or becomes part of 
the financial statements of the company, which may be a threat for auditor 
independence (Levitt, 2000). These situations might be more likely to arise where there 
are working relationships between directors and a common audit firm/partner in more 
than one company due to their personal relationships, the large investment in linked 
companies, economic dependency and mutual interests and the possibility of losing 
more if the auditor is replaced by the family of linked companies.
In contrast, auditor independence can be improved by strengthening the role of 
audit committees regarding the joint provision of audit and APNAS (Ramsay Report, 
2001). The Ramsay Report (2001) recommends that audit committees should have the 
responsibility of stating in the annual report whether the level of APNAS is compatible 
with maintaining auditor independence and that they should include reasons why and 
areas where auditor independence becomes questionable. Audit committees should also 
review the economic importance of the company (in terms of audit and APNAS fees) to 
the auditor, and assess whether the economic importance of the company to the auditor 
may impair or appear to impair the auditor’s judgment or independence (Ramsay 
Report, 2001). Thus, audit committee members working in more than one company 
where those companies are audited by a common auditor may limit or at least control 
the purchase of APNAS compared to where members have fewer audit committee 
positions to improve auditor independence. The following sections provide the results 
for hypotheses HI a -  HI f. Non-directional hypotheses are created for the associations 
between APNAS fees and interlockings.
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7.1.1.1 Hypotheses (HIa -  HIß
Director interlocking (DLKS) is significantly and positively associated with 
APNAS fees (supporting HI a). A positive significant association between DLKS and 
APNAS fees supports the proposition that the interlocking directors purchase more 
APNAS, which provides them with more power to pressure the auditors to act in the 
linked companies’ favour. Director-audit firm interlocking (DAFLKS) is not significant 
(rejecting Hlb). This does not provide evidence of impaired auditor independence when 
there are more directors and an audit firm links in other companies.
Audit committee member-audit firm interlocking (ACAFLKS) is significantly 
and negatively associated with APNAS fees (supporting Hie). A significant and 
negative association supports the proposition that audit committee members limit or at 
least control the purchase of non-audit services from incumbent audit firms in 
interlocking situations to improve perceptions of auditor independence.
Director-audit partner interlocking (DAPLKS) and audit committee member- 
audit partner interlocking (ACAPLKS) are significantly and negatively associated with 
APNAS fees (supporting Hlc and Hlf). A significant and negative association may 
indicate the benefits of knowledge-spillovers or discounted prices for APNAS due to 
the joint provision of audit and APNAS, which may not impair auditor independence. 
ACLKS is not significant (rejecting Hid).
The results of sensitivity tests of APNAS fee model are mixed. The results of 
sensitivity analyses are consistent with original model (Equation 1) when clustering 
observations and when excluding observations which did not audit committees. 
However, the results are not consistent with original model (Equation 1) when
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excluding financial industries from the analysis. The results of examining FEERATIO 
are not consistent with the APNAS fee analysis.
These findings reveal that interlocking links of directors in other companies 
affect APNAS fees, which may impair auditor independence. The relationship generated 
between directors and a common audit firm may not be associated with impaired auditor 
independence. However, director-audit partner, audit committee member-audit firm and 
an audit partner links are negatively associated with APNAS fees, which may not 
impair auditor independence.
7.1.2 AUDIT FIRM TENURE
It has been argued than an audit firm rotation policy should be implemented as 
long-term relationships between auditors and their clients may negatively affect auditor 
independence (Walker et a/., 2001). Prior research also argues that there are perceptions 
that the auditor may become more accommodating to the client as auditor tenure 
increases (Shockley, 1981). This perception of impairment of auditor independence 
with longer auditor tenure would be due to expectations of complacency, a lack of 
innovation, less rigorous audit procedures, and an overconfidence of the auditor in the 
client (Shockley, 1981). The current study examines whether interlockings are 
associated with audit firm tenure. If audit firm tenure is positively and significantly 
associated with interlockings, it may signal impaired auditor independence because a 
long association may create a familiarity threat and the auditor may become too 
sympathetic to the client’s interests (APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, 2006). A familiarity threat occurs by virtue of a close relationship with an 
audit client, its directors, officers or employees, a firm or a member of the assurance 
team (APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, 2006). A significant and
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negative association may indicate that interlocking companies change auditors more 
frequently to improve auditor independence.
The following sections provide the findings of the audit firm tenure hypotheses 
H2a -  H2f.Non-directional hypotheses are created for the associations between 
APTENURE and interlockings.
7.1.2.1 Hypotheses (H2a -  H2f}
It is argued in this study that audit firm tenure might be longer if there are 
interlocking relationships between directors and/or audit committee members and a 
common audit finn/partner. If audit firm tenure is affected by interlocking associations, 
such interlockings can reduce auditor independence because a long association between 
management and the auditor is one of the main factors affecting perceptions of auditor 
independence (Hoyle, 1978). The results show that DAFLKS is positive and 
significantly associated with AFTENURE (supporting H2b). This finding supports the 
argument that auditors and directors may develop personal relationships over time based 
on trust and familiarity, which may be important for the maintenance of long-term 
auditor-client relationships and decrease the pressure for auditor changes (Courtney and 
Jubb, 2005). Thus, the finding provides evidence of impaired auditor independence 
when there are more links between director and audit firm.
In contrast, ACLKS is weakly significant and negatively associated with 
AFTENURE (supporting H2d). This result indicates that an audit committee may 
recommend changing the audit firm more frequently to improve perceptions of auditor 
independence. The test variables, DLKS, DAPLKS, ACAFLKS and ACAPLKS are not
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significant (rejecting H2a, H2c, H2e and H2f). This result indicates that the number of 
these interlocking links is not associated with audit firm tenure.
The results of AFTENURE model are consistent when clustering observations, 
excluding AA observations from the sample. The results are also consistent when only 
including observation which had audit committees during the period of study.
Therefore, the findings indicate that a personal association between directors and 
an audit firm may lengthen audit firm tenure, which may impair auditor independence. 
In contrast, a personal association between audit committee members and an auditor 
may shorten the audit firm tenure, which might be interpreted as meaning that the audit 
committee recommends changing the audit firm more frequently to improve perceptions 
of auditor independence.
7.1.3 AUDIT OPINION
The relationships developed between directors and/or audit committee members 
and an audit firm/partner in linked companies may affect the auditor’s decision about 
whether to qualify the audit reports of linked companies due to their frequent 
interactions and close relationships. The following sections provide the findings in 
relation to hypotheses H3a -  H3f. Negative associations between OPINION and 
interlockings are predicted.
7.1.3.1 Hypotheses (H3a -  H3J)
The results show that DLKS, DAFLKS and DAPLKS are significantly and 
negatively associated with the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion by the 
auditor (supporting H3a, H3b and H3c). These results can be interpreted as evidence of
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reduced audit quality because when there are more links between directors and between 
directors and audit firm/partner, the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion 
decreases.
The associations between OPINION and ACLKS and ACAFLKS are not 
significant (rejecting H3d and H3e). The finding indicates that the associations between 
audit committee member and between audit committee member and audit firm in other 
companies are not associated with the likelihood of issuing a qualified opinion, and 
therefore, audit quality. However, ACAPLKS is significantly and negatively associated 
with the likelihood of receiving a qualified audit opinion (supporting H3f). This result 
indicates that when there are more links between audit committee member and an audit 
partner in other companies decrease the likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion and 
therefore, audit quality.
The results of sensitivity test of the OPINION model are consistent with the 
original model (Equation 3) when clustering observations, redefining audit opinion, 
including ABSDACC as an additional control variable, including interaction between 
ABSDACC and interlockings, and excluding financial industries. The results are not 
consistent with original model (Equation 3) when adding interaction between APNAS 
and interlockings and AFTENURE and interlockings, and excluding from the sample 
observations which did not have audit committees.
7.1.4 EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Interlocking relationships between directors and/or audit committee members 
and an audit firm/partner may influence earnings management of linked companies, 
which may affect audit quality. The process of earnings management may be influenced
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by the combined activities of directors, management and auditors because the 
preparation of financial statements is based largely on conventions, estimates and 
opinions resulting from the combined judgement of directors, auditors and advisors 
(Ball et al., 1979).63 Levitt (1998) argues that management and the board of directors, 
who have the authority to specify the contents of the annual reports, may manage 
earnings to satisfy consensus earnings estimates. Thus, the relationships between 
directors and/or audit committee members and an audit firm/partner in other companies 
may affect earnings management of the linked companies due to their close associations 
and large stakes in linked companies. The following sections provide the results for 
hypotheses H4a -  H4f. Non-directional hypotheses for the associations between 
ABSDACC and interlockings were used.
7.1.4.1 Hypotheses (H 4a- H4f)
The interlocking variables DLKS, DAFLKS, and DAPLKS are significantly and 
positively associated with the absolute value of discretionary accruals (supporting H4a, 
H4b and H4c). These findings indicate that the number of links between directors and 
between directors and audit finn/partners in other companies is associated with higher 
discretionary accruals for those companies, which provides evidence consistent with 
reduced audit quality.
ACLKS and ACAFLKS are not significantly associated with the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals (rejecting H4d and H4e). Thus, when there are more links 
between audit committee members and between audit committee member and audit firm 
in other companies does not affect the discretionary' accruals of those companies and, 
therefore, audit quality.
63 A revised version of the “Statement on the General Principles of Professional Auditing Practice” issued 
in 1954 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, cited by Ball et al. (1979).
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ACAPLKS is significantly and positively associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals (supporting H4f) indicating that the number of links between 
audit committee members and an audit partner may affect reported earnings. Thus, the 
number of personal relations between an audit partner and audit committee members in 
other companies may influence both parties’ behaviour with regard to earnings 
management issues, which may decrease audit quality.
The results are mixed in sensitivity tests of the DACC model. The results are 
consistent for smaller companies (below median size) with the original model (Equation 
6). The results for both larger and more profitable companies are similar but not 
consistent with original model (Equation 6). The results of the rest of sensitivity 
analyses are not consistent with the original model (Equation 6).
7.2 IMPLICATIONS FROM THIS STUDY
The findings from this study have a number of implications for policy-makers 
and the existing literature. The findings may inform the policymakers and corporate 
boards and prompt them to consider the importance of promoting appropriate guidelines 
on the composition of boards of directors and audit committees for listed companies. 
The relationship created among directors and/or audit committee members and an audit 
finn/partner in other companies raises important public policy questions regarding 
auditor independence and audit quality that have not been addressed previously with the 
benefit of research evidence. The findings from this study provide evidence of these 
issues to policy-makers.
The impact of associations between audit committee members and an audit 
fmn/partner in other companies and their association with auditor independence and
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audit quality is explored in this study. The findings indicate that audit committee 
members sitting on more than one company’s audit committee and having a common 
audit firm/partner may influence the audit committee members’ behaviour in linked 
companies. Specifically, the relationship between audit committee members and audit 
partners in linked companies may degrade auditor independence and audit quality as 
indicated by the significant associations between ACAPLKS and APNAS fees, 
OPINION and DACC.
The findings related to APNAS fees and interlockings may be useful to 
regulators, professional accounting bodies, auditors and audit partners in the debate over 
the joint provision of audit and APNAS and auditor independence where directors, audit 
committee members and an audit firm/partner come together through linked companies. 
The findings for the audit firm tenure hypotheses can contribute to the potential policy 
implications for the debate surrounding mandatory audit firm rotation and the role of the 
independent auditor when audit firms/partners are associated repeatedly with directors 
and/or audit committee members.
The findings relating to audit quality might be useful to auditors, regulators and 
other users of audited financial statement information in regard to director and/or audit 
committee members and an audit firm/partner relations in the organisational 
environment. A significant association between interlockings and the likelihood of 
issuing a qualified opinion provides evidence of reduced audit quality, which supports 
the proposition that auditors of linked companies are less likely to qualify an audit 
report, perhaps due to the possibility of revenue losses and damage to personal relations 
in a family of linked companies. The findings relating to earnings management also 
provide evidence of compromised audit quality in interlocking situations because the
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number of interlocking links is significantly associated with the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals. The findings from the audit opinion and earnings management 
produce consistent evidence to support the view that certain types of interlockings are 
linked with biased financial reporting. These findings may support any future regulatory 
initiatives to prevent firms from appointing directors of companies with the same 
auditor or for limiting the number of directorships that can be acquired.
The findings of the current study offer additional information on global concern 
over the incidence of interlocking directorates (Pass, 2004; Kiel and Nicholson, 2006). 
The Australian Shareholders Association is concerned that any director who serves on 
more than five boards is not acting in the best interest of company shareholders (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2006). In the light of these concerns, in determining the independence of 
directors and whether a director has a material relationship with the company or another 
party that might impair their independence, ASX Corporate Governance Council 
Recommendations 2.2 and 2.3. (2003) recommends that boards consider all relevant 
facts and circumstances, including any interlocking board or other company committee 
relationships. The findings of the current study provide evidence of compromised audit 
quality in director and/or audit committee member-audit firm/partner interlocking.
The findings also enrich the existing literature where there is a lack of research 
evidence on the impact of relationships between directors and/or audit committee 
members and audit firms/partners on auditor independence and audit quality. The 
findings from this study offer at least two important contributions to the extant 
literature. First, this is the first study provide evidence on how an interlock associated 
with having the same audit partner can lead to biased financial reporting. Second, while 
studies examining audit committee effectiveness have primarily focused on the effect of
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characteristics such as independence, expertise, and diligence, the current study appears 
to be the first to provide evidence how the effectiveness of audit committees can be 
compromised by the presence of interlocking associations between audit committee 
member and audit partners. This is supported by the significant associations between 
audit opinion and earnings management based results for audit committee member and 
audit partner interlocks. Thus, the findings of the current study would be useful for 
regulators evaluating whether to limit the number of directorships and/or audit 
committee memberships where there are common audit firms and audit partners for 
those companies. The regulators may also consider imposing a “cooling-off’ period for 
directors to be a member of other boards or audit committees in other companies with 
the same audit firm/partner to improve auditor independence.
7.3 LIMITATIONS
This study has a number of limitations. First, the findings from this study are 
limited to the period studied and, moreover, may not be generalisable to other countries 
or environments that do not have similar characteristics. The other limitations of this 
study are discussed below.
Executive and non-executive directors are not separated in calculating 
interlockings. It is difficult to identify the actual independent directors because most of 
the small and medium size companies during the period of study do not provide detailed 
information about director independence. That is why the choice was made not to use an 
executive/non-executive classification of directors.
Directors’/audit committee members’ expertise or educational background is not 
explored in this study. This is done because during the period of study many small
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companies do not specifically disclose the directors’ qualifications. Expert and 
professionally qualified audit committee members may be more effective in performing 
their monitoring roles and may have a higher probability of being appointed to more 
than one company’s audit committee. Experienced director and/or audit committee 
member interlocking may have more affect on companies’ decision-making and also 
may be more in demand.
Other types of interlockings identified in the literature (e.g., Fich and White, 
2005) such as, CEO interlocking, indirect interlocking and reciprocal interlocking, 
which may have different effects on auditor independence and audit quality, are not 
included in this study.
Distinction between director interlocking, audit committee member interlocking 
and director and/or audit committee member and audit firm/partner links that arise in 
connection with motivations other than the strategy argued throughout this study are not 
explored. For example, multiple board holdings may be the result of personal empire 
building and director-auditor links may arise purely by chance and the association 
might be non-strategic rather than a deliberate strategy (Jubb, 2000).
The number of interlocking links calculated in this study is based on the sample 
companies. Any additional position holds by directors, audit committee members and 
audit firm/partner outside the sample companies were not included due to the lack of 
information available in companies’ annual reports.
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The commencement date of audit finn/partner audit engagement and the joining 
date of directors in linked companies, which may have an association with auditor 
selection, is not explored in this study.
There are shortcomings involved in using the proxies for measuring auditor 
independence and audit quality. However, as auditor independence and audit quality are 
hard, if not impossible, to observe, previous research uses earnings management 
surrogates (Menon and Williams, 2004; Myers et al, 2003), accounting conservatism 
(Hamilton et al, 2005) or audit opinion (DeFond et al., 2002; Geiger and Raghunandan, 
2002) as proxies for audit quality. Thus, the findings from this study should be 
interpreted in light of the limitations of the proxies used.
The auditor independence and audit quality models used in this study include 
control variables that are considered appropriate. Some of the variables are likely to be 
subject to measurement errors. There may be other influential variables that have been 
omitted from the models, which could affect the findings from this study.
7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This is the first study to investigate audit committee members and audit 
finns/partners interlocking and their influence on auditor independence and audit 
quality. This study opens up this area of research on interlockings and their effects on 
audit and APNAS fees as well as audit firm tenure and audit quality. Future research 
may involve investigating the following issues.
First, future researchers can consider the separate impact of interlocked 
executive and non-executive directors on auditor independence and audit quality. Also,
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identifying the impact of different types of interlockings such as direct/indirect 
interlocking, reciprocal interlocking and CEO interlocking on auditor independence and 
audit quality.
Second, future studies can identify the engagement date of audit firm/partner and 
the joining date of directors in linked companies to investigate whether the directors 
have direct influence on auditor selection.
Third, future studies can classify the types of APNAS fees (which have been 
available from 2005 onwards) to see the impact of interlockings on each type of 
APNAS fee. For instance, investigating if directors and/or audit committee members 
have more or less influence on specific types of APNAS.
Fourth, future researchers can consider the effects of interlockings between 
directors of companies in the same industry and their effect on auditor independence 
and audit quality. The issue would provide evidence on whether industry specialists 
have more interlocking with industry expert directors or with other types of companies.
Fast but not the least, future studies also can use the data about relationships 
between directors and/or audit committee members that have lasted for an extended 
period to identify whether directors and/or audit committee members’ interlocking 
companies have been audited by the same audit firm/partner over that time period.
7.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study provides evidence that the relationships generated between directors 
and/or audit committee members and a common audit firm/partner with other
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companies may impair auditor independence as well as degrade audit quality. The 
results from the auditor independence based analyses are not consistent with the 
conclusion that all types of links used in the current study may impair auditor 
independence. However, the results from the audit quality based tests provide consistent 
evidence to suggest that director interlocking, director-audit firm/partner interlocking 
and audit committee member-audit partner interlocking impair audit quality. The results 
can be interpreted that interlocking directors and/or audit committee members are 
associated with lower audit quality not because they impair auditor independence, but 
because they are too busy to effectively monitor the management of their firms as a 
result of their multiple directorship and/or audit committee memberships. Thus, the 
findings will be of interest to regulators to support the view that certain types of 
interlockings are linked with biased financial reporting. The results support the future 
regulatory initiatives to impose a “cooling-off’ period before a director can serve as a 
director and/or audit committee member of another company with the same auditor.
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APPENDICES
Appendix - 1
Summary of variable definitions
Test variables
D L K S D ire c to r  in te r lo c k s
D A F L K S D ire c to r -a u d it  F inn in te rlo c k s
D A P L K S D ire c to r -a u d it  p a r tn e r  in te rlo c k s
A C L K S A u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r  in te r lo c k s
A C A F L K S A u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r -a u d it  F inn in te r lo c k s
A C A P L K S A u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r -a u d it  p a r tn e r  in te r lo c k s
Other interlocidng variables
T D L K S T o ta l d ire c to r  in te rlo c k s
T D A F L K S T o ta l d ir e c to r - a u d it  Finn in te rlo c k s
T D A P L K S T o ta l n u m b e r  o f  d ire c to r -a u d it  p a r tn e r  in te rlo c k s
T A C L K S T o ta l a u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r  in te r lo c k s
T A C A F L K S T o ta l a u d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e r -a u d it  Firm in te r lo c k s
T A C A P L K S T o ta l n u m b e r  o f  a u d it  c o m m itte e  m e m b e r -a u d it  p a r tn e r  in te r lo c k s
Dependent Variables
L n A P N A S N a tu ra l lo g  o f  a u d ito r  p ro v id e d  n o n - a u d i t  se rv ic e s  fees
A F T E N U R E N u m b e r  o f  y e a rs  the  au d it F inn h as b e e n  e n g a g e d  b y  th e  c u rre n t c lie n t
O P IN IO N 1 i f  th e  a u d ito r  issu e s  o th e r  th a n  an  u n qualiF ied  o p in io n  in  th e  c u rre n t 
y e a r , 0 o th e rw ise
D A C C D isc re tio n a ry  a c c ru a ls
A B S D A C C A b so lu te  v a lu e  o f  d isc re tio n a ry  a c c ru a ls
T A C C T o ta l a c c ru a ls  is th e  d iffe re n c e  b e tw e e n  o p e ra tin g  in c o m e  (0 1 ) an d  
c a sh  flo w  fro m  o p e ra tio n s
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+ D A C C In c o m e -in c re a s in g  d isc re tio n a ry  a c c ru a ls
-D A C C In c o m e -d e c re a s in g  d isc re tio n a ry  a c c ru a ls
I n d e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le s
L n T A N a tu ra l lo g  o f  to ta l a sse ts
B IG  4 1 i f  a c o m p a n y ’s in c u m b e n t a u d ito r  is a B IG  4 a u d it firm , 0 o th e rw ise ;
E Q U IT Y 1 i f  th e  c o m p a n y  issu e s  n ew  sh a re s  d u r in g  th e  c u rre n t  y ea r, 0 o th e rw ise
M E R A C Q S 1 i f  th e  c o m p a n y  is e n g a g e d  in a m e rg e r /a c q u is i t io n  a c tiv ity  in  th e  
c u rre n t y e a r , 0 o th e rw ise
R O A O p e ra tin g  in c o m e  d iv id e d  by  a v e ra g e  to ta l a s se ts
L E V E R A G E R a tio  o f  to ta l lia b ilitie s  to  to ta l a sse ts
N E G  R O A 1 i f  th e  firm  rep o rts  a n e g a tiv e  re tu rn  on  a sse ts  in  th e  c u rre n t y ea r, 0 
o th e rw ise
M B M a r k e t- to - b o o k  ra tio  at f i s c a l - y e a r - e n d ,  d e f in e d  a s  m a rk e t v a lu e  o f  
e q u ity  d iv id e d  by  sh a re h o ld e r  e q u ity
IN IT IA L 1 i f  th e  a u d it f in n  e n g a g e m e n t is in e i th e r  th e  f irs t o r  se c o n d  y e a r  w ith  
th e  c u rre n t a u d itee , 0 o th e rw ise
U X A F U n e x p e c te d  a u d it fees  e s tim a te d  fro m  th e  re s id u a ls  o f  th e  a u d it  fee 
m o d e l
U X A P N A S U n e x p e c te d  A P N A S  fees e s tim a te d  fro m  th e  re s id u a ls  o f  th e  A P N A S  
fee  m o d e l
P Q U A L 1 i f  th e  co m p a n y  has o th e r  th a n  an  u n q u a lif ie d  o p in io n  in  th e  p re v io u s  
y e a r , 0 o th e rw ise
L n A G E N a tu ra l log  o f  ag e  o f  the  c o m p a n y  m e a su re d  as th e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a rs  the  
c o m p a n y  has b een  lis ted  on  the  A S X
G T A G ro w th  -  m e a su re d  as  p e rc e n ta g e  c h a n g e  in to ta l a s se ts  fro m  the  
p re v io u s  p e rio d
222
L O S S 1 i f  the  c o m p a n y  re p o rte d  a lo ss  e ith e r  in  th e  c u rre n t y e a r  o r  p re v io u s  
y ea r, 0 o th e rw ise
A A 1 i f  th e  a u d it firm  w a s  A rth u r  A n d e rse n  d u r in g  2 0 0 1 , 0 o th e rw ise
S Q R S U B S sq u a re  ro o t o f  n u m b e r  o f  su b s id ia r ie s
IN D E P A C 1 i f  th e  a u d it c o m m itte e  c o m p ris e s  a m a jo r ity  (f if ty  p e r  c e n t o r  m o re )  
o f  n o n -e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to rs , 0 o th e rw ise
0 1 O p e ra tin g  in co m e
C F O C a sh  flo w  fro m  o p e ra tio n s
A R E V c h a n g e  in  re v e n u e  fro m  p e r io d  t-1 to  p e r io d  t
A R E C C h a n g e  in n e t a c c o u n ts  re c e iv a b le s  fro m  p e r io d  t-1 to  p e rio d  t
P P E G ro ss  v a lu e  o f  p ro p e r ty , p la n t a n d  e q u ip m e n t
L T A C C V a lu e  o f  to ta l a c c ru a ls  in  y e a r  t-1 ; th a t is th e  d if fe re n c e  b e tw e e n  the  
o p e ra tin g  in c o m e  (0 1 )  a n d  c a sh  f lo w  fro m  o p e ra tio n  (C F O ) in p re v io u s  
y e a r  sc a le d  by  a v e ra g e  o f  to ta l a s se ts  o f  t-1 a n d  t-2
S G R O W T H N e x t y e a r  sa le s  m in u s  c u rre n t y e a r  sa le s  d iv id e d  by  c u rre n t y e a r  sa le s
C A S H F L O W C a sh  flo w  from  o p e ra tio n s  sc a le d  b y  c u rre n t y e a r ’s to ta l a sse ts
L n M V E N a tu ra l lo g  o f  m a rk e t v a lu e  o f  e q u ity . A  c o m p a n y ’s m a rk e t v a lu e  o f  
e q u ity  is c a lc u la te d  as its p ric e  p e r  sh a re  a t f isc a l y e a r  e n d  tim e s  th e  
n u m b e r  o f  sh a re s  o u ts ta n d in g
B O A R D IN D P p e rc e n ta g e  o f  n o n -e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to rs  on  b o a rd
B D IN D P 1 i f  th e  m a jo rity  (f if ty  p e r  cen t o r m o re )  b o a rd  m e m b e rs  a re  n o n ­
e x e c u tiv e , 0 o th e rw ise
A C S IZ E N u m b e r  o f  au d it c o m m itte e  m e m b e rs
Y E A R 03-05 D u m m y  v a r ia b le s  fo r y e a r  o f  d a ta
I I N D U S T R Y 1 i f  in  th e  n o m in a te d  in d u s try  g ro u p , 0 o th e rw ise ; 25 d u m m ie s  fo r  26  
A S X  in d u s try  g ro u p s .
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